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Preface
This dissertation contains four separate studies in the fields of corruption and coop-
eration. The first chapter explicates the mechanism that links the fractionalization of
society with its level of corruption within a theoretical model of relational contracting.
The other three chapters describe experimental studies. The second and third chapters
evaluate two popular anti-corruption policies, the ‘Four-Eyes-Principle’ and ‘Whistle-
Blowing’, with respect to their effectiveness in decreasing the level of corruption and
increasing social welfare. The last chapter considers the effect of endowment uncertainty
on cooperative behaviour in a linear public goods game and explains it by specific condi-
tional cooperation preferences.
Cooperation between decision-making agents is recognized as one of the single most
important mechanisms in economic research and represents one of the cornerstones of
economic development. Countless economic activities have been analysed with game
theoretic models of cooperation. Experimental methods may not only demonstrate the
deficiencies of standard economic theory in terms of explanation and predictive power,
they may also help to improve existing models.
The public goods game (Isaac and Walker 1988) represents one of the most popu-
lar vehicles to experimentally analyse cooperative behaviour. It models the dilemma of
the opposition between selfish preferences and social efficiency. Numerous experiments
have shown that participants behave in a highly cooperative way in situations for which
the standard economic theory of rational payoff maximization predicts strictly selfish be-
haviour. In my view, the most convincing approach to explaining the phenomenon of
cooperation is the existence of conditional cooperative behaviour. This links the public
goods game to games that are specifically designed to analyze trust and reciprocity, e.g.
the gift exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993), the investment game (Berg et al. 1995) and
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the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982). Applications of these games even extend to
criminal activities such as corruption. Administrative corruption, defined as ‘the misuse
of public power for public gain’ (Klitgaard 1988) is recognized as the ‘single most im-
portant obstacle to economic development’ (The World Bank 2008). The key to effective
anti-corruption policy with respect to institutional design is the understanding of the
determinants, mechanisms and weaknesses of corruption. This demands the analysis of
two different levels of cooperation common to most corrupt transactions.
Since any corrupt relationship is by definition illegal, the corrupt partners cannot
rely on legal third parties, i.e. the courts, to enforce their contracts. The transaction
between a client and a corrupt official depends on trust and reciprocity which may be
fostered for example by repeated interaction. This kind of cooperation is similar to the
mechanism modelled in the gift exchange game. In contrast to the original gift exchange
game, where cooperation is efficient with respect to social welfare (measured e.g. in the
sum of payoffs to all affected individuals), corrupt reciprocity is socially undesirable due
to the reasonable assumption of its strong negative externality to the public (Shleifer
and Vishny 1993, Rose-Ackermann 1999). In the case of instable corruption, it would be
socially optimal for all agents to stay away from reciprocity and cooperation, and adhere
to their selfish rationality. The situation involving all members of a society with respect
to their choices for or against corrupt reciprocity can hence be seen as a reverse public
goods dilemma in a broader sense.
The first chapter focuses on the role of the fractionalization of a society in determining
the level of corruption. In a series of empirical cross-country studies social fractionaliza-
tion, often (crudely) measured by the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF,
see Appendix 1A) has been identified as an important determinant of the level of cor-
ruption measured by the Corruption Perception Index or similar indices (Alesina and
Ferrara 2002, Mauro 1995, Bardhan 1997). In a cross regional analysis, providing a more
controlled environment, Dincer (2008) finds an inversely U-shaped relationship between
the two variables. However, none of these studies provides a model based theoretical
explanation for the empirical evidence.
As a basis of our analysis we use an infinitely repeated version of a standard, multi-
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stage game of administrative corruption which captures the enforcement problem of the
illegal transaction. In order to describe the main mechanism underlying the relationship
between the social structure and corruption we define the structure of society in terms
of its fractionalization as a vector of separated sub-networks whose members share infor-
mation. Assuming that clients use simple punishment strategies as devices to maintain
corrupt cooperation within relational contracting, we find that the maximum level of
corruption is to be expected in societies that consist of a large but not maximal number
of small (but not minimal) groups. This is due to the inversely U-shaped relationship
between the relative size of a sub-network (measured in the number of group members
relative to the size of society) and its members’ ability to stabilize corrupt transactions.
The (relative) size of a sub-group has two countervailing effects on the corruption level.
On the one hand, the (average) probability of a successful corrupt transaction (expected
frequency) increases in the number of group members. This is because the incentives
for opportunism decrease due to growing stakes for the official. On the other hand,
an increase in the relative sub-group size increases the (personal) costs for the clients
through the internalization of a larger part of the negative externality. Thus, necessary
compensation of a growing number of peers decreases the profitability of corruption.
This chapter provides a model-based explanation of the inversely U-shaped relation-
ship between social fractionalization and corruption found in Dincer (2008). The results
of our model are also in line with empirical observations of cross-country comparisons
(Gunasekara 2008, La Porta et al. 1999 and Alesina et al. 2003). Our model can be
extended to account for considerations of the influence of different types of social capital
on corrupt behaviour.
Using the standard model of self-interested payoff maximization to analyse the
mechanisms that underlie the determinants of corruption may only be reasonable in sit-
uations in which limit values and benchmark examinations are considered, and therefore
simplifying assumptions such as infinite repetitions are justified. In finitely repeated
interaction (or one shot games) of corruption, neither the standard self-interested model
nor models of strong reciprocity relying on social preferences such as altruism (Andreoni
and Miller 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or intentions (Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger 2004) can provide a consistent explanation or predictions for corrupt
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behaviour based on cooperation. This and the scarcity of reliable field data complicate
any analysis of corruption that aims at deriving policy implications. In order to evaluate
the usefulness of proposed anti-corruption measures, or those that are in force, controlled
experiments are indispensible to complement empirical studies. The findings of several
studies, e.g. Armantier and Boly (2008), demonstrate the external validity of laboratory
corruption experiments (Dusek et al. 2004).
Following Abbink et al. (2002) with respect to experimental methodology, the second
chapter describes an experimental approach to assess one of the most potent counter-
corruption policy tools, the ‘Four-Eyes-Principle’ (business has to be conducted by
at least two individuals, hence four eyes). Although proposed in various reports and
lists of recommendations for anti-corruption measures by national and international
organizations, it lacks any theoretical or empirical justification (Pörting and Vahlenkamp
1998, Rieger 2005, Wiehen 2005). In our laboratory experiment we replace a single
decision-maker with a small group of two officials who decide jointly in the role of the
official in order to model the introduction of the ‘Four-Eyes-Principle’. We show that the
introduction of the ‘Four-Eyes-Principle’ can lead to an increase rather than a decrease of
the level of corruption. This result comes as a surprise when considering predictions from
the standard self-interested model alone and ignoring effects stemming from the dynamics
of group decision-making. Controlling for effects that are purely driven by differences
in marginal incentives (i.e. effects stemming from the splitting of the benefits and costs
of corruption between two officials) we find that group decision-making is dominated by
the motive of individual (long term) profit maximizing, which has been identified as a
main explanation for group decision-making (Kocher and Sutter 2007). Combining data
of final choices (outcomes) with evidence from inside the decision-making process (i.e.
the dynamics of individual choices), we show that groups follow strategies that foster
reciprocity in a more sustainable way than their individual counterparts, which leads to a
higher number of successful corrupt transactions. To explain the behavioural characteris-
tics in more detail, we analyse the content of electronic chat messages exchanged during
the joint decision-making process. In an average situation of disagreement between two
officials, it is the official with the more corrupt agenda who dominates the decisions
despite the honest official’s veto power. Since corrupt reciprocity maximizes individual
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payoffs for the immediate transaction partners, arguments in favour of a strategy that
fosters corrupt reciprocity are most persuasive. We interpret this result as support
for the Persuasive Argument Theory attributing groups a higher ability to adhere to
behaviour that generates maximum individual payoffs (Pruitt 1971). Our results show
that the profit maximizing motive may dominate in the group decision-making process
even though there is an obvious trade-off with social efficiency. Since they ignore the
negative external effects of corruption, groups produce the least desirable outcomes in
terms of welfare by their reciprocal behaviour. Against existing policy recommendations,
the results of our experiment cast doubt on the usefulness of the introduction of the
‘Four-Eyes-Principle’. This chapter does not only evaluate an anti-corruption measure, it
also provides insights into the motivations, within groups and individuals, that underlie
strategic decisions in social dilemmas in general and in the dilemma of corruption in
particular.
The third chapter experimentally assesses the effectiveness of another tool of anti-
corruption policy. The institutional enabling of whistle-blowing is seen as a powerful
measure to contain corrupt activity (Drew 2003). Whistle-blowing is generally defined as
‘the act of disclosing information in the public interest’. Despite its widespread use and
perceived success, experimental evidence seems to cast doubt on its usefulness (Abbink
2006, Lambsdorff and Frank 2010, forthcoming). This may be because the analysis of
whistle-blowing within the standard set-up of a corrupt transaction accounts for only
one aspect of its total effect on social welfare. The standard game of corruption, often
used to analyse the effect of a determinant on the frequency of corruption, only considers
the direct but not the indirect consequences of corruption on social efficiency. While
the direct consequences may be captured by the expected negative externality to the
public resulting from a successful corrupt transaction, the indirect consequences include
efficiency losses caused by honest clients leaving productive markets because of their fear
of being exploited by corrupt officials.
Where in the standard game of corruption the official has a passive role with respect to
the initiation of a corrupt transaction, we expand the standard model by allowing both
sides of the transaction to activate corruption. The symmetry of corrupt engagement
enables us to assess the potential effects of the introduction of the opportunity to blow the
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whistle on the two main negative consequences of corruption. First, whistle-blowing may
reduce the negative effect of corruption hindering ‘honest’ clients to engage in productive
activity by providing a tool against demanding corrupt officials. Second, whistle-blowing
may affect the stability of the corrupt transaction and influence the number of successful
deals and hence the amount of realized negative externalities.
We find that the total effect of symmetrically punished whistle-blowing (i.e. the
punishment is independent of who has blown the whistle) is ambiguous. Confirming the
findings of Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) and Abbink (2006), whistle-blowing increases
the stability of a corrupt transaction. However we find that it also reduces the effect
of corruption deterring productive activity, offering a safeguard for an ‘honest’ client
against the extortion by a corrupt official. We demonstrate that asymmetric leniency for
the official can offset the negative effect of whistle-blowing. Our results can be explained
using simple arguments as to subjects’ belief structures and payoff maximization. More-
over, we find that leniency is especially effective for male officials. The consideration of
asymmetric punishment of illegal activities in general and leniency for whistle-blowing in
particular should be considered in legislature. Our extended model of corruption provides
the basis for experimental research targeting both direct and indirect effects of corruption.
While the focus of the first three chapters is on the negative consequences of coop-
erative behaviour in corruption, the fourth chapter, which is joint work with Johannes
Maier, considers socially desirable cooperation. In an experimental public goods game
using the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Isaac and Walker 1988) we study the effect
of uncertainty as to others’ endowments on contribution behaviour. In most applications
of public goods provision it is more realistic to assume heterogeneity instead of homo-
geneity of initial endowments between cooperation partners. The own endowment can be
private information, which means that endowment levels of fellow group members can be
unknown. In situations of charitable giving, for example, endowments (individual wealth
levels) are likely to be heterogeneous and information about them remains private, while
information about actual contributions (donations) are often made publicly available. To
quantify and explain the effect of endowment uncertainty on cooperative behaviour we
use an adapted version of the experimental two-stage approach used by Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010).
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In the first stage of our experiment, subjects had to state their contribution preferences
conditional on their group partners’ contributions and endowments. Here we used an
incentivized strategy method (Selten 1967). In the second stage, we quantify the effect
of uncertainty in a repeated linear public goods game (ten periods) played in partner
design with groups of three participants. While subjects knew their own endowment
and the endowments of their two group partners in the certainty treatment, they only
knew their own endowment, low or high, in the uncertainty treatment. However, they
knew that the others were either high or low endowed. When we pool all observations
of each treatment, we only find a small negative but insignificant effect of uncertainty
on average contribution levels. When we separate observations according to participants’
endowments, we find that subjects with high initial endowments contribute slightly more,
while participants with low endowments contribute substantially less under uncertainty.
These two opposing effects of uncertainty lead to lower contribution levels in poor and
higher contribution levels in rich groups. The inequality in income levels between low
and high endowed subjects therefore increases through uncertainty.
We explain our treatment effects by two mechanisms, the effect of deviating beliefs
and the net effect of (strategic) over-contribution. We attribute both effects to condi-
tional contribution preferences. One of our main results is that subjects are relative
conditional contributors. In the context of heterogeneous endowments this means that
they contribute more, the lower their group partners’ endowments holding their absolute
contributions constant. This and the findings of systematically deviating beliefs explain
the former of the two mechanisms. Under uncertainty, low endowed subjects believe
that they are in a richer group than they actually are and therefore contribute less in
the repeated public goods game than they would have done, had they known the correct
endowments of their group partners. High endowed subjects, on the contrary, believe that
their group members are poorer on average and hence contribute more. The preference
for relative conditional cooperation also explains the treatment differences in (strategic)
over-contribution that remains when we substract the effect of deviating beliefs. The
intuition for (strategic) over-contribution is that subjects contribute higher levels in
repeated games than their stated preferences should allow in order to trigger positive
reciprocity and thereby sustain cooperation (see e.g. Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). In
contrast to groups in the certainty treatment and groups consisting of high endowed
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individuals in the uncertainty treatment, we do not find (strategic) over-contribution in
groups of low endowed individuals under uncertainty. We attribute this to their fear of
sending the wrong signals (i.e. being high endowed) by making large contributions. This
fear may be due to participants’ anticipation of others’ relative conditional cooperation
preferences. Overall, the combination of the two mechanisms explains a large fraction
of our treatment effects. This paper not only explicates contribution behaviour under
uncertainty, it also expands the knowledge of conditional cooperation preferences in
general. Its results motivate future research on the theoretical foundations of conditional
cooperation.
All four chapters contain their own introductions and appendices so they can be read
independently.
Chapter 1
How do Groups stabilize Corruption?
1.1 Introduction
Confirming prevailing opinion, resigned World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz once
called corruption ‘the single most important obstacle to development’ (The World Bank
2008). Most empirical as well as theoretical studies share the view that the negative
effects dominate the positive effects of corruption (Huntington 1968 and Leff 1964, Aidt
2003, Bardhan 1997). The negative consequences of widespread corruption range from
effects stemming from rent-seeking (Lambsdorff 2002), over the deterrence of (foreign)
direct investments (Mauro 1995, Egger and Winner 2006), endogenous production of red
tape (Guriev 2004) to inefficient (re)allocation of resources (Bohn 2004, Bertrand et al.
2007). These negative effects can be generalized as direct or indirect negative externalities
to the public, created by the realization of a corrupt transaction.
Given any institutional set-up that is not able to prevent the occurrence of corruption,
which we define as ‘the misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Klitgaard 1988), com-
pletely, the level of corruption depends critically on the stability of the illegal transaction
and the degree of internalization of its negative externalities. Although it is of critical
importance to the determination of the level of administrative corruption found in a
country or region, the level of internalization of the negative external effects has received
only limited attention in the literature. Rose-Ackerman (1999) notes that the internal-
ization of the negative externality is likely to be connected with social fractionalization.
She attributes this to information transmission and mutual cognizance of illegal activity
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between sub-group members. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that the composi-
tion of a society can significantly affect the ability of criminals to stabilize their corrupt
transactions using their sub-group (network) membership (Schramm and Taube 2001).
The empirical corruption literature provides some evidence on a causal relationship be-
tween the fractionalization of a society and its level of ‘perceived’ corruption1. Mauro
(1995), Gunasekara (2008) and Alesina et al. (2003) find a positive correlation between
the fractionalization of a society (country) with respect to its ethnic structure measured
by the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF), see Appendix 1A, and the level of
corruption measured in CPI (or comparable subjective indices). The relationship is found
to be non-linear when shifting the analysis to a more controlled environment, considering
cross-regional data. Using data from 48 US-American states, providing high control of
(secondary) determinants (e.g. income, education etc.), Dincer (2008) finds an inversely
U-shaped (hump-shaped) relationship between an index of fractionalization similar to
the ELF and corruption measured by the relative numbers of convictions. States that
are highly but not totally fractionalized seem to exhibit the highest levels of corruption.
States with little or extremely high fractionalization show significantly lower levels. Al-
though there are several approaches to explain the underlying mechanisms, e.g. through
in-group favouritism or joint bribe maximization (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), there is no
theoretical model-based explication of the empirical evidence.
In this paper we explain the hump-shaped relationship between social fractionaliza-
tion and corruption in the framework of the New Institutional Economics of corruption.
We define social structure as the number and size of (unconnected) informational sub-
networks. These networks can be interpreted as the result of overlapping radii of trust
(Realo et al. 2008, Fukuyama 1995).2 We apply a simple repeated multi-stage game which
centres around the commitment problem of the partners of a corrupt transaction being
solved by the application of unforgiving punishment strategies in repeated interactions
(Pechlivanos 1997). The focus is on the interaction between the effects of the existence
and shape of sub-networks on the internalization of the negative external effect and the
1Most empirical studies work with indices, e.g. the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by
Transparency International (TI). The CPI is based on the subjective evaluation by international as well
as local experts on the level of corruption in a certain country or region (see Transparency International
2005 for a detailed description of the index).
2In a crude way (losing some of the information) the structure of society can be mapped into the
one-dimensional index of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF, see Appendix 1A and Alesina et al.
2003).
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stabilization of illegal corrupt transactions.
Analysing simple benchmark punishment strategies, we find that the variation in the
size of a group (which defines the number of agents committing to a certain punishment
rule) has two countervailing effects on the ability of individual sub-group members to
stabilize their corrupt transactions. On the one hand, a larger group provides its members
with additional power to stabilize a corrupt deal by raising the stakes (and thereby the
threat-point) for a potentially defecting public official. On the other hand, the amount of
internalization of the negative external effect, which is a by-product of cognizance, and
thereby the cost of corruption is increasing with the size of a sub-network. We show that
the balance between these two countervailing effects causes small but not minimal groups
to maximize their members’ ability to stabilize corruption. Through the implications
of this result on the structure of an entire society, our model provides a theoretical
rationalization of the empirical observations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce
the basic model of corruption and explain the main mechanism of bilateral punishment
strategies. Section 1.3 introduces the existence of sub-networks and describes the main
consequences of group-enforcement through multilateral punishment strategies in the
infinitely repeated game. Section 1.4 summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Model
In its most general form a corrupt transaction is best described as a Principal-
Agent-Client relationship which can be broken down into two distinct Principal-Agent
(P-A) problems (Lambsdorff 2007). In the first, a benevolent government, representing
the principal, delegates a (perfectly defined) task to his imperfectly controllable agents
represented by potentially corrupt public officials.3 This P-A problem is in essence
not specific to corruption. Hence the New Institutional Economics (NIE) of corruption
focuses on the P-A problem between the public official and a private entity (e.g. a firm)
that may be willing to pay for preferential treatment. A central aspect of the analysis is
3With this specifications we exclude political or grand corruption.
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the enforcement problem of a corrupt transaction.
1.2.1 Framework
Consider a society that consists of a small number (> 1) of potentially corrupt public
officials (O) and a large number (N ) of individuals (clients). All clients are potential
bribers (B).4 Assume that clients need some kind of permit (e.g. a licence) given out by
the officials in order to engage in any kind of economic (e.g. productive) activity. Legally
proceeded transactions never yield positive payoffs (e.g. the government-set price for the
licence is equal to the net expected payoff for any given transaction). In terms of efficiency
as well as social welfare, a licence should only be given out in case client B satisfies a set
of conditions. Conditions are exogenous (defined by the benevolent authority) and can be
thought of as safety requirements, quality standards, etc. Officials are required (by the
benevolent authorities) to test whether conditions are met by the client and subsequently
give out the licence or reject the request. Obtaining the licence without having to satisfy
the set of conditions gives return E to the client. E may include opportunity costs of
time or monetary costs saved e.g. by using sub-standard quality etc.5 Hence, the client
may have an incentive to distort the behaviour of the official who is neither controlled
nor monitored perfectly (by the authorities)6 by paying a bribe b.
A successfully completed corrupt transaction causes the negative externality D. D
is directly proportional to the return of corruption (D = iE) where i depicts the factor
of inefficiency common to all corrupt transactions. The damage D is assumed to spread
equally across all (N ) members of society. The assumption of a flat distribution of a fixed
level of damage is a simplification that can be rationalized by considering personal dam-
age as the certainty equivalent of the expected risk of damage caused by the realization
of the corrupt transaction.
4This assumption follows the hypothesis of money maximizing individuals conducting illegal activity
whenever this yields a positive payoff (Becker 1968).
5We assume that B ’s only motivation to satisfy the obligations set by the authorities is to receive the
licence which enables production. There is no intrinsic motivation to satisfy the legal conditions. The
reason for B ’s sub-optimal choice of production technology (in equilibrium) lies in the non-internalized
external effect.
6We simplify our analysis considerably by assuming that the official does not face the risk of being
fired.
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The per-head-damage can be written as d = D
N
= iE
N
.
Setting i > 1 ensures that the total damage (in form of the externality) caused by a
successful corrupt deal is always larger than the sum of benefits for the corrupt partners.
From a social point of view (welfare perspective), O should always force all clients to
satisfy government-set (and first-best-results inducing) requirements. This constitutes
corruption as socially undesirable.
Delivering the corrupt service in exchange for a bribe (cooperating in the corrupt trans-
action) causes costs c to the official. These costs may include the moral costs of being
responsible for causing damage to the public (fellow citizens) and real (technical) costs of
hiding illegal activities from the authorities. Note that in this set-up the amount of these
costs cannot be modified by the official. Nor do they depend on the profitability of the
corrupt transaction (E). Costs c could also be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of
the lottery between no punishment in the good state and (e.g. monetary) punishment in
the bad state of the world (i.e. detection by the authorities).7 By incurring c, the official
is able to guarantee return E to the client.8 Consider Figure 1.1 for the timing and payoff
structure of the 3-stage game.
Figure 1.1: Extensive Form
7The assumption of constant costs of corruption serves as a simplification and may be changed in
a more comprehensive model in which O may (endogenously) choose the amount of c to determine the
probability of detection.
8This implies that the probability of being detected is assumed to be 0 if costs c are paid.
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The first line in the payoff vectors depicts the payoff for the official, the second line
that for the briber and the third line shows the (total) monetary external effect on the
public. In Stage 1, client B offers bribe b  [0, E]9 to the official O. The bribe can either
be accepted or rejected (by O) in Stage 2. A bribe of 0 may be interpreted as a decision of
honest acquisition of the licence. If O rejects the bribe (no acceptance, action ‘na’), the
game (round) ends and both agents receive their reservation utility of 0.10 If O accepts
the bribe (action ‘a’) she enters Stage 3 and decides whether to provide the corrupt service
(‘t’) or to defect and pocket the bribe (‘nt’). If O fulfils the costly task (of delivering the
corrupt service to B), B ’s return E and the negative externality D = d ∗N is realized.
It can easily be shown (see Appendix 1B for a short proof) that in a one shot game
the only Sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium (SNE) is characterized by B playing b = 0
(being honest) in Stage 1, rationally expecting O to choose ‘a’ in Stage 2 and ‘nt’ in
Stage 3 for any amount of b. This is because O cannot credibly commit to cooperate.
There is no corruption and no inefficiency without third party contract enforcement.
Since most forms of corruption are illegal, the contractual exchange of bribes for illegal
services cannot be protected or enforced by legal third parties (i.e. the courts) and thus
relies on other forms of contract enforcement (Lambsdorff et al. 2005).
1.2.2 Stabilizing corruption through repeated interaction
Among several theories on possible ways of stabilizing the corrupt transaction pro-
vided by the economic literature on corruption (see Appendix 1D for a short summary)
repetition of the transaction seems to be the main driver of stability (Schramm and Taube
2001, Pechlivanos 1997). Consider the infinitely repeated game (G∞(δ)), where δ is the
discount factor for future periods, common to all agents. All agents maximize their dis-
counted present value of the stream of expected monetary payoffs over their infinite life
time by choosing actions from their action space, maxati E
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1gi(ati(ht−1)).
Each agent has complete and costless access to the entire history of information (ht)
about her own and her (direct) transaction partner’s (partners’) behaviour. ati is the
9We do not assume a budget constraint but restrict the amount of transfer to the gross product
(return) of the corrupt transaction.
10We assume transaction costs of 0 for simplicity.
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action space and gi(.) the payoff depending on strategies which may be dependent on the
past behaviour of (a sub-set of) players, where i = {O,B}. The period-wise repetition of
the SNE of the one-shot game (‘b=0’; ‘a’/‘na’; ‘nt’) remains an equilibrium in the infinite
repetition of the game, but is not the unique equilibrium. Being interested in maximal
levels of corruption, we consider (only) the most collusive equilibrium (in pure strategies)
that is backed by the strongest of incentive compatible punishment strategies and treat
the results as benchmarks.11
By applying the Folk Theorem, a corrupt deal can be stabilized by a Grim Trigger Strat-
egy (Axelrod 1984) played by B.
B has to pay a bribe high enough to ensure incentive compatibility for O and low enough
to yield a positive payoff for herself. The Grim Trigger strategy of B can hence be for-
mulated as:
‘Pay the equilibrium bribe b∗ as long as O has never defected (i.e. played ‘nt’) before and
play ‘b = 0’ forever, otherwise.’
We call it a ‘Bilateral Punishment Strategy’ (BPS).
The Incentive Compatibility Constraint of O under BPS (ICCBPS) embodies a con-
dition under which the official prefers to deliver the corrupt service rather than defect on
B. The expected life time pay-off from cooperation appears on the left and the immedi-
ate payoff plus the continuation value from cheating on the right hand side of equation
(1.1).12
ICCBPS : b− c+
T∑
i=1
δi−1(bi − c) ≥ b+ 0; T →∞ : 1
1− δ (b− c) ≥ b (1.1)
Solving for the minimal incentive compatible bribe b* yields b∗BPS(δ, c) =
1
δ
c.
To satisfy ICCBPS, the bribe b has to be sufficiently larger than c. In order to make it
worthwhile for the client to enter the corrupt relationship (instead of engaging in honest
activity), the Participation Constraint (PCBPS) of B has to be satisfied. Corruption
takes place only if the surplus of the briber E is large enough to cover the (equilibrium)
11Weaker punishment strategies such as e.g. ‘Tit for Tat’ (Axelrod 1984) in which only the behaviour
of the last period is relevant for the actions played by the relevant agent are therefore not considered in
order to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
12Note that the negative externality does not occur in any of O ’s considerations since we use the
assumtions of the model of self interested payoff maximization.
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bribe b* and B’s personal expected loss from the negative externality (d).
PCBPS : E − iE
N
− b∗BPS ≥ 0 (1.2)
Solving for the minimal surplus E∗ yields: E∗BPS = c
N
δ(N−i) . E
∗
BPS can be interpreted as
the minimal corrupt return of a transaction for which the briber will rationally choose
to bribe the official.
1.2.3 Level of corruption
We define the level of corruption as its (relative) frequency.13 The minimum return
E∗ can be taken as a direct measure of the maximum level of corruption for the following
reasons. E is likely to differ across types of economic activities. Some types are more
suitable for creating the opportunity to extract rents through corruption than others.
This is likely to be true across (Bardhan 1997) but also within economic sectors (e.g.
special purpose construction offers more scope to extract rents through corruption than
the maintenance of infrastructure, Klitgaard 1988).
We assume that E takes values between E and E according to the distribution func-
tion f(E). Furthermore we assume that E is stable across individuals of society (all
individuals can, in expectation, extract the same rent from a given type of economic
activity through the use of corruption). The expected total number of realized corrupt
deals (per capita as well as for the entire society of identical clients when multiplied by N)
is captured by the sum of all deals that yield (in expectation) a return E ≥ E∗. Ordering
all economic transactions according to their potential for corrupt rent extraction, the fre-
quency ‘Frqť of per capita (as well as overall corruption within a society) can be defined as
Frq(E∗) = 1− F (E∗) , with the cumulative distribution function F (E∗) =
∫ E∗
E
f(z)dz.
Independent of the specific form of f(E) it is clear that the level of corruption (per capita)
is strictly decreasing in E∗ (∂Frq(E
∗)
∂E∗ < 0).
14
The time structure of our game implicitly assumes that B holds all bargaining power
13This is in line with the notion of CPI being strongly correlated with the relative frequency of
transactions involving corruption.
14Any cumulative distribution function satisfies: ∂F (E)∂E > 0.
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since she makes a ‘take it or leave it’ offer. Irrespective of how bargaining power is
distributed between client and official, the level of corruption that can be stabilized by
some punishment strategy will be defined by the relative mass of potential transactions
that yield a corrupt return E that is high enough to pay the equilibrium bribe b∗ and
compensate for expected personal losses. Hence E∗ always defines the maximum level
of corruption, independent of the distribution of bargaining power since the transaction
with a corrupt return E∗ is the ‘last’ (marginal) type of transaction for which corruption
is profitable and will be undertaken. See Appendix 1E for a detailed explanation.
1.3 Analysis
1.3.1 Heterogeneity of social structure
The New Economic Sociology describes corruption as the result of the clash between
particularized and universal norms where the institutional economics of corruption dis-
tinguishes between trust to insiders and trust (or responsibility) to outsiders (Lambsdorff
et al. 2005). In our view trust between individuals ultimately determines the level of
corruption through its implications on the structure of society with respect to its frac-
tionalization into sub-groups enabling the exchange of information between its members.
Exchange of information enables joint cooperation, but also determines the degree of the
internalization of external effects. This idea can be visualized by depicting the intensity of
trust as the sizes of the radii of trust around individuals (Fukuyama 1995, 1999, Putnam
2000, Realo et al. 2008, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). Considering a given pattern of
individual proximity15, the sizes of the individual radii of trust define the shape of society
(i.e. the number and size of its sub-groups) in the following way. Two individuals are
linked as soon as their radii of trust overlap. A sub-network is defined by all individuals
linked either directly or indirectly.
Figure 1.2 contains four panels as examples of social structures defined by different
sizes of radii of trust. In Panel 1, very small radii of trust leave society highly fraction-
15By given we mean the pre-determined geographical position of each individual on a plain. Fixed
proximity is justified by exogenous variables such as heritage.
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alized. There are only small sub-groups (depicted by the larger circles), which may be
interpreted as nuclear entities (e.g. families). As the radii of trust increase, the size of
networks grows, while their numbers decrease (Panel 2 and 3). There are fewer but larger
networks sharing trust and information. At a certain size, the radii of trust overlap in
such a way that a single network is created which includes all members of society (Panel
4). Social fractionalization graphically depicted by the set union of the plains of radii
of trust can be defined by a vector containing the number and size (in the number of
individuals) of all separable sub-networks.16
Figure 1.2: Examples of group structures
1.3.2 Multilateral Punishment Strategies (MPS)
The existence of sub-networks defined by their members’ trust has an important ef-
fect on the level of corruption that can be stabilized in our model since mutually trusting
16The assumption of exclusiveness of network membership based on trust can be justified by the
existence of natural barriers such as language, dialects or cultural differences driven by ethnic or religious
differences as they tend to foreclose link formation to outsiders and increase the (prohibitively high) costs
of setting up bridging links between members of other sub-networks (Alesina et al. 2003).
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individuals are likely to share information. We use a mechanism of contract enforcement
close to the one described in Greif (1993), which was motivated by historic (14th century)
sources of an ethnic group of Jewish traders (Maghribi). These solved their enforce-
ment problems in their cross Mediterranean trade (modelled as a legal P-A relationship)
through a reputation mechanism based on joint punishment strategies enabled through
an information network.
The lack of sufficient repetition of bilateral contracting led to the demand for an in-
stitution securing mutually profitable trade. The threat of spreading the information of a
potential breach of contract between a principal and a specific agent to the entire network
increased the stake for any agent decreasing her incentives for opportunistic defection.
Defecting on a single network member would have entailed the loss of all potential future
gains from trade with any member of the network. The common knowledge (within the
network) of the deployment of Multilateral Punishment Strategies (MPS) can explain
the larger set of transactions that can be stabilized within the informational network as
compared to the use of bilateral contracting alone.
Where Greif (1993) considers a fixed structure of society (the ethnic group of Maghribi
Traders), we are interested in the differences in the ability to stabilize corrupt transactions
between members of societies of different structures with respect to the existence and
size of sub-networks. The necessity to use informal institutions such as Multilateral
Punishment Strategies (MPS) to enforce socially efficient trade in medieval times stems
from the lack of legal international institutions. These problems are in general solvable
by appropriate and functional international legal institutions including commercial courts
and law enforcement agencies. The same is not true for corrupt transactions which are
illegal by definition.
While Greif (1993) notes that the limit to the (relative) number of deals that can be
stabilized under MPS stems from the quality of the available information exchange tech-
nology (i.e. the reliance on sending long distance letters) the main limit to stabilization in
the set-up of corruption is determined by the (degree of) internalization of the negative
external effect. To include the structure of society into our model, consider the simple
3-stage corruption game with the time and pay-off structure described above (Figure 1.1).
We assume that the society consists of N bribers to be fractionalized into k groups of
size ni (i = {1, 2, .., k}), where
∑k
i=1 ni = N .
How do Groups stabilize Corruption? 20
To establish the main systematic relation between the properties of a society and the
level of corruption, we first consider a specific sub-group of society and denote its size
(number of individual members) by n (dropping the subscript i). The crucial feature in
our model of social structure is that information flows perfectly inside a sub-network17.
This means that it cannot be purposefully ignored or limited by any individual mem-
ber and does not spill over to the members of other sub-groups. As in the Maghribi
Traders’ problem, sub-groups in our set-up can act like transaction networks. By sharing
information about the behaviour of an agent (i.e. the official) and committing to a cer-
tain (punishment) strategy, sub-group members are able to increase the expected future
pay-off which is at stake for the official in case of misbehaviour (defection).
Again we assume that information storage is perfect in a sense that all potential bribers
of a certain sub-group can (free of cost) track the complete history of the behaviour of
a specific official O towards any of their fellow sub-group members. However, they do
not have any (relevant) information about the official’s behaviour towards (any unlinked)
outsiders (members of other sub-groups). We assume that the structure of society is
constant. Sub-group members cannot be admitted or expelled from a sub-group (links
cannot be established or severed). Apart from the history of the behaviour of an official,
information transmission in our model involves the details about the illegal deal including
the size of the bribe b, the size of the return E and thereby the size of the per-head damage
d caused by successful realization. This gives each sub-group member the potential to
serve as a key witness in a criminal law suit. To prevent sub-group members from
informing the authorities in order to press compensation for their personal damage on a
legal basis they have to be compensated for (at least) their expected personal loss caused
by the successful corrupt transaction.18
It is clear that sub-group members will always accept a ‘take it or leave it’ offer by the
active briber covering their expected total damage. Distributional issues of the extracted
rent (E − b∗ − d) within a sub-group have no effect on the marginal corrupt transaction
that can be stabilized (characterized by E∗). Hence the frequency and level of corruption
(per head) within a sub-group of size n is ultimately determined by E∗ as long as all
17This assumption is similar to the conditions imposed in Greif (1993).
18We assume that the expected monetary punishment (lawsuit) is strong enough to ensure that B
always (for all relevant values of E) prefers to compensate all sub-group members fully. Hence, retaliations
of unsatisfied group members do not occur in equilibrium.
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sub-group members are being compensated (obtain d each). This means that a (certain
type or class of) corrupt transaction will only be undertaken if it yields a return E high
enough to cover both expenditures, bribe b∗ and n ∗ d.19
In the one shot version of an adapted game between a particular member of a sub-
group of a certain size and an official, the uniqueness of the SNE of Section 1.2.1 remains.20
To incorporate the effects of information transmission between sub-group members within
the repeated game, we consider ICC and PC under an adapted version of Grim Trigger,
the benchmark punishment strategy.
Our Multi-lateral Punishment Strategy (MPS) builds on B ’s threat of cancelling po-
tential future economic transactions not only when defected on herself but also when
observing (having observed) misbehaviour towards any of her fellow sub-group mem-
bers.21 Again, all agents in the economy live for infinite periods and maximize their
expected present value of life time payoff by discounting their continuation payoff with
the common factor δ.22
In the simplest case, the MPS for B can be formulated as follows.
‘Pay the equilibrium bribe b∗ as long as O has never defected on any of B’s fellow
sub-group members. Never engage in any corrupt transaction with O again and choose
another O who is known to have never defected23 on B or any of B’s fellow sub-group
members otherwise.’ 24
Appendix 1B provides more details on the incentive compatibility of the MPS.
19Modelling the peer-compensation as a fixed payment is the easiest vehicle of transporting the idea
of joint payoff maximization by all members of a sub-group. In reality direct large-scale compensation
payments on a project basis are unlikely. In expectation all group members engage in the same class of
corrupt transactions in their infinite life time, making direct compensation redundant. The direct com-
pensation makes sure that only those transactions are realized that cover all fellow sub-group members’
losses (the sub-group’s share of the total negative externality).
20Consider the same backward induction argument as applied in the one shot game of the situation
of bilateral contracting in Section 1.2.1 (and Appendix 1B).
21This is consistent with the mechanism in Greif (1993).
22We ignore the potential problem of renegotiation between B and O by assuming that collusion
between officials is impossible. This assumption is especially reasonable if staff relocation among officials
is common and officials do not belong to the same sub-group. The existence of network ties between an
official and a client provides a different form of contract enforcement device (Kingston 2007) that is not
considered in this paper.
23In equilibrium there is no defection, hence there must always be at least one O who has never
defected before as long as we assume that there are more officials than needed.
24As under BPS, there are more forgiving strategies, e.g. ‘Tit for Tat’, which are not considered in
order to keep the analysis as simple as possible (benchmark argument).
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1.3.3 Corruption and group size
Compared to the case with only two agents (ICCBPS), the Incentive Compatibility
Constraint under the Multilateral Punishment Strategy ICCMPS changes with respect to
the expected future loss of the benefit from potential corrupt transactions in case of defec-
tion of the official. Incentive compatibility has to include all O ’s potential transactions
with any of B ’s fellow sub-group members.25 Since we assume clients to be homoge-
neous, we consider a representative agent (B) in a sub-group of size n in order to derive
the ICCMPS.
ICCMPS : b− c+
T∑
i=1
δin(bi − c) ≥ b+ 0; T →∞ : b− c+ δ
1− δn(b− c) ≥ b (1.3)
Solving for the minimal incentive compatible bribe yields b∗(δ, c, n)MPS = (1−δnδ + 1) c.
The larger the sub-group, the lower the equilibrium bribe has to be in order to hinder
O from defection: ∂b∗
∂n
= −1−δ
n2
c < 0. For the full effect of n on the level of corruption,
consider B ’s new Participation Constraint PCMPS. B will only participate if her profits
are still positive after paying b∗MPS and compensating all her sub-group members for the
damage realized by the corrupt transaction.
PCMPS : E − niE
N
− b∗MPS ≥ 0 (1.4)
This yields the minimum return: E∗MPS(δ,N, c, i, n) = cN
1+δ(n−1)
nδ(N−in) . For a given size of
the sub-group n and under the technical assumption of N > in, the partial effect of
the size of society N is negative: ∂E∗
∂N
= − (1+δ(n−1))
δ(N−in)2 i c < 0 if N > i n. The larger
the society, the wider the total damage is spread and the less of it has to be internalized
through the compensation of all sub-group members. There are two countervailing effects
of sub-group size n on E∗:
E∗n(n) ≡
∂E∗(n)
∂n
=
cN(i(2 + δ(n− 2))n−N(1− δ))
δn2(N − in)2 S 0. (1.5)
On the one hand we can identify a positive effect, the Coalition Effect (CE). The larger
the sub-group, the more future potential earnings are at stake for O when deciding
25The assumption that all n transactions potentially take place in any of the periods implies sufficient
(time) capacities available to the official.
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between cooperation (t) and defection (nt). This decreases the equilibrium bribe b∗MPS
needed for incentive compatibility.
On the other hand, there is a negative effect, the Internalization Effect (IE), which
captures the direct internalization of the sum of negative external effects relevant for B ’s
fellow sub-group members. The number of sub-group members (group size) increases the
sum of compensation payments needed for the successful engagement in corruption.
Corruption maximizing group-size
We can show that the relationship between E∗ and n is U-shaped for all relevant coefficient
values. This means that an intermediate group size balances the trade-off between the
two countervailing effects.
First, we show that an increase in the size of the sub-group (whose members useMPS )
increases the level of corruption for low values of n. Consider the marginal effect of n on
E∗(n) at n = 1: E∗n(n = 1) = c δN
((2−δ)i−(1−δ)N)
((1−δ)i−δt)2 .
If N > i
2− δ
(1− δ) : E
∗
n(n = 1) < 0. (1.6)
For group enforcement through MPS to be effective (E∗ is smaller in a group when using
MPS than in the case of BPS), the size of society N needs to be large enough compared
to the factor of inefficiency of corruption (i) and the discount factor δ.26
Second, we show that, due to the inefficiency of corruption, group enforcement
(through MPS) does not provide more stability than BPS when sub-group size n is
large relative to the size of society N. Note that in our set-up of perfect information
transmission inside a sub-group, sub-group members cannot choose to use a bilateral
punishment strategy since information cannot be withheld. This may be rationalized by
the inability of group members to hide criminal activities from their peers.27 If sub-group
size n reaches values smaller but close to N (N = N
i
) which is, by definition (i > 1),
strictly smaller than N , we can show that E∗ approaches infinity under MPS and hence
26With δ = 0.9 (a depreciation rate of 10%) society must be only ten times larger than the factor of
inefficiency.
27The U-shaped curve of E∗(n) indicates that MPS is individually optimal only up to a certain
sub-group size no above which BPS would be optimal if feasible (if information could be blocked).
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no corruption occurs.28
lim
n→N
i
E∗ = lim
n→N
i
cN
1 + δ(iN − 1)
nδ(N − in) = limz→0
c (1 + δ(N
i
− 1))
z
→∞. (1.7)
Third, we show that there is a unique group size n∗ that minimizes E∗ and hence maxi-
mizes the level of corruption. E∗n(n) ≡ ∂E
∗(n)
∂n
= cN(i(2+δ(n−2))n−N(1−δ))
δn2(N−in)2 = 0. Solving
for n∗ yields:
n∗(i, δ, N) =
i(1− δ) +√i2 + δ(1− δ)(N − i)i
δi
. (1.8)
Since the second derivative is positive (∂
2E∗(n)
(∂n)2
> 0) for the relevant range of n29, sub-
group size n∗(i, δ, N) characterizes the global (and unique) minimum in E∗.
Characteristics of corruption maximizing group size
The size of society N affects the corruption maximizing sub-group size in the following
way. The larger N , the broader the spreading of the inefficiency causing a lower per
capita damage d. While having no effect on the CE, a bigger society decreases the IE,
as less of the total negative effect needs to be internalized under a given sub-group size.
Hence the balancing sub-group size n∗ increases with N .
n∗N ≡
∂n∗
∂N
=
1− δ
2
√
i2 + δ(1− δ)(N − i)i > 0 (1.9)
The opposite is true for the factor of the inefficiency of corruption. While the degree
of inefficiency is not accounted for in the CE it increases the (total) amount of the
internalized damage (IE ) and thus shifts n∗ in the opposite direction. The larger the
inefficiency relative to the return E, the smaller the size of the sub-group that maximizes
corrupt activity.
n∗i ≡
∂n∗
∂i
= − (1− δ)N
2i
√
i2 + δ(1− δ)(N − i)i < 0 (1.10)
Since the function E∗(δ,N, c, i, n) is convex and continuous in n (for at least
28If BPS is feasible, the maximum amount of corruption is determined by E∗BPS for all groups of size
n > no
29E∗nn(n) ≡ ∂
2E∗(n)
(∂n)2 =
cN((1−δ)(2(N−in)2−in(n−2in))+i2δn3)
δn3(N−in)3 > 0 for n ≤ 2N3i . Specifically E∗nn(n∗) > 0
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1 < n < 2N
3i
)30, decreases in n for small sub-group sizes (n < n∗), has a unique
minimum of corrupt activity at n∗ and increases in n for n > n∗, we conclude that E∗(n)
must be a U-shaped function in n.
It is trivial to check numerically that, for any reasonable set of parameters (e.g. δ ≥ 0.5,
discounting is not excessive and i ≥ 1.2, the inefficiency caused by corruption is sig-
nificant), the corruption maximizing group size n is small relative to N . In this set of
parameters, the corruption maximizing sub-group size is at least ten times smaller than
the size of the society (n∗ ≤ N
10
). As an example, Figure 1.3 depicts the function E∗
Figure 1.3: Exemplary form of E∗
over n where E∗ is displayed in multiples of the direct costs of corruption c with the
parameter values delta = 0.9, N = 100 and i = 1.5. In this example the minimum
return E∗(n), characterizing a maximum number of corrupt transactions, is produced
by sub-groups of size n∗ = 4. Using MPS, groups of size n between 2 and 12 produce
corruption levels that are higher than those attainable under BPS. If group size is larger
than 13, we find the same per capita corruption levels as in a totally fractionalized society
(n = 1), if BPS is feasible and lower levels if not. The decline of E∗(n) in n for n < n∗
can be interpreted as the result of the stabilizing effect of increasing the radii of trust,
linking more individuals to the sub-group. The section to the right of the minimum (n∗)
shows that a further increase in the radii of trust deters individuals from engaging in
30Recall that ∂
2E∗(n)
(∂n)2 > 0 for this range.
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corrupt transactions because of increasing costs of internalization. The U-shaped curve
of E∗(n) translates immediately into a hump-shaped curve in the relation between per
capita frequency of corruption and sub-group size n.
1.3.4 Structure of society and level of corruption
We have shown that, irrespective of the behaviour of the other sub-groups in a society,
sub-groups that are small relative to society are able to (and will) produce the highest
levels of corruption per capita.31 This implies the following relationship between the
structure of (the entire) society and the level of corruption. Let ng denote the number
of members in sub-group g (g = {1, 2, ..., k}) of k different groups in a society of size
N where
∑k
g=1 ng = N . The relative frequency of corrupt transactions is calculated as
Frqsoc =
∑k
g=1 ng(1−F (E∗(ng)))
N
.32 We can show that a society S∗ which is fractionalized into
(k∗ = N
n∗ ) sub-groups of size n
∗ (ng = n∗) exhibits the maximum level of corruption. For
n∗ << N , the problem of a positive balance after dividing is negligible.33 Departing from
the situation of ng = n∗ we consider the effects of deviations in terms of changes in the
size and number of sub-groups on corruption, holding the size of society constant. In the
following we discuss the properties of S∗ with respect to its connection to the notion of
ELF as well as the implication of deviations of its structure on the level of corruption.
First, we hold the number of sub-groups constant (k = k∗). Regard society Snewk
which deviates from S∗ in the characteristics (i.e. the size) of at least one sub-group. For
any sub-group larger than n∗ (nm > n∗) at least one (other) sub-group with size nl < n∗
is needed to hold the size of society constant (at N∗). Consider all other sub-groups
maintaining size n∗ (ng 6=l,m = n∗). It is easy to see that Snewk will exhibit lower levels of
corruption, since E∗(nl) > E∗(n∗) (the IE dominates the CE ) as well as E∗(nm) > E∗(n∗)
(the CE dominates the IE ) as shown in Section 1.3.3 (n∗ defines the global minimum in
E∗ and hence the global maximum in the frequency of corruption levels per capita). By
31Recall that the level of corruption within a society is defined by its expected frequency, and the
return E is distributed according to the function F (E). Hence the frequency of corruption is defined by
1− F (E∗).
32Sub-groups are assumed to be homogeneous, therefore all individuals within a certain sub-group
produce the same (relative) amount of successful corrupt transactions (per head) in expected terms.
33According to the definition of the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (see Appendix 1A), S∗
would be characterized by ELF ∗ = 1−∑k∗g=1(n∗gN )2 = 1− k∗(n∗N )2.
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the convexity of the ELF 34, any society of size N and with a number of sub-groups k
will exhibit a fractionalization index of ELF < ELF ∗ (being less fractionalized) if any
n 6= n∗. The further away a society shifts from the characterization of S∗ in terms of a
lower ELF , the lower its level of corruption. Moreover, the total level of corruption is
strictly decreasing in the sum (since n∗ constitutes a unique minimum in E∗) as well as in
the variance (since E∗(n) is convex) of the sum of (individual) differences between ng and
n∗. Since V ar(n− n∗) = V ar(n), the ELF and the total level of corruption must go into
the same direction considering societies of equal size and equal numbers of sub-groups.
Second, we consider societies of the same size but different numbers of sub-groups (of
the same size). Here we have to consider two cases. If in society Snewn, the number of
sub-groups is smaller than k∗ (knewn < k∗), the size of each sub-group must be larger than
n∗ (nnewn > n∗). This means that each member of any sub-group exhibits a lower (per
capita) level of corruption since (E∗(nnewn) > E∗(n∗)). Snew− would show an ELFSnewn <
ELFS∗
35 indicating a less fractionalized society.
If the number of sub-groups in Snewn is larger than in S∗ (knewn > k∗), nnewn < n∗, the
(average) critical value of the rent of coruption must be larger than in S∗ (E∗(ngnewn) >
E∗(n∗)) because of the shape of E∗(n). It is clear that Snewn is more fractionalized than
S∗ (ELFnewn > ELF ∗) using the reverse argument from above. The larger the sum
of (individual) differences between n and n∗ (in either way), the lower the frequency of
corruption. Moreover, due to the convexity of E∗(n) (E∗nn(n) > 0), the difference in the
level of corruption decreases at an increasing rate.
Third, we compare societies allowing for different numbers as well as different sizes
of sub-groups. A society being characterized by ELF > ELF ∗ (higher fractionalization)
must consist of a larger number of sub-groups (k > k∗) than S∗ (for all combinations
of sub-group sizes). Holding the size of society constant (N = N∗) there must be at
least two sub-groups (l,m) with nl,m < n∗. Hence the overall level of corruption must
be lower than in S∗ since E∗(nl,m) > E∗(n∗). Compared to S∗, a society (of the same
size) exhibiting an ELF < ELF ∗ may either consist of a smaller number of sub-groups
(k < k∗ and hence n > n∗) or accommodate sub-groups of unequal size (or both). In
all (three) cases there are at least two sub-groups (l,m) which exhibit lower (per capita)
34The more variance in the sub-group size, the smaller ELF holding k constant.
35ELFSnewn = 1−
∑knewn
gnew−=1(
ngnewn
N )
2 = 1− knewn(nnewnN )2 < 1− k∗(n
∗
N )
2 = ELFS∗ , since Nnewn =
knewnnnewn = K∗n∗ = N∗ and nnewn > n∗.
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levels of corruption since nl,m 6= n∗ and hence E∗(nl,m) > E∗(n∗).36
These results provide a simple theoretical explanation for the inversely U-shaped rela-
tionship between the social fractionalization of a society and the level of corruption found
by Dincer (2008) using data from 48 (US-)American states. Our model interprets this
observation as an effect stemming from the distribution of citizens (mass) between the
sub-groups of a society. Regions with a structure close to that of S∗ exhibit the highest
levels of corruption, while societies that are either more fractionalized (ELF > ELF ∗) or
less fractionalized (ELF < ELF ∗) show lower levels. Generally, the larger the distance
to S∗ in terms of the sum of differences between n and n∗, the lower the level of corruption.
1.3.5 Stability and convergence of group size
The internalization of part of the negative external effect through the compensation
of all sub-group members leads to efficient behaviour within sub-groups but causes large
inefficiencies for the society as a whole. Hence, even if we consider the size of the radii of
trust as endogenous, i.e. subjects can sever or establish links to citizens in their immediate
proximity (by increasing or decreasing their radii of trust, see Figure 1.2) we still face
a prisoner’s dilemma type situation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Regard a situation
of (k∗) sub-groups of corruption maximizing size n∗. It would be socially efficient to
increase the radii of trust (e.g. by promoting trust to outsiders) in order to increase the
internalization and thus reduce the relative number of corrupt transactions and thereby
the amount of inefficiency resulting from the negative external effects.
However, for the members of a particular sub-group it cannot be individually optimal
to increase their radii of trust as long as their sub-group size is greater than or equal
to n∗. A unilateral step of increasing the radii of trust by the members of a particular
sub-group would yield a lower level of corruption in society (and thereby decrease the
degree of realization of the negative external effect) but at the same time decrease the
expected individual corrupt rents for all members of this sub-group.
Given the behaviour of the members of all other groups, the positive effect of the decrease
36If the sub-group size n is not constant, the relationship between the level of corruption and the
ELF is not monotonic since the ELF does not allow for a unique matching.
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in damages caused by the realization of fewer corrupt transactions per head is lower
than the loss of individual rent creation through corruption. Therefore there cannot
exist a member of any sub-group of size n∗ ≤ n ≤ (N − 1) (or n∗ ≤ n ≤ (no − 1) in
case of the feasibility of BPS) who has an incentive for the establishment of additional
links to outsiders. This means that a society fractionalized into groups of corruption
maximizing size will not transform into any other structure by endogenous link formation.
1.4 Conclusion
Our analysis of the effect of the social structure on the level of corruption focuses on
the solution of the enforcement problem in the Principal-Agent relationship between a
bribing client and a corrupt official through the use of multilateral punishment strategies.
The social structure is defined by a society’s fractionalization into sub-groups. These are
visualized by multilateral links between individuals stemming from the overlapping of
radii of trust of different sizes. The critical feature of a sub-network is the perfect (and
unimpeded) flow of information between all of its members.
Considering the deployment of (bilateral and) multilateral punishment strategies, we
show that the relative size of a sub-group determines the relative mass of economic trans-
actions for which corruption is profitable (for a representative member) and hence defines
the (per capita) level of corruption. For a broad range of parameters, the (unique) max-
imum level of corruption is found for sub-groups that are small relative to the size of
society since these balance the trade-off between two countervailing effects in the enforce-
ment problem.
Translating this result into the relationship between the social structure of an entire so-
ciety and its (per head) level of corrupt activity we conclude that a society fractionalized
into a large number of relatively small sub-groups presents the maximum level of corrup-
tion. The further away from these characteristics a society moves (in terms of lower or
higher fractionalization, e.g. measured by the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization index),
the lower the total level of corruption. This explains the inversely U-shaped relationship
between social fractionalization and corruption found by Dincer (2008).
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As explicated in this paper, the corruption maximizing sub-group size is small relative
to the size of society. This result is also consistent with the observations in cross country
studies of a strong positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the level of
corruption (Alesina et al. 2003, Lipset and Lenz 2000, Tonoyan 2005).37
Our model shows that, even in situations where there is no special (e.g. parochial)
relationship between a briber and an official38, the structure of a society affects the fre-
quency of corruption. The main driver of the results is the mechanism of multilateral
punishment strategies, which is successful only because the corrupt agents use the value
of the official’s reputation to increase the power of the stabilizing effect of repeating the
corrupt transaction. This links the model to the experimental literature on indirect reci-
procity. In studies by Seinen und Schram (2006) and Bonein and Serra (2007) the level
of cooperation is found to be determined not only by direct interaction between trans-
action partners but also by ego’s information on alter’s relevant cooperative behaviour
towards third parties in a repeated game. The main argument in the explanation of
(enhanced) strategic cooperation is similar to that used in our model. Information about
the transaction partner’s past cooperative behaviour to outsiders serves as a device to
capitalize on the threat of reputational damage in the case of defection (non-cooperative
behaviour), see also Novak and Sigmund (1998). However, it is information transmission
that ultimately limits the level of corruption by forcing individuals to take into account
larger parts of the negative externality that they are causing by engaging in corruption.
In order to refine the model and enhance its explanatory power, the model might be
enriched by additional dimensions of characteristics of sub-groups. Where we assume
perfect transmission of information inside a group, the rate of transmission should also
depend on characteristics such as absolute sub-group size. This would capture the idea
of the qualitative distinction between bonding and bridging social capital (Fukuyama
1995, Harris 2007). We leave this extension to future research.
37Several studies (Mauro 1995, Bardhan 1997) indicate that northern European countries, which
are characterized by very low levels of fractionalization, exhibit the lowest levels of corruption where
Sub-Sahara-African as well as South-East-Asian countries (such as the Chad, Sierra Leone, Cambodia
and the Philippines) in contrast feature a highly fractionalized society and the highest corruption levels
(measured in the Corruption Perception Index).
38Our model ignores nepotism (i.e. an official belongs to the same sub-group as the bribing client),
which is, in terms of the enforceability of a corrupt transaction, equivalent to the vertical integration of
the official into a group of bribers (see Appendix 1D and Klitgaard 1988).
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1.5 Appendix 1
Appendix 1A: Definition of the ELF
The Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization Index measures the probability that two
individuals, randomly drawn from the population, belong to different ethnic groups
(Bossert et al. 2006).
ELF = 1−∑kg=1(ngN )2
Let k be the number of different ethnic groups in society, ng the size of group g (measured
by the number of members) and N the size of society. The larger the ELF, the more
fractionalized the society. The ELF is crude in the sense that societies consisting of
different structures can lead to the same ELF. However, it is the most practical measure
of fractionalization and widely used in empirical studies.
Appendix 1B: Equilibrium properties
In order to check for the equilibrium property of E∗ and b∗ as well as O and B playing
according to the MPS, consider the following arguments. Since the formal proofs would
be technically equivalent to the ones in Greif (1993) we will outline the intuition only.
B’s behaviour
Under MPS, only an ‘honest’ official (an official who has never reportedly cheated on
B or any of B ’s fellow sub-group members) will be hired by B and all her sub-group
members in future periods, whereas an official who has cheated (at least once) on B or
any of B ’s fellow sub-group members will in equilibrium never be hired (by them) again.
Implicitly, O ’s expected future payoff through bribery determines the magnitude of the
equilibrium bribe b∗. The larger the potential future payoffs, the smaller is b∗. Hence
an ‘honest’ official has a brighter prospect of future gains from corruption, so that a
briber will always prefer an honest official to an official who is known to have cheated at
least once, since the cost, i.e. the incentive compatible bribe is lower. In our model, the
difference in expected future payoff between an official who has cheated and an official
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who has not, is extreme, since (on the equilibrium path) a cheater will never be bribed
again, which yields 0-profit for all future periods. A model that would allow for imperfect
information transmission (which would not destroy the entire future perspective of a
cheating official) and some probability of leaking information to outsiders would cap-
ture the argument of the re-hiring of the (more) ‘honest’ official(s) in a more realistic way.
O’s behaviour
The official will always choose ‘a’ as long as ‘b > 0’. Moreover, she will choose ‘nt’ for all
b < b∗ and ‘t’ for all b ≥ b∗ (ICC ). The existence of several officials causes competition for
bribes (no monopoly for the official), hence there must be unemployment39 and positive
rents for those officials who serve bribing clients.
However unemployed officials who have a clean record of corrupt cooperation be-
haviour with respect to at least one sub-group, may try to under-bid the equilibrium
bribe b∗. This would lead to a violation of the ICC, since any b < b∗ leads to defection
of the official in the first period of the relationship. Hence such a bribe will never be
(rationally) chosen (or accepted when proposed) by any B.
Appendix 1C: Uniqueness of the Sub game perfect Nash Equilib-
rium
We show the uniqueness of the SNE by using an argument of backward induction.
Denote by Ii the information set in stage i (i  {1, 2, 3}). Let p(Ii) be the probability of
reaching stage ‘i’ and q(‘s’|Ii) the conditional probability of the relevant agent choosing
action ‘s’ once having reached stage i. An information set contains all relevant information
about all relevant players’ behaviour up to stage i.
First, we show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which O chooses ‘t’ in Stage 3.
Consider a strategy-set EQU1 = [s1, s2, s3] in which p(I3) > 0 and q(‘t’|I3) > 0. Compare
the payoff, resulting from the realization of this strategy-set (PO(EQU1)) to that of
an alternative set (EQU1new) which consists of equal strategies up to stage 3 but for
39An unemployed official does not engage in corruption.
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which q(‘t’|I3) = 0 yielding payoff PO(EQU1new). Since b > b − c, PO(EQU1new) >
PO(EQU1) and EQU1 cannot constitute an equilibrium.
Second, we show that O will never choose ‘na’ if b > 0. Consider the strategy-set
EQU2 = [s1, s2, s3] in which p(I2) > 0, q(‘t’|I3) = 0, q(‘b > 0’|I1) = 1, q(‘nt’|I3) = 1 and
q(‘na’|I2) > 0. Compare PO(EQU2) to the payoff of the strategy set EQU2new which
differs from the former only in q(‘na’|I2) = 0. Since b > 0, PO(EQU2new) = b > 0 =
PO(EQU2) so that EQU2 is not an equilibrium. It is clear that O is indifferent between
‘a’ and ‘na’ if b = 0.
Third, we show that B setting a positive bribe cannot belong to the equilibrium path.
Compare the payoff levels of the strategy set EQU3 exhibiting q(‘t’|I3) = 0, q(‘na’|I1) = 0
and q(‘b > 0’|I1) > 0 with a similar set that differs only in q(‘b > 0’|I1) = 0: EQU3new.
Since PO(EQU3) = −b < 0 = PO(EQU3new), EQU3 cannot describe an equilibrium.
Hence the unique Sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium is characterized by [‘b=0’; ‘a’/‘na’,
‘nt’].
Appendix 1D: Alternative explanations of corrupt stability
Knapp (1986) emphasizes that third-party enforcement of a corrupt transaction can
be circumvented by middlemen who perform the ‘dirty work’ of the transaction between a
client and an official. These arrangements are usually labelled as commissioned services.
Despite being a widely used practice, the deployment of middlemen does not solve the sta-
bility problem in the corrupt model, since it only shifts the vulnerability to opportunism
to a third party. A corrupt transaction then consists of two unenforceable transactions,
one between the client and the middleman and the other between the middleman and
the official. Hence, the theoretical problem of contract enforcement is rather duplicated
than eliminated.
Some individuals or groups try to solve the problem by vertical integration, i.e. in-
tegrating a public official into their own social network. This may be done in two ways.
A group of clients may form informal relationships with officials through reciprocal gift
exchange (Klitgaard 1988), or they may encourage closely related agents such as fam-
ily members to enter administrative offices which enable them to stabilize corrupt deals
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through parochial exchange in the future.
Another option is the use of assets as collateral. The application of collateral can be
seen as a simple form of a second (legal) game linked to the actual corrupt transaction.
Kingston (2007) considers the stabilization of a one-shot bribery game by using the
expected future revenue of another game (which is stabilized by infinite repetition) as
collateral for the corrupt transaction. The corrupt parties make their strategy choices of
one game contingent on the (expected future) outcome of the other game.
Schramm and Taube (2001) point out that certain social structures in general and
specific networks in particular (which may or may not feature criminal elements as their
main objective) can help to stabilize corruption. Unlike our model, they consider official
and briber to belong to the same (e.g. ethnically or regionally pre-defined) sub-group and
therefore share distribution channels (see Ogilvie 2004, Greif 2006, Kandori 1992). The
mechanism of stabilizing corruption is similar to the vertical integration argument. Along
this argumentation favouritism of group members over outsiders, altruism towards sub-
group members or positive externalities within sub-networks arising from deals between
sub-group members are likely to be the main drivers.
In China, repeated transactions between contractors within Guanxi Networks seem
to be central to the enforcement mechanism. In general, these networks stem from
common heritage, family ties and other predominantly exogenous factors (Schramm and
Taube 2001, Lambsdorff 2007). Guanxi Networks are not primarily built to facilitate
illegal activities but present alternative means of stabilizing economic transactions (le-
gal and illegal) in an environment that does not provide sufficient legal protection of
commercial activity. Group membership may decrease transaction costs (which can be
especially high in illegal activities) but also provides the framework for credible threats,
sanctions and punishment strategies against defective and opportunistic behaviour.
Indirect reciprocity as found in experiments (Seinen and Schram 2006) may play a
role, as agents may condition their own reciprocal behaviour on information obtained
in situations that did not involve themselves but third parties, e.g. fellow group members.
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Appendix 1E: Bargaining power
In order to show the insignificance of the distribution of bargaining power for the
resulting level of corruption, consider the following two benchmark cases.
If B holds all bargaining power (which is implicitly assumed in our set-up since B
can make a take-it or leave-it offer), all types of deals that yield a return E ≥ E∗ are
undertaken with b = b∗. B gets the net surplus of E − E*. Any b > b∗ would be
incentive compatible for O but would shift rent away from B, which cannot constitute an
equilibrium. Any b < b∗ in turn would not satisfy ICC and thus would yield a negative
payoff (−b < 0) for B, which cannot be optimal for her either. B maximizes her payoff
while satisfying ICC by paying b∗ for all deals that yield E ≥ E∗.
If O holds all bargaining power, she will (implicitly) demand b = E N−i
N
as long as
E ≥ E∗. If E < E∗, either ICC or PC is violated. The marginal (‘last’) feasible deal (in
terms of the ordering of expected rent from corruption) is again the one that yields E∗
which gives a 0-payoff to B (weakly satisfying PC ) and ensures incentive compatibility
for O.
There is no reason to believe that for any distribution of bargaining power which can
be understood as a linear combination of the two benchmark cases, the marginal (‘last’)
stabilizable deal yields a return different from E∗.
Hence E∗ qualifies as a measure for the total level of corruption within a society inde-
pendent of the distribution of bargaining power between B and O.
Chapter 2
Bringing the Four-Eyes-Principle to the
Lab
2.1 Introduction
With almost daily media attention of high profile scandals, corruption, generally de-
fined as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ (OECD 2010), has been recognized
as a major problem. In general, a corrupt transaction is illegal and exerts a large neg-
ative external effect on outsiders, which is usually assumed to be larger than the sum
of benefits to the agents who are directly involved. This defines corruption as socially
inefficient (Klitgaard 1988, Rose-Ackerman 1999).
In addition to traditional views of deterring an agent from engaging in criminal activity
by varying the amount of penalties and the probability of detection (Becker 1968), the
New Institutional Economics (NIE) of corruption concentrates on finding an institutional
design that optimally exploits the instability of the corrupt transaction between a client
and an official (Schulze and Frank 2003).1 The instability of a single corrupt transaction
stems from the enforcement problem between a bribing agent and a potentially corrupt
official. Its illegal nature precludes the assistance of legal third parties, i.e. the courts
(Lambsdorff 2007). The occurrence of corruption therefore relies heavily on trust and
1There is a considerable amount of theoretical research on the Principal-Agent relationship between
a (benevolent and non-corrupt) government and its public officials (Groenendijk 2004). Ignoring the lack
of (legal) enforcement of a corrupt transaction between O and B boils the problem down to the analysis
of an ordinary Principal-Agent model with a specific application.
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reciprocity and is difficult to explain in standard theoretical models. Nonetheless, national
as well as international organizations such as Transparency International, the OECD and
several national fiscal authorities publish lists of (institutional) policy recommendations
containing measures to curb corruption. Along with ‘staff rotation’ (analyzed in Abbink
2004), the introduction of the Four-Eyes-Principle (4EP), ‘a requirement that business
has to be effectively conducted by at least two individuals (four eyes)’, is one of the most
prominent examples (Pörting and Vahlenkamp 1998, Rieger 2005, Wiehen 2005, Hussein
2005). As a result of general problematic tractability (let alone predictability) of corrupt
behaviour, a theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of the 4EP does not exist. Nor is
there any kind of traceable empirical evidence to support its usefulness.
Not only in the corrupt context, but also on a general level, the distinction between
individuals and small groups as decision-makers has been widely ignored in the theoretical
literature. Differences between the behaviour of individuals deciding alone or in a group
have only recently been addressed in the field of experimental economics, where results
seem ambiguous. Some studies find that the behaviour of groups is closer to standard
equilibrium predictions derived from the self interested model of payoff maximization
(e.g. Bornstein and Yaniv 1998, Blinder and Morgan 2005), other studies (e.g. Kocher
and Sutter 2005, 2007, Cason and Mui 1997) provide experimental evidence to the con-
trary. Kocher and Sutter (2007) conclude that the direction of the group decision-making
effect critically depends on the nature of the task determining which of two countervail-
ing motives, the profit maximizing motive or the competitive motive, dominates. The
basic set-up of our laboratory experiment is close to those used in Abbink (2004) and
Lambsdorff and Frank (2010). Our experiment is designed to assess the effects of the
introduction of the 4EP on observed levels of corruption. Within this framework we
model the 4EP as replacing a single official (deciding individually) with a group2 of two
officials deciding jointly according to a decision-making process that secures veto power
for non-corrupt officials.
Using four different treatments we can separate two countervailing effects of the intro-
duction of the 4EP. One is due to the difference in marginal incentives resulting from the
division of the transfer between the jointly deciding officials. The other effect is deter-
mined by the group decision-making process alone (keeping marginal incentives constant).
2Although the entity consists of only two participants we call it a group rather than a team.
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Rejecting predictions taken from (self interest based) arguments within the standard
model of corruption, we find that the introduction of the 4EP increases the frequency
of successful corrupt transactions unambiguously. We substantiate this hypothesis in
three stages. First, we consider only outcomes (actual corruption levels). Second, we
investigate behaviour in the decision-making process, i.e. we compare initial and final
choices. Third, we analyse the content of electronic text messages exchanged during the
decision-making process between jointly deciding officials. Our results strongly suggest
the dominance of the profit maximizing motive (Kocher and Sutter 2007, Blinder and
Morgan 2005). Groups reveal more functional behaviour with respect to conditional re-
sponding. By their higher (joint) cognitive capacity, groups of officials seem to be more
capable of maximizing their payoffs by following strategies that are shown to lead to a
higher frequency of corrupt transactions based on mutual reciprocity. Our explanations of
the observed effects are in line with the argumentation of the persuasive argument theory
(Pruitt 1971). Since groups perform better in solving the enforcement problem between
briber and official, the introduction of the 4EP moves behaviour further away from the
theoretical prediction of selfish behaviour, which, in the corrupt context falls in line with
the social optimum. Therefore our results cast doubt on the usefulness of the introduction
of the 4EP and its justification as a recommended measure against corruption.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
experimental set-up giving details on the specifications of all four treatments. Section
2.3 analyses the effects of the introduction of the 4EP in the framework of the NIE of
corruption and forms hypotheses. Section 2.4 gives details on the procedure of the ex-
periment. In Section 2.5 we describe the main findings, provide a detailed explanation of
the empirical strategies and interpret the results. Section 2.6 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Experimental set-up
2.2.1 Corruption and the NIE
In its most general form, a corrupt transaction can be described as a Principal-Agent-
Client relationship, in which the principal, represented by the government or any kind
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of benevolent3 authority, deals with its clients (private entities, e.g. firms) through its
agents, the potentially corrupt (not perfectly monitored) public officials. Clients may
have an incentive to transfer side-payments (i.e. bribes) to relevant officials in order to
alter their behaviour with respect to their duties (i.e. fulfilling legal procedures clearly
defined but not perfectly controlled by the authorities).
The main mechanism of the instable and therefore interesting part of the relationship
is best explained in a simple 3-Stage game:
In Stage 1, a client (e.g. a potentially bribing firm) B decides on the level of bribe
b=0,1,...,12 Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) to be given to a potentially corrupt
official O. The limit of 12 EMU reflects B ’s budget constraint. At this point the amount
of b is tripled. The factor 3 captures the idea of a difference in the marginal utilities of
money between a (wealthy) client and a (poor) official (Abbink et al. 2002).
In Stage 2, O can either ‘accept’ the transfer b and keep the tripled amount (3*b) to
herself or ‘reject’ it. In the latter case the game ends, O keeps only b to herself (as some
‘benefit’ from pro social behaviour) while the rest (the remaining amount of 2*b) is used
for the ‘public benefit’.4 If O accepts the bribe, she gets the tripled transfer for sure. She
automatically enters Stage 3 where she decides between two options. The first option
includes initiating an increase of B ’s payoff by 16 EMU (delivering the corrupt service)
at the fixed costs of 4 EMU (to herself). In this case, the ‘public’ suffers substantially (by
−24 EMU). Note that independent of the size of the transfer, the negative externality
is always larger than the sum of payoffs for the agents B and O so that a successful
corrupt transaction is always inefficient by construction.5 In the second option O arranges
nothing (implicitly defects on B), saving costs for herself and the public from the negative
externality. The costs of delivery may be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the
lottery: punishment in the case of detection and corrupt success, or as the practical
costs of engaging in a criminal activity, e.g. hiding illegal activities from colleagues and
superiors.6
3This excludes political or ‘grand’ corruption (see Klitgaard 1988).
4This implies the assumption of equal marginal utility between O and the public.
5See Bardhan (1997) for a review of (empirical) evidence supporting the assumption of the negative
externality and inefficiency of corruption.
6Abbink (2004) uses a fourth stage which accounts for probability of detection. Using a lottery
instead of a fixed amount to model the cost of corruption adds another problem of individual differences
(risk aversion). This would require to disentangle potential treatment effects from differences in risk
aversion.
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If O decides against delivering the corrupt service in Stage 3, B does not get the
bonus, O does not bear the costs of 4 EMU, and only a minor negative externality to the
public (4 EMU) is realized. Within the standard self interested model it is never optimal,
neither in a one shot nor in a finitely repeated game, for O to deliver the corrupt service
and hence for B to transfer a positive bribe, see Appendix 2A for a short proof. Figure
2.1 represents the basic set-up in its extensive form.
Figure 2.1: Extensive form representation
2.2.2 The 4EP
In order to investigate the effects of the introduction of the 4EP on the level of
corruption in this set-up, we consider two participants instead of one making the decisions
of the official in Stage 2 and Stage 3. We define the level of corruption as the frequency
of successful corrupt transactions relative to the total number of possible transactions.7
We use four different versions of the game as treatments of the experiment. In all four
treatments, subjects play their version of the corruption game for ten successive peri-
ods. After each period they learn about their group partners’/partner’s (payoff relevant)
7Note that in our set-up this number is directly proportional to the sum of negative externalities,
but not directly proportional to the average (total) payoff of the participants.
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choices.8 All treatments are run in a partner design so that all subjects remain in their
respective unit (of B and O subjects) for all ten periods of the experiment. Separating
potentially countervailing effects and still being able to compare outcomes across treat-
ments, we have to consider different group sizes within the treatments. Find Figures
2.7 and Figure 2.8 in Appendix 2B for representations of the full extensive forms of the
games played in the respective treatments.
In our experiment, the ‘public’ is modelled in two different ways. In one set of
sessions (mode 1) we model the externality on the public as payments (reductions of
payments) to four randomly chosen participants of the (same session of the) experiment.
For technical reasons a particular subject can never be hit more than once per period. In
the second set of sessions (mode 2) we model the externalities as increases or decreases
in the amount of a donation to the public aid organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.
We chose ‘Doctors without Borders’ to obtain results as comparable as possible to the
findings of Lambsdorff and Frank (2007, 2010, forthcoming), who use this organization
in their experiment. The use of donations to a charity in experiments goes back to Eckel
and Grossman (1996). As expected, we find from answers to our post-experimental
questionnaire that virtually all subjects approve of this organization and take this as
evidence for our working hypothesis that the reduction of a real donation represents a
valid model for the reduction of public welfare. The total amount of added or deducted
payments is equal across the two modes. Using two different modes of modelling the
externality including real outsiders allows us to address the problem of a ‘super-game’
considering the possibility of participants forming expectations on the behaviour of
participants outside their own group.
IDT19
In Treatment 1, the ‘Individual Decision-making Treatment 1’ (IDT1), we consider units
of two subjects, one in the role of the official O and one in the role of the potential briber
B. The 3-Stage corruption game (see Figure 2.1) is played for ten consecutive periods.
At the end of each period, all participants get to know their own payoffs. Additionally,
8By choosing a repeated instead of a one-shot set-up, we focus on the strategic component of the
reciprocal transaction of corruption which we expect to be affected by the number of participants within
a decision-making entity (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. 2006).
9See Figure 2.7 in Appendix 2B for the extensive form representation.
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type B subjects get information about the (Stage 2 and Stage 3) decisions of their
transaction partners (of type O). While through this information all subjects know
about the negative or positive externalities they have helped to cause to the public (four
randomly chosen participants in mode 1 or ‘Doctors without Borders’ in mode 2) they
do not learn about the magnitude of the spill-overs that may have been caused to them
by the decisions of the subjects outside their unit in mode 1. Nevertheless, there could
be violations of the independence assumption due to considerations of a ‘super-game’.
Participants may condition their choices on their beliefs about the other participants’
corrupt behaviour which may affect them through the negative externality. To check for
the existence of effects stemming from this ‘super-game’ and provide a robustness check,
we use mode 2 in which the public is modelled as a ‘real’ third party, the recipients of
the donation towards the public aid organisation. At least for this mode independence
of observations across units is warranted.
TDT1
In the second treatment, the ‘Team Decision-making Treatment 1’ (TDT1), we form units
of three subjects, one B and two O types. The B type decides in Stage 1 about her bribe
b which is tripled and then transferred to both officials of her (3-player-)unit. Note that
although the amount goes to two players, it is subtracted only once from B ’s account.
The parameters of the game are set in such a way that the incentives for the officials are
equal to the ones in IDT1, given the amount of bribe. This way we can separate the true
‘Group Decision-making Effect’ (GDE) from effects stemming from the partition of the
bribe between the two officials.
In Stage 2 and Stage 3, the two officials of a unit make their decisions jointly. In
both stages they decide independently first. If they do not come to an unambiguous
decision (e.g. one official decides for ‘reject’, the other for ‘accept’ in Stage 2), they learn
about each other’s choice and decide again. If there is still no agreement, they get the
opportunity to communicate with each other via a real time electronic ‘chat’ in which
they can, for one minute, exchange electronic messages (see the translated instructions
in Appendix 2C).
If there is still no mutual consent, the corruption-unfriendly choice is taken (‘reject’
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in Stage 2 and ‘defect’ in Stage 3). This rule reflects the veto-power of officials who do
not want to engage in a corrupt transaction in Stage 2 and those who do not want to
reciprocate in Stage 3 (in both cases avoiding damage to the public). The idea is that an
official cannot force her colleagues to engage in a corrupt transaction but can try to con-
vince them. As a consequence of the decision-making rule, a corrupt transaction can only
be successful if both officials (finally) choose ‘accept’ in Stage 2 and ‘cooperate’ in Stage 3.
IDT2
The ‘Individual Decision-making Treatment 2’ (IDT2) differs from IDT1 only in the
number of possible transactions between a particular B -O pair. In this treatment we
consider units of four, two type B and two type O participants. Every type B participant
sends only one transfer to one of the two officials in her unit per period. This means that
playing the game for ten periods makes five possible transactions per pair, producing two
transactions per period and four-player-unit. The reason for running this treatment is
to control for possible effects in the behaviour of subjects stemming from playing in a
larger group and interacting less frequently with a particular transaction-partner. The
decisions of the participants within a unit of four yield only one independent observation.
In Stage 1, one of the (potential) bribers (B1) decides about her transfer b1 to one of
the officials (O1), and the other briber (B2) decides about her transfer b2 to the remaining
official (O2). All transfers are tripled and shown to the respective officials. In Stage
2 and Stage 3 each of the officials decides independently. The respective pairs change
every period so that in the following period B1 decides about the size of her transfer to
O2 while B2 interacts with O1.
TDT2
In the ‘Team Decision-making Treatment 2’ (TDT2) we form again four-player-units.
Each of the two type B players sends one transfer each to the group of two officials who
decide jointly in Stage 2 and Stage 3, according to the same decision-making process
explained for TDT1. Contrary to the case of TDT1, the transfer is split equally so that
each of the officials receives only half of the tripled amount of the transfer chosen by the
respective briber (3 ∗ 0.5 ∗ b). This means that each of the type B participants makes
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one decision, while each of the two officials has to decide in two separate situations per
period. As a consequence, each type O subject receives two payoffs per period, while B
receives only one.
Here the parameters are set in such a way that one transaction in TDT2 corresponds
to two transactions in IDT2 in terms of payoffs for type O subjects. This means that O ’s
individual incentives in a certain situation (transaction) are not equal to those in IDT1,
TDT1 or IDT2, since a certain transfer b leads to double the amount of revenue reaching
a single official in IDT2 as compared to the revenue reaching each of the subjects in the
role of the official in TDT2. Not only gains (tripled transfers) but also costs (4 EMU)
are shared equally10 between the two officials.
2.2.3 Related literature
In some respects the set-up of the corruption game is similar to that of the gift
exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993), which analyzes reciprocity in labour markets. Workers
are found to increase their effort when being paid a premium in addition to the market
clearing wage. The investment (trust) game (Berg et al. 1995) also shares important
elements with the corruption game with respect to design. In this game, the transfer sent
by an investor is tripled. Part of the revenue may be sent back by a responder. As in
the corruption game, the gains through trust and reciprocity are linear. Several studies
find positive levels of reciprocity in one-shot versions and even higher levels in repeated
versions of these games (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000, Gächter and Falk 2002).
The main and most important difference between these games and the corruption
game is the fact that cooperation in the form of positive reciprocity is beneficial for
all members of society (i.e. the society as a whole), whereas in the case of corruption,
cooperation is only beneficial for the client and the official but not for the public in
general (and those who are hit by the negative externality in particular). The negative
externality is (usually) assumed to be high enough to result in a net social loss. This
difference may have strong effects on the level of cooperation and positive reciprocity, as
10The assumption of an equal split of the transfer reflects equal bargaining power and similarity of
the officials. There is no reason to believe that endogenous distribution would yield a different sharing
rule.
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well as on its behavioural explanations and motivations.
Contrary to theoretical predictions applying the standard self interested model of pay-
off maximization, Abbink et al. (2000, 2002), Abbink (2004, 2006), Abbink and Hennig-
Schmidt (2006), Jacquemet (2005) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2007, 2010, forthcoming)
find a large amount of cooperation in a series of laboratory experiments using one-shot
as well as (finitely) repeated versions of set-ups comparable to ours.11
These findings can neither be explained (or predicted) by the standard self inter-
ested model (see Appendix 2A), nor by models of reciprocity based on social preferences.
Altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2002) fails as an explanation since a successful corrupt
transaction does not only decrease the payoff of outsiders (resources of potential refer-
ence groups), but also decreases the sum of payoffs, leading to an efficiency loss. It is
also unconvincing to use an argument based on inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Charness and Rabin 2002), since the outcome of a successful reciprocal transaction
reduces the welfare of those who are potentially (by the externality modelled in mode
1) or certainly (by the externality modelled in mode 2) worse off than the corrupt part-
ners. Any equilibrium would critically depend on the assumptions on the identity of the
reference group which is likely to be heterogeneous across and possibly not even consis-
tent within subjects (across periods). The clear strategic background of the situation
makes an explanation of reciprocity based on intentions (Falk and Fischbacher 2006 and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) difficult, since positive transfers are unlikely to be
considered as displays of kindness. More convincing explanations may be expected in
the notion of ‘weak’ reciprocity based on repetition and reputation formation (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003, Kreps et al. 1982) or of impulses of reciprocity (Strassmair 2009).
However, even though behaviour in the basic set-up may be (partly) explainable by a
theoretical model ex post, all theories lack the ability to develop point predictions with
respect to the effect of the introduction of the 4EP, since this involves the additional
problem of group decision-making. We know from the experimental literature on group
decision-making that decisions made in a small group or team can differ substantially
from individual decisions even if individual marginal incentives are equal (Chalos and
Pickard 1985, Levine and Moreland 1998). Experimental evidence suggests that the
11The common feature is the trade-off between reciprocity based maximization of individual long-term
payoffs and a combination of impulses of myopic payoff-maximization and preferences for social efficiency.
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direction of the effect of group decision-making is ambiguous and depends highly on
the nature of the particular situation. The majority of studies find that decisions made
in small unitary groups (which is the case in our study) act more in line with the
predictions of the self interested model of payoff maximization (Blinder and Morgan
2005, Bone et al. 1999, Bornstein and Yaniv 1998, Kugler et al. 2007), while there is also
contrary evidence (e.g. Cason and Mui 1997). Kocher and Sutter (2007) show (using a
gift exchange game) that decisions made by a small group may be either more or less in
line with selfish preferences. The total effect of group decision-making seems to depend
on what kind of motivation dominates the decision-making process, the competitive or
the profit maximizing motive.
2.3 Hypotheses
In our analysis, we distinguish between two main effects of the introduction of the
4EP with respect to the officials’ behaviour. First, the introduction of the 4EP causes
a bribe to be divided between two officials instead benefiting just one. Keeping B ’s
behaviour (i.e. the amount of transfer) constant, the splitting of the bribe causes each
official to receive half of what a single official would have got. We call the officials’
immediate reaction to the lower benefit from a bribe in TDT1 and TDT2 the ‘Bribe
Splitting Effect’ (BSE). Second, we consider the pure effect of group decision-making
when we hold marginal effects constant and call it the ‘Group Decision-making Effect’
(GDE).
2.3.1 Bribe Splitting Effect
From a series of experiments using comparable set-ups (e.g. Abbink 2004), we know
that the probability of success increases with the level of transfer (bribe). The phe-
nomenon relates closely to the findings of reciprocity in the gift exchange game (Fehr
et al. 1993). For simplicity we assume that the bribe is shared equally between the two
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officials, ignoring potential distributional issues.12 The existence and magnitude of an
effect stemming from the splitting of a bribe depends on what officials condition their
behaviour on. Officials may consider the monetary benefits of the bribe only or they
may include the ‘intentions’ of the briber. Leaving intentions out, the correlation be-
tween the size of the bribe and the probability of positive reciprocity may be explained
by the trade-off between marginal benefits and marginal costs of engaging in corruption.
Moreover, considering the repeated set-up, the minimum amount of transfer (in an early
period) needs to be large enough to give O an incentive (in terms of expected benefits in
the future) to make her incur personal costs with the objective to trigger B ’s reciprocity
in future periods.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the monetary benefits (Be) and costs (C ) on the y-axis as a
function of the level of transfer on the x-axis for treatments TDT1 and TDT2. In TDT2,
the benefits as well as the costs are split between the officials and hence are both half
as large as in TDT1. The net monetary benefits (differences between benefits and costs)
are labelled as NTDT1 and NTDT2.
Figure 2.2: Monetary Costs and Benefits of corruption in TDT1 and TDT2
For b < 4
3
, corrupt behaviour cannot be rationalized since costs are larger than ben-
efits.13 For b > 4
3
the monetary benefit is always larger in TDT1 than in TDT2. The
difference is increasing in b. If O conditions her corruptibility on the net benefit of the
transaction (at all), the probability of corrupt success must be weakly larger in TDT1
12In our anonymous setting there is no reason to believe that there should be any other kind of
distribution rule to be agreed by both officials.
13For b < 43 not even the technical costs c are covered.
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than in TDT2 for all b > 4
3
.14 The difference in probabilities should be even larger con-
sidering not only the monetary but also the moral costs of inflicting (monetary) harm to
other members of society (i.e. other participants of the experiment in mode 1 or recipients
of the donation in mode 2). Unlike the technical costs (c), these are likely to apply to
both officials at the full scale, since the approval of both is needed to finalize a corrupt
transaction and hence they should both be held morally accountable (see Appendix 2A
under ‘Responsibility and veto Power’).
However, if subjects condition their behaviour on intentions and equilibrium outcomes
alone (i.e. they consider the ‘kindness’ of B ’s decision only in the sense that it leads to
a certain outcome, given that the transaction is successful) there should not be any
difference between the conditional behaviour of type O subjects in TDT1 and TDT2. By
the construction of the experiment15, strategies leading to equalized outcomes between
B and O (ignoring the negative externalities to the public) are equal across treatments
(require the same actions for both types), see Section 2.5.1. Hence outcome-based models
of inequity aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999) would yield the same predictions across
treatments assuming the irrelevance of the negative externality.
Hypothesis 1: “Holding bribe levels constant, there will be no difference in cor-
ruption levels between TDT1 and TDT2, if officials condition their reciprocal behaviour
exclusively on intentions or consider equalization of payoffs only.”
Hypothesis 1 will be rejected if the actual amount of bribe in a particular situation
has an effect on the probability of success of a corrupt transaction (being different in
TDT1 as compared to TDT2). In this case we call the effect the Bribe Splitting Effect
(BSE).
2.3.2 Group Decision-making Effect
In order to measure the effect of group decision-making (GDE) separated from BSE,
we have to compare the behaviour of subjects deciding alone and subjects deciding
14This allows for individual heterogeneity and does not even exclude participants who would never
engage in a corrupt transaction (pj(b; c) = 0 for any value of b and c)
15Including the difference in the number of transactions played per period by the different types.
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within a group in situations in which all relevant decision-makers face the same marginal
monetary incentives. The comparison between IDT1 and TDT1 satisfies this condition.
So we compare the expected number of successful corrupt transactions, E(Nsuccess)IDT1
(one official decides individually) with the expected number of successful corrupt deals,
E(Nsuccess)IDT1 (two officials decide jointly) facing the same bribe b.
In IDT1, the probability of success of a corrupt transaction is pi(b) for the deal in
which official Oi is relevant. Assume that the probability of corrupt success (reciprocity)
is positively dependent on the relevant bribe b (see e.g. Abbink 2004).
In TDT1, officials Oi and Oj decide jointly in Stage 2 and Stage 3. The group decision-
making process provides veto power for non-corrupt and non-reciprocal behaviour (‘reject’
in Stage 2 and ‘defect’ in Stage 3).
In this case the probability of success is pi(b)pj(b) (both officials have to decide in favour
of corruption), if decisions are completely independent. Since pi(b1) ≤ 1 and pj(b2) ≤ 1,
E(Nsuccess)IDT1 = pi(b) ≥ pi(b)pj(b) = E(Nsuccess)TDT1. As long as the individual be-
haviour of officials is independent of the decision-making process (including the obser-
vation of or the belief on the behaviour of the other official), the expected number of
successful corrupt transactions should be weakly greater under IDT1 than under TDT1.
Hypothesis 2: “If decisions are completely independent of the decision-making
process we will observe lower (relative) numbers of successful corrupt transactions in
TDT1 than in IDT1.”
Experimental evidence shows that individual decisions are far from independent when
made inside a group or team. The decisions made by small groups tend to be more
in line with the predictions of the self interested model of payoff maximization when
considering bargaining situations in which competition plays a relevant role, while in
games representing social dilemmas, e.g. the public goods or the gift exchange game,
groups may even move further away from the predictions of standard game theory (Cason
and Mui 1997, Levine and Moreland 1998). Kocher and Sutter (2007) track this back to
two opposing motivations driving the effect of group decision making, the competitive
and the profit maximizing motive. The total effect depends on which of these dominates.
The set-up of a corrupt transaction cannot easily be categorized into one of the two
situations. Where reciprocity-based cooperation increases the level of social welfare in
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most applications (as it usually helps to overcome a social dilemma), corrupt reciprocity
decreases social welfare (and efficiency) by design. For the official it is always individually
(in the short term) as well as socially optimal not to reciprocate in the corruption game.
Competitive Motive
The pure fact of group membership may cause a shift in individual preferences towards
a decision that reflects higher awareness of competition with other groups or individuals
(minimal group paradigm, Tajfel and Turner 1986). In our situation this may push groups
to behave more in line with the predictions of standard game theory. Members of a group
may follow strategies that increase the difference of pay-off levels between in- and out-
group members. Especially under mode 1 (fellow subjects are hit by negative external
effect), this may help cooperation within and hinder cooperation across groups16.
An important question, which cannot easily be answered in our setting, is who
exactly type O subjects consider as their (refernce) group members. This could be the
fellow official (who a subject forms a group with), but it could also be the unit of all
participants involved in the transaction, including the type B subject(s).
Being primarily interested in behavioural differences between individual decision-making
treatments (ID treatments) and group decision-making treatments (GD treatments), the
in-group-effect within the transaction unit (including respective B and O participants)
should be considered as irrelevant, since it should be equally present in all treatments.
What distinguishes individual from group decision-making treatments is the additional
in-group-effect between jointly deciding officials in TDT1 and TDT2. The creation of
a sub-group by letting officials decide jointly may result in more competitive behaviour
towards their type-B transaction (unit) partners, which may result in myopic profit
maximization at the cost of corrupt reciprocity. We denote this motivation as the
Competitive Motive (CM).
Profit Maximizing Motive
The Profit Maximizing Motive (PMM) causes groups to make decisions that yield larger
payoffs (in the long run) while, if necessary, shifting behaviour even further away from
equilibria predicted by standard theory (Kocher and Sutter 2007). Despite being in-
16This may involve the understanding of participants being involved in a reverse public goods dilemma.
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efficient on a social level (by the reverse public goods dilemma), a successful corrupt
transaction yields the largest individual payoffs for the transaction partners (unit), given
the behaviour of other groups. Groups may be more capable of suppressing short-sighted
impulses of behaviour which may maximize myopic payoffs but ultimately decreases total
individual payoffs of all transaction partners. This behaviour includes free-riding or de-
fecting in social dilemmas (e.g. the public goods game using the voluntary contribution
mechanism) and failing to foresee the breakdown of future cooperation (reciprocal rela-
tionships). The Persuasive Argument Theory (PAT, see Pruitt 1971, Bishop and Myers
1974, Burnstein et al. 1973) predicts that groups are more successful in finding strategies
that maximize their members’ long term payoffs. Explorative and knowledge capacities
in groups (containing more than one individual) are expected to be greater than those of
a single individual. Chalos and Pickard (1985) proclaim that groups are better in process-
ing information load. In games where payoff maximizing strategies are as complicated as
in the repeated corruption game, we expect groups to develop and follow more successful
strategies than individuals with respect to maximizing their members’ monetary payoffs
when we assume that groups and individuals exhibit equal preferences with respect to
the trade-off between individual and social welfare maximizing.
Hypothesis 3: “If the group decision-making process is dominated by the CM,
outcomes in TDT1 will be closer to the game theoretical predictions than those in IDT1.
If the PMM dominates group decision-making, groups will produce higher levels of
corruption by following strategies that are more successful in maximizing their members’
individual payoffs.”17
2.3.3 B ’s behaviour
The introduction of the 4EP may not only affect the behaviour of the officials but
also that of the bribers. The direction of the effect depends entirely on the beliefs about
the (effects on the) behaviour of the official(s).18
17Note that the comparison between IDT1 and TDT1 shuts off any potential effect arising from the
splitting of the bribe between the two officials deciding jointly in a group since marginal incentives for
all subjects are the same in both treatments.
18Relying on the assumptions of standard game theory (within the self interested model), we do
not expect bribers across treatments to adhere to different beliefs about the behaviour of groups and
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Even if we assume very restrictive belief structures it is difficult to formulate consistent
hypotheses. If subjects of type B expect groups of officials to be less likely to reciprocate
(given a certain amount of bribe) than individual officials, B ’s reaction can (still) go into
both directions. On the one hand, bribers who want to initiate a corrupt transaction
may be discouraged by their anticipation of a higher probability of failures and therefore
choose ‘0’-transfers more often in the GD treatments. On the other hand, there might be
an increase in the bribe level in the GD treatments, coming from bribers who anticipate
that groups of officials are more demanding to be ‘convinced’ to act in a reciprocal way
than individuals are. Therefore the total effect is ambiguous and depends on which of
the effects dominates the decisions.
The argument for a belief structure that assumes higher reciprocity (for any bribe
level) within groups of officials leads to similarly ambiguous predictions. In contrast to
the inconclusive predictions on B ’s expected reaction on the anticipation of the GDE,
we can form hypotheses on the direction of the effect stemming from B ’s anticipation of
the BSE. This can be quantified by comparing average bribe levels between TDT1 and
TDT2. If bribers anticipate the BSE (correctly) they may send larger transfers in order
to compensate the splitting of the bribe.19
Hypothesis 4: “The bribe level (and distribution) will be different in TDT1 and
TDT2 if type B subjects anticipate officials to behave according to the BSE and react
accordingly.”
2.3.4 Gender effects
An especially important finding in the empirical literature on corruption is the rela-
tionship between gender and corruption. Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) find
that female participation in market transactions leads to lower levels of corruption. Sung
(2003) however advocates that the findings might be at least partly due to inconsistencies
individuals, since in all treatments the Sub game-perfect Nash Equilibrium (see Appendix 2A) is unique
and predicts neither positive transfer levels nor positive reciprocation.
19Note that such a reaction can not be explained by models of inequity aversion, since a strategy that
aims at equalizing payoffs would not proclaim different levels of transfers across these treatments.
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related to omitted variable biases.20
Avoiding these problems, Rivas (2007) as well as Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming)
use controlled laboratory experiments to find that women tend to reciprocate less often
with the corrupt partner in the role of the official even if risk aversion, a potential source
of behavioural gender difference, can be ruled out as a driving force (Schubert et al.
2009).21
The findings lead to the conclusion that the presence of women may destabilize trust
and reciprocity-backed stability of the corrupt transaction. It provides a strong argu-
ment for policies aiming at increasing women participation in corruption-sensitive sectors
within public procurement. Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming) show that the gender
effect is especially strong when B has a direct opportunity of negative reciprocity, i.e.
costly punishment of defective behaviour (by the tool of whistle-blowing). This may be
explained by the fact that female participants are less inclined to reciprocate negatively
and therefore do not anticipate negative reciprocity in the behaviour of their transactions
partners.
In our set-up B ’s only opportunity of negative reciprocity is by reducing bribes in
future periods. Relying on the results of corruption experiments using comparable set-
ups we do not expect a strong gender effect in B ’s behaviour as long as O ’s gender
is unknown. For the individual decision making (ID) treatments, we expect a gender
effect only if the female lack of anticipation of negative reciprocity extends to cross-
period reciprocity (i.e. anticipating lower transfers in periods following a defected transfer
situation). In order to control for gender effects within officials in the GD treatments,
we need to distinguish between pure female groups (both officials are women), mixed
groups and pure male groups. Even if we assume a gender effect within the officials’
decision-making, the interaction of a male and a female official, when deciding jointly, is
20The real but unobserved driver may be the quality and level of development of institutions, affecting
both, women labour market participation and corruption. Assuming a positive correlation between
institutional quality and women (labour market) participation, we would expect an over-estimation of
the predicted effect. Furthermore, women might self-select into sectors where corruption is less rampant.
This may be motivated by a vector of non-measurable variables presenting even more complex problems
of misspecification.
21Note that experiments on corruption that model the individual cost of reciprocation by adding a
lottery including a large loss of payoff with small probability as a fourth stage of the corruption game
(instead of modelling it as a certainty equivalent) cannot distinguish corruption-specific gender effects
from gender effects that are caused through differences in individual risk aversion without controlling for
individual risk attitudes separately.
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unclear.
Hypothesis 5: “If the gender effect is present in our repeated set-up, female officials
in the ID treatments and pure female groups of officials in GD treatments may produce
lower levels of successful corrupt transactions than male officials in ID treatments and
pure male (and mixed groups) in the GD treatments.”
2.3.5 Total effect
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the implementation of the 4EP, we consider the
total effect, i.e. the combination of the BSE and the GDE. The total effect can be directly
measured by the comparison of IDT1 (or IDT2) and TDT2.
The introduction of the 4EP can only help to reduce the level of corrupt activity, if the
conditions of either of the two following situations hold. First, the 4EP will certainly
reduce corruption, if the BSE and the GDE are both positive. Second, it will reduce
corruption, if a positive BSE over-compensates a negative GDE (which is dominated by
the Profit Maximizing Motive).
Only if the GDE is negative and over-compensates the BSE, the introduction of the 4EP
is counter-productive even without considering the costs of the installation of such an
institution.
Hypothesis 6: “If the GDE is negative (PMM is stronger than CM) and dominates
the BSE, the average rate of corrupt success will be greater in TDT2 than in either IDT1
or IDT2. In this case the 4EP is counter-productive.”
2.4 Procedure
All 8 sessions (two sessions for each treatment) were programmed and conducted at
the experimental laboratory MELESSA at the University of Munich. It used the program
Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner 2004). Each
session was conducted with 24 subjects (a total of 192 participants). Subjects were
randomly assigned a type, (B or O) and randomly allocated into units of two in IDT1,
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into units of three (one type B and two type O participants) in TDT1 and into units of
four (two type B and two type O participants each) in IDT2 and TDT2. In all treat-
ments group members stayed together in their units for all 10 periods (partner design)
where full anonymity was ensured.22 Every period was paid where 1 EMU was worth 5
eurocents. Payoffs were summed up over all 10 periods and paid out in private at the end
of the experiment. The whole experiment took less than 90 minutes. The instructions
were kept completely neutral, avoiding any language indicating the subject of research
in order to concentrate on the specific features of the model and minimize the differences
between the instructions of the treatments. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) show
that framing has no significant effect on behaviour in the corruption game. All this was
common knowledge to all participants. Understanding of the (rather complicated) set-up
was insured by partly reading out the instructions, answering questions in private and
checking of several control questions. At the end of the experiment subjects filled in a
questionnaire including demographic information. Payoffs lay between 4 Euros and 25
Euros excluding a show up fee of 4 Euros which is standard to experiments at MELESSA.
Average earnings amounted to 14.37 Euros. A total of 249.10 Euros was paid out as a
donation to the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’ as a result of the decisions made
by the participants in the treatments where we chose mode 2 as a model of the negative
externality (one session in IDT2 and one session in TDT2).
2.5 Results and Interpretation
As noted in Section 2.2, the negative external effect has been modelled in two different
ways. According to predictions using the standard self interested model, there should be
no effect of either of the two models and hence no difference between the set-ups, neither
in the behaviour of the official (or the group of officials) nor in that of the briber. In our
experiment, the difference might have played a role for the size and even direction of the
GDE. In mode 1, the negative external effect hits four randomly chosen participants of
the same session who themselves make decisions that may result in negative payments to
22Note that the interaction of officials was conducted via a chat which did not allow for any form of
identification, see the Appendix 2C for the full instructions of TDT2.
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other participants. This interaction between groups may produce an unwanted additional
in-group effect and destroy the idea of the external effect as an unreciprocated reduction
in the payoff of unrelated third parties. In particular, subjects may justify their own
corrupt behaviour by their belief of others’ corrupt interaction. Corrupt behaviour might
even be considered as a payoff equalizing equilibrium (‘super-game’). In order to rule out
effects stemming from these considerations we applied mode 2 in one session of IDT2 and
one session of TDT2. In mode 2, the ‘super-game’ problem is eliminated by modelling
the negative externality as a reduction of a (fixed) amount of donation to the public aid
organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.23
Checking for differences we compare all relevant variables, i.e. the average total
transfer-level, the transfer levels after success and failure of a corrupt deal (measure
of the client’s reciprocity), the average relative number of successful deals, the percent-
age of rejected bribes and the percentage of zero-value transfers between observations of
the two modes and find no significant difference, taking averages over all 10 periods for
each (relevant) subject and applying (pair-wise) two-sided Mann Whitney U-tests24 on
group levels (p ≥ 0.363; N ≥ 16). We take this as sufficient evidence for the assumption
that the design of the externality (mode) does not have any significant impact on the
outcomes of the relevant decisions. We therefore pool the data from these sessions in the
respective treatments for the entire analysis. The absence of a ‘super-game’ effect may be
explained by subjects having difficulties in forming beliefs of higher orders (see Anderson
and Holt 1997, Hung and Plott 2001).
The main objective of the experiment is to evaluate the introduction of the 4EP by
comparing the main performance variables in IDT2 and in TDT2. This may have been
problematic since these treatments do not only differ in the decision-making process and
splitting of the bribe, but also in the numbers of transactions per period for the officials.
Where in TDT2 an official interacts with each of the two bribers in her unit of four
once in a period, an official in IDT2 only interacts once in every two periods with any
of the bribers in her unit of four. This makes a large difference with respect to the
‘horizon’ of bilateral (IDT2) or multilateral (TDT2) repetition. Considering repetition as
23We chose this organization to be able to compare our results to those obtained in Lambsdorff and
Frank (2007) who use donations to this public aid organization to model the negative externality of their
corruption experiment.
24Unless stated otherwise (exact, highest or lowest) p−values and numbers of observations (N) apply
to the two-sided Mann Whitney U-test.
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a major determinant of reciprocal behaviour (see Abbink 2004) there may be differences
in corrupt behaviour not related to any of the effects discussed in Section 2.3 (GDE and
BSE). A comparison between the outcomes of IDT2 and TDT2 may still be interpreted
as capturing the total effect of the introduction of the 4EP if we take into account that it
may lead to an increase in the frequency of multilateral transactions. This consideration
is not unreasonable assuming that the available number of officials is held fixed across
the situations modelled in the treatments.
To check whether there is an effect of the amount of repetition we compare the
outcomes of IDT1 and IDT2. Although we do not find any significant differences in
the main variables (U-tests; p > 0.236; N ≥ 24), we do not pool the data from these
treatments, but apply separate tests.
2.5.1 Descriptive results
Table 2.1: Performance variables
Corrupt success Payoff Neg. Externality Transfer level
Treatment mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
IDT1 0.25 0.09 13.13 3.92 2.90 1.01 3.18 1.52
IDT2 0.25 0.06 12.72 3.78 3.49 2.12 3.16 1.25
TDT1 0.47 0.07 7.32 4.26 5.13 2.91 3.58 1.15
TDT2 0.42 0.05 9.40 4.05 5.38 1.97 4.15 1.24
All means are calculated as averages across periods and (relevant) participants of the respective
treatment.
Table 2.1 shows the values of the four main performance variables in all treatments.
Corrupt success depicts the average share of successful transactions per unit (Nsuccess
Ntotal
).25
Payoff represents the average payoff level (in Euros) after the reduction of the negative
externality26 (final payoff) per subject. Neg. Externality describes the level of the
25Note that units contain two, three or four individuals, which makes a comparison between absolute
levels of corrupt success inconclusive.
26To be able to accurately compare payoff levels between all treatments, we subtract the relevant
share of the reduction of the donation from the actual payoff in the externality mode 2.
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(relevant) negative externality in Euros. Transfer level measures the average amount of
bribe (in EMU) transferred by type B participants per period and unit.
Corruption levels
Comparing corrupt success rates (Corrupt success) between treatments, we can iden-
tify a relatively small but significant Bribe Splitting Effect. The difference in corrupt
success rates between TDT1 and TDT2 (0.05) is significant (p = 0.082; N = 28). We
reject Hypothesis 1. Corrupt success does not seem to depend exclusively on inten-
tions or final outcomes. Moreover we find a substantial Group Decision-making Effect
(Hypothesis 2). The negative difference in the corrupt success-levels between IDT1 and
TDT1 amounts to 0.22 (p = 0.034; N = 40) and strongly suggests the dominance of the
Profit Maximizing Motive (Hypothesis 3). The large and significant difference (0.17)
between IDT1/IDT2 and TDT2 (IDT1 vs. TDT2: p = 0.002; N=36, IDT2 vs. TDT2:
p = 0.042; N=24) indicates a negative total effect of the introduction of the 4EP even
if we control for the difference in the number of repetitions (between IDT1 and TDT2)
confirming Hypothesis 627.
Figure 2.3: Success-probabilities over Periods
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the differences in the dynamic development of success-
27The Profit Maximizing effect dominates the Competetive Motive in group decision-making. The
resulting effect is stronger than the Bribe Splitting Effect.
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probabilities over the 10 periods between the treatments. Subjects in the GD-treatments
start with very high levels of successful corruption, which decline gradually, showing a
large ‘end-game effect’ (end of repetition in the 10th period), while corruption levels stay
relatively stable (at a lower level) in both ID treatments. We interpret this observation
as first evidence for the hypothesis of groups following systematically different strategies
compared to individuals.
Payoff and externalities
The average net payoff28 is more meaningful in terms of a welfare comparison between
the treatments than the level of corruption. Figure 2.4 shows the average total payoff
level (Payoff ) per subject in comparison to the average negative external effects (caused
by the average subject, Externality) for all four treatments.
Figure 2.4: Payoff levels and levels of externalities
The bilateral differences can be explained through two effects related to the transfer
level and corruptibility. First, the level of transfer increases the payoff independent of
the outcome since bribes are tripled (accounting for the assumed difference in marginal
utility between O and B) and hence enhance efficiency and payoffs. Second, the level of
successful corrupt transactions (which is positively correlated with the transfer level, see
Section 2.5.2) reduces payoff levels through the impact of the negative externality. The
28As net payoff we define the sum of payoffs after subtraction of the externality caused by others’
decisions.
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relatively large (but marginally insignificant) difference in payoff levels between TDT1
and TDT2 of 2.08 Euros (p = 0.157; N = 28) is due to lower levels of transfers and higher
levels of successful corruption. The relatively low difference in payoff levels between both
ID treatments and TDT2 can be explained by the negative difference in bribe levels and
the positive difference in the level of corrupt success. While we can report a significant
difference in payoff levels only between IDT1 and TDT2 (∆ = 3.73; p = 0.071; N = 36)
and not between IDT2 and TDT2 (∆ = 3.32; p = 0.153; N = 24), all differences
between ID treatments and TDT1 are significant on the 1%-level (p ≤ 0.002 N ≥ 28).
Taking cumulated payoffs as a measure for welfare suggests a negative total effect of the
introduction of the 4EP. To consolidate this result we can report large differences between
the treatments in the distribution of payoffs across subjects. Table 2.2 depicts the values
of the Gini-coefficient29 for all treatments.
Table 2.2: Gini Coefficients
IDT1 IDT2 TDT1 TDT2
Gini 0.14 0.15∗ 0.18 0.16∗
Observations 48 48 48 48
Bribers/Officials 24/24 24/24 16/32 24/24
∗ The values of the Gini-coefficients of sessions run in
mode 2 are adjusted for the negative externality.
In both GD treatments some units of subjects accumulate large payoffs by sending high
transfers and profiting from positive reciprocity at the expense of other participants
(mode 1) whose units do not engage in corruption (as often) but are hit by the negative
external effect just the same. This leads to more inequality in payoffs indicated by higher
values in the Gini-coefficients. The difference in the Gini-coefficients between TDT1 and
TDT2 may be due to the different numbers of officials and bribers.
Payoff maximizing strategies of B
Assuming that subjects aim at maximizing personal payoffs, type B subjects’ strategies
29The Gini-coefficient measures the distribution of wealth within a certain population on a scale
between 0 and 1 where a value of 0 corresponds to complete equality and a value of 1 signifies complete
inequality.
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vary systematically in their effectiveness between the treatments. We use a simple linear
panel regression (random effects) to derive the profitability of bribing. To account for
dynamic aspects and potentially decreasing (or increasing) profitability of transfers we
use the following specification for 88 (all) participants of type B. We cluster errors on
the unit level to take possible dependence of behaviour between type B participants into
account.
M1 : PPit = β0 + β1bit + β2b
2
it + γDi + δDi ∗ bit + ζDi ∗ b2it + it (2.1)
Index i stands for respective subject, index t for the respective period. The dependent
variable PP signifies the individual payoff (in EMU) excluding subtractions from the
externality caused by subjects outside a subject’s unit. Independent variable b indicates
the transfer paid by briber i in period t. The quadratic variable b2 captures a potential
non-linear effect of the transfer on period payoffs (decreasing marginal payoffs). Vector
D stands for the treatment Dummy variables DIDT2, DTDT1 and DTDT2. Accordingly,
vectors D∗b and D∗b2 contain interaction effects of b with treatment dummies for TDT2,
TDT1 and TDT2.
We find (see Table 2.8 in Appendix 2B for the full list of estimated coefficients for M130)
that the individual payoff per period is strictly increasing in the level of transfer sent to
the (group) of official(s) in all treatments.
There is no significant evidence for a decreasing profitability of bribing. Neither β2 nor
any element of ζ is different from 0 (t-tests; p ≥ 0.262) in either of the treatments. The
main finding is that bribing is far more profitable in the GD than in the ID treatments.
On average an additional unit of transfer increases the payoff per period by 1.896 EMU in
IDT1 and 2.029 in IDT2 (∆ = 0.1321; t-test: p = 0.284). By contrast, the marginal effect
is 3.94 EMU per unit in TDT1 and 2.63 EMU in TDT2. The differences in the marginal
effects between ID and GD treatments are all highly significant (t-tests for differences
between IDT1 and TDT1 and TDT2: p < 0.001 and F-tests for differences between IDT2
and TDT1/TDT2; p < 0.001).
Payoff maximizing strategies of O
30Using pooled OLS (with and without period dummies) did not yield qualitatively different results.
To account for the censored independent variable we also ran the model with Tobit yielding similar
results.
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The differences in the individual profitability from engaging in corrupt activities between
the treatments are not as large for the officials. We estimate a simple OLS regression,
measuring the marginal effect of N , the number of successful corrupt transactions (num-
ber of choices in which the (group of) official(s) has cooperated) on ‘Payoff’, the total
payoff of each (group of) official(s).31
M2 : Payoffi = β0 + β1Ni + γDi + δDi ∗Ni + i (2.2)
Vectors D and D ∗N have analoguous interpretations as D and D ∗ b in Model M1. The
results of the regression are reported in Table 2.9 of Appendix 2B. Using OLS as well as
Tobit (as a robustness check), we find a strong positive effect of the number of successful
transactions on the total payoff in all treatments. The profitability of being corrupt is
significantly higher in both GD treatments than in the ID treatments (t-tests for IDT1
vs. TDT1/TDT2 and F-tests for IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2; p ≤ 0.004). While officials in
the ID treatments earn on average only 15.892 (IDT1) and 15,075 (IDT2) EMU more
for an additional successful corrupt transaction, the rate is at 19,035 (TDT1) and 20.923
(TDT2) EMU considerably higher in the GD treatments (Differences between ID and
TD treatments are all significant; t-test for IDT1 vs. TDT1/TDT2, F-test for IDT2 vs.
TDT1/TDT2: p ≤ 0.001).
Altruism
To accept a bribe instead of rejecting it (in Stage 2 of the game), means to keep the
benefit of the tripled transfer for oneself instead of sharing it with the public. Moreover,
the corruption game is designed in such a way that for any given level of transfer, the
socially optimal decision (maximizing the sum of payoffs) is to reject the bribe in Stage
2. The number of non-zero rejections of bribes in Stage 2 is extremely low in all four
treatments.32 In only 6.75% of possible cases (i.e. if b > 0) (groups of) type O subjects
reject a non-zero bribe in IDT1 compared to 6.22% in TDT1, 5.40% in IDT2 and 5.48%
in TDT2. Displays of altruism towards the public at a high personal cost (2b) are
31Since officials within a unit in the GD treatments decide jointly they receive the same payoff and
are therefore treated as a single observation. Officials who are in the same unit but decide independently
(IDT2) are treated as individual observations but we cluster their standard errors in the regression.
32Accepting a 0-level bribe should be (weakly) dominated by the option ‘reject’, since it inflicts
damage to the public with no personal gain. Therefore an interpretation as altruistic behaviour cannot
be justified.
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rare and confirm the findings of Büchner et al. (2008) with respect to altruism in the
context of negative externalities. Moreover, we do not find a significant difference across
treatments (pair-wise U-tests between all treatments: p ≤ 0.472; N ≥ 24).
Transfer levels
Average bribe levels (including 0-transfers) are substantially (and significantly, U-tests
in all treatments: p < 0.001, N ≥ 12) larger than 0 for all treatments and almost
identical within the ID treatments (3.18 and 3.16 EMU). Transfers are at 3.58 only
insignificantly larger in TDT1 than in the individual decision-making treatments (TDT1
vs. IDT1/IDT2: p = 0.351/0.464, N = 36/28). At 4.15 EMU, the average transfer
level in TDT2 is significantly (U-tests: TDT2 vs. TDT1/IDT1/IDT2; p ≤ 0.041; N ≥
24) larger than those in any of the other treatments. The large difference in transfer
levels between TDT1 and TDT2 suggests that bribers anticipate different behaviour from
officials and react accordingly. Taking into account that success levels in corruption are
significantly lower in TDT2 than in TDT1 despite the positive difference in transfer
levels, we conclude, assuming realistic beliefs, that bribers anticipate the BSE and ‘react’
by trying to ‘convince’ officials by transferring larger bribes (Hypothesis 4).
The distribution of the size of transfers reveals even more information about B ’s
behaviour. Figure 2.5 shows the relative frequency of transfer levels for all treatments.
Transfers are almost identically distributed in IDT1, TDT1 and IDT2. There are only
few low (b < 4 EMU) and high (b > 8 EMU) transfers. We observe a very strong mode at
b = 5. This particular observation may, e.g. be explained by subjects behaving according
to preferences based on inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The strategy [b = 5
EMU; ‘accept’; ‘cooperate’] leads to equal payoffs for B and O within a unit in all four
treatments.33
The distribution in TDT2 depicts a significantly different pattern. We compare
the distribution of bribes in TDT2 to those in all three other treatments with a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p < 0.001; observations of strictly positive bribes: N ≥ 382;
all observations: N = 480). In TDT2 probability mass is shifted towards the higher
33For the results to be explained by social preferences we either need to assume that B and O ’s
reference group excludes the public (other participants in mode 1 or recipients of donations from ‘Doctors
without Borders’ in mode 2), or assume a certain structure of beliefs on the (corrupt) behaviour of the
other units (only valid for mode 1).
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Figure 2.5: Relative distribution of transfer levels
end of transfer levels. The second mode at b = 10 EMU can be explained by a reaction
to the bribe splitting. Within a certain situation between a particular briber and two
officials, the strategy [‘b = 10 EMU’; ‘accept’; ‘cooperate’] leads to equalized payoffs.
However, since the total payoff for a certain period consists of two payments for each of
the officials, while the briber only receives one, this strategy does not equalize outcomes
with respect to the total period payoff. It is common knowledge (and was made explicitly
clear with the help of several control questions in the instructions) that it is the strategy
[‘b = 5 EMU’; ‘accept’; ‘cooperate’] that yields equal outcomes (in expectations) for all
transaction partners, just as in the other treatments. While the monetary benefits as
well as the monetary costs are split in TDT2 (compared to TDT1) we may interpret the
higher levels of transfer levels in TDT2 as a premium compensation for the ‘moral’ costs
of causing damage to the public, which applies to both participants, since they both
have full (moral) responsibility for the corrupt outcome.34
2.5.2 Conditional reciprocity
Conditional reciprocity of O
Throughout the experimental literature on trust and reciprocity in general (Fehr et al.
34See Appendix 2A for an explanation of full responsibility.
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1993) and on the corruption game in particular (see e.g. Abbink et al. 2002, Abbink
2004, Lambsdorff and Frank 2010), the scale of reciprocation has been found to depend
critically on the first mover’s behaviour (in our case the level of b). In order to explain
differences in the level of corruption between our treatments we need to control for the
level of transfer. Figure 2.6 shows the probability of a successful corrupt deal (in %) for
any positive bribe level (1-12 EMU) for all treatments.
Figure 2.6: Success rates conditional on Transfer
In all treatments success rates increase with the level of b (Spearman rank correlation
coefficients ρ ≥ 0.85; p < 0.001 for all treatments). This is not surprising, since the
cost of corruption is fixed, and future gains from successful reciprocity increase with
the size of the bribe, assuming that bribe levels are positively correlated across periods.
While the relationship between success and transfer levels seems almost linear in IDT1
and IDT2, we observe a different pattern for the GD treatments. In these treatments the
conditional probability is substantially higher for large transfers (b > 5 EMU) and slightly
lower for small ones (b < 5 EMU). We find significant positive differences in probabilities
between GD and ID treatments for larger transfer levels 5 < b ≤ 11, considering transfer
levels separately (TDT1 vs. IDT1/IDT2: p ≤ 0.021, TDT2 vs. IDT1/IDT2: p ≤ 0.094;
N ≥ 12). The negative differences for b < 5 are not significant for pair-wise comparisons
except for b = 2 (IDT1/IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2: p ≤ 0.08; N = 22). Differences at b =
{0; 1; 3; 4; 5; 12} are not significant at any relevant level between ID and TD treatments
(p ≥ 0.127; N ≥ 5).
Parametrically, the most straight-forward way to quantify the differences in the prob-
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ability of a successful corrupt transaction conditional on the relevant transfer between the
treatments is to use a linear panel regression (random effects) controlling for clustered
standard errors on the unit level. Since we are primarily interested in the causal relation-
ship between the level of transfer (b) and the success levels (SC ), we do not distinguish
between a corrupt deal that failed in Stage 2 or in Stage 3. Treating the decisions ‘reject’
and ‘defect’ equally with respect to the outcome of a corrupt deal (success or failure), we
do not have to take the selection process of reaching Stage 3 into account.35
We use the following specifications for the linear probability model:
M3 : Prob(SCit = 1|ψX) = β0 + β1bit + γDi + δDi ∗ bit + θZi + it (2.3)
ψ stands for the vector of coefficients. X represents independent variables. Again, vectors
D and D ∗ b stand for treatment dummies and interaction terms of treatment dummies
with the transfer b, just as in Model M1. Vector Z contains individual demographic
characteristics (e.g. age, gender36, an interaction term between gender and the level of
transfer, etc.) obtained from the questionnaire. Since we do not find any significant
effects with any of these characteristics we do not report them in the regression output
(Table 2.3).37 M3 in Table 2.3 reports the results (coefficients and standard errors) of
the linear probability model.
In all treatments, we find that an additional unit in transfer (b) increases the proba-
bility of the corrupt success significantly (1%-level). The effect is significantly stronger
in both GD than in the ID treatments ( t-tests for IDT1 vs. TDT1/TDT2: p ≤ 0.003,
F-tests for IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2: p < 0.001). There is no indication for the confirma-
tion of the hypothesis that women are less reciprocal in a corrupt transaction (than men)
when we consider observations from all four treatments. The behaviour of female officials
(in ID treatments) and ‘all-female’ groups of officials (in GD treatments) does not appear
to be different from that of their male (‘all-male’ and mixed group-) counterparts with
respect to corrupt reciprocity (all coefficients including a gender dummy remain highly
35Treating the outcomes of ‘reject’ and ‘defect’ differently would require a Heckman-selection process
explaining the selection of cases in which Stage 3 is reached (Heckman 1979).
36For officials in the GD treatments we use a dummy for ‘all-female’ groups and do not distinguish
between ‘all-male’ and mixed groups.
37As a robustness check we ran the panel regression with a series of specifications, including a regression
excluding Z and a set of pooled OLS regressions including dummy variables for periods. None of these
specifications yield results qualitatively different from those reported in the left part of Table 2.3.
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insignificant; t-tests: p ≥ 0.397). Female participants do not seem to behave more in line
with the predictions of the standard self-interested model (Hypothesis 5). An expla-
nation may be found in the absence of the possibility of direct punishment of defective
behaviour by the bribers (e.g. negative costly retaliation), which is believed to be a main
determinant of the gender effect found in Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming).38
Table 2.3: Output of (M3) and (M4)
Dependent variable: SC
(M3) (M4)
Lin. Prob Probit
Coefficient Stand. error Coefficient Stand. error
Constant 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0215 1.5832∗∗∗ 0.1052
DIDT2 0.0981
∗∗∗ 0.0351 0.5442∗∗∗ 0.1536
DTDT1 −0.0343∗∗ 0.016 −0.4637∗∗ 0.2091
DTDT2 −0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0232 −1.3272∗∗∗ 0.3162
b 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0132 0.2123∗∗∗ 0.0171
DIDT2*b −0.0208 0.0175 −0.0981 0.0872
DTDT1*b 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0162 0.2438∗∗∗ 0.0402
DTDT2*b 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0133 0.3402∗∗∗ 0.0540
Pseudo R2 = 0.36 −
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level.
Number of subjects: 96, Number of clusters: 64, Number of periods: 10
The non-linear relationship of success-probabilities and transfer levels observed in
Figure 2.6 can be quantified by a simple maximum likelihood model. To account for
differences in the marginal effect of an additional unit in transfer on the success probability
across transfer levels we run the following Probit model in its panel version (random
effects).39 We use the same set of independent variables and repeat all robustness checks
38See Chapter 3 for a comprehensive discussion of the gender effect.
39See Pereira et al. (2006) and Gneezy and List (2006) for examples of the use of a panel version of
maximum likelihood models in comparable settings, i.e. repeated gift exchange games.
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(pooled version etc.) applied to the linear probability model (M3).
M4 : Prob(SCit = 1|ψX) = φ(β0 + β1bit + γDi + δDi ∗ bit + θZi) (2.4)
Again, ψ stands for the vector of coefficients and X for independent variables. As ex-
pected, qualitative results (direction and significance of the evaluated marginal effects at
the mean of of transfers b = 3.46) do not change compared to the results from the linear
probability model, see (M4) in Table 2.3. Table 3.10 in Appendix 2B reports marginal
effects of the relevant40 variables as well as predicted conditional probabilities of success
of model M4. The Probit model shows that marginal effects are lower in the TD than in
the ID treatments for low transfers, b < 3, while they are higher for b ≥ 4. Consequently,
the predicted success levels (probabilities) conditional on the transfer level are lower in
the TD treatments than in the ID treatments for b ≤ 4 while they are larger for b ≥ 6
(see Table 2.10 in Appendix 2B).
The pattern shown in Figure 2.6 and quantified in M4, i.e. a stronger curvature of
the probabilistic cumulative distribution function for GD than for ID treatments, may
be explained by differences in the strategies between groups and individuals. On the one
hand, groups of officials seem to ‘defect’ (or ‘reject’) more often in the case of low transfer
levels. On the other hand, they seem to be more likely to reward high transfers than their
individual counterparts by corrupt reciprocity. We interpret this as strategic signals of
unwillingness to return the corrupt favour in less profitable transactions (aiming at in-
ducing a higher transfer in the following periods) and signals of willingness to reciprocate
for high transfers (aiming at receiving further high transfer in future periods in exchange
for cooperation). This strategy seems to aim at the extraction of a maximum amount of
cumulative bribes. In all treatments, a large fraction of non-zero transfers over all ten
periods (between 36% in IDT1 and 52% in TDT2) fall into the interval for which the
probability of success is significantly larger in the GD than in the ID treatments. Hence
the strategies followed by groups seem to be more successful in the sense of higher recip-
rocal stability between briber and official than the strategies applied by individuals. We
interpret this as a piece of strong evidence for the dominance of the Profit Maximizing
Motive in group decision-making (Hypothesis 3).
40Again we do not report any coefficients that are not significant, e.g. a dummy variable for gender.
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Conditional reciprocity of B
The stabilization of the corrupt transaction does not only depend on the reciprocal be-
haviour of the official but also on that of the briber. In order to test for conditional
reciprocity on the side of the briber, we compare the average size of transfer between
periods that follow a successful corrupt transaction and those that follow a failed41 trans-
action. We apply a method introduced by Abbink (2004) that requires calculating the
difference in average bribe transfers after a successful and after an unsuccessful deal (ig-
noring the history of events up to this point in time) for every type B participant. The
resulting variable is called R ( R =
∑
bs
Ns
−
∑
bf
Nf
, where s stands for success and f for fail-
ure). Replicating the qualitative results reported by Abbink (2004), briber’s reciprocity
is strictly positive for an average of 83% (79.2% in IDT1, 82.3% in IDT2, 87.5% in TDT1
and 84.3% in TDT2) of (the total of 88) typeB participants in all treatments. This indi-
cates a strong positive correlation between former corrupt success and the magnitude of
the bribe in the next period.42 Additional to the simple R-values we also calculate a ad-
justed R-values which consider only observations of type B subjects who exhibit at least
one case of corrupt success and at least one case of corrupt failure.43 We can reject the
hypothesis that R- (adjusted R-) values are different from 0 for all treatments (Wilcoxon
matched pairs signed rank test, p < 0.001; N ≥ 14).
We find substantially higher R-values for both GD treatments than for the ID treat-
ments, which further strengthens the hypothesis concerning the success of strategies fol-
lowed by groups of officials with respect to payoff maximization through corrupt reci-
procity (maximizing the benefit from transfers). This also explains why corruption is
more profitable for officials in the GD treatments (see Section 2.5.1). Type B subjects
may anticipate type O ’s strategies with respect to reciprocity and adapt by developing
more accentuated reciprocity in their own behaviour. We do not find any significant
effect of gender (splitting observations according to B ’s gender in all treatments and ap-
plying pair-wise U-tests, female vs. male: p ≥ 0.476; N ≥ 14) with respect to bribers’
reciprocity.
41Again, we do not distinguish between cases of rejected bribes and cases of defections.
42The variable R is a very crude measure of reciprocity in the sense that it does not control for
potential determinants of the decision, e.g. the number of successful transactions before t − 1 or the
magnitude of transfers in former situations. Nevertheless it provides some (comparable) measure of B ’s
reciprocity.
43For groups without observations of both choices the interpretation of R is useless. Therefore we
exclude those groups in the statistical tests.
Bringing the Four-Eyes-Principle to the Lab 70
Table 2.4: R-value and adjusted R-value
IDT1 IDT2 TDT1 TDT2
R-Value 1.846∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗ 2.857∗∗∗ 2.720∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.36) (0.45 ) (0.39)
adjusted R-Value 2.445∗∗∗ 2.300∗∗∗ 3.064∗∗∗ 3.142∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.32) (0.37) (0.28)
Standard deviations in parentheses
*** denotes significance of a Wilcoxon matched pairs rank sum test
at the 1%-level
2.5.3 Switching behaviour
So far we have analyzed revealed behaviour by considering outcomes alone. Our data
on the group decision-making process allows for a more detailed analysis of the reasons
and motivations underlying observed treatment differences. Since there are no significant
differences in the behaviour of officials between the treatments in Stage 2 (see Section
2.5.1) we concentrate on O ’s Stage 3 behaviour.
The data on initial choices of individual officials in the GD treatments demonstrate that
(at least part of) the higher levels of reciprocity within groups are due to mechanisms
within the decision-making process and not based on differences in individual preferences.
First, we identify situations in which officials within a group initially revealed opposing
opinions on a decision, i.e. one official in the group chose to ‘defect’ and the other to ‘coop-
erate’ in the first step of the decision-making process. Second, we compare the (relative)
numbers of successful corrupt transactions and failures following initial disagreement.
For simplicity we pool cases of final disagreement and final consent against reciprocation
(since both cases lead to a failed deal because of the veto power rule). Tables 2.5 and 2.6
show average percentages of corrupt success and failure conditional on initial consent (or
the lack of it).
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Table 2.5: Success and Initial Consent, TDT1
Successful corruption Failed Corruption Total
No initial Consent 23.13% 8.75% 31.88%
Initial Consent 23.75% 44.37% 68.12%
Total 46.88% 53.12% 100%
Averages are derived from 160 transactions (16 independent groups of officials in 10
periods) in TDT1
Table 2.6: Success and Initial Consent, TDT2
Successful corruption Failed Corruption Total
No initial Consent 20.42% 18.33% 38.75%
Initial Consent 21.66% 39.59% 61.25%
Total 42.08% 57.92% 100%
Averages are derived from 240 transactions (12 independent groups of officials in 10
periods) in TDT2
Assuming independence of decisions (i.e. no influence of the process on final decisions)
we would expect 100% of transactions without initial consent to fail because of the veto
power of the non-reciprocating official. On the contrary, we find that the final decision
was made in favour of (corruption-stabilizing) reciprocity in 72.6% (23.13
31.88
, TDT1 in Table
2.5) and 52.70% (20.42
38.75
, TDT2 in Table 2.6) of cases in which the two officials initially
disagreed. Assuming that initial decisions reflect the true underlying preferences, this
means that the decision-making process alone is responsible for a large share of the
treatment effects with respect to corrupt success levels. We conclude that (in both
treatments) those officials who are in favour of engaging in, or maintaining, a successful
corrupt relationship dominate the outcome of the decision-making process although
their decision-adversaries hold veto power. We take this finding as evidence for the
Persuasive Argument Theory (Pruitt 1971) which suggests that those participants (in
the role of O) who provide the most valuable ideas for maximizing long term individ-
ual payoffs during the experiment (which in our case is the maintenance of the corrupt
relationship through reciprocity, see Section 2.5.2) dominate the decisions within a group.
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2.5.4 Content analysis
In addition to the arguments derived from the comparison of outcomes between
the treatments (see Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2) and the analysis of choices in the different
phases of the group decision-making process (see Section 2.5.3), we are able to get some
insight into the mechanism of group decision-making by considering the content of the
messages44 exchanged during the decision-making processes of Stage 2 and Stage 3. 22
(out of 28, 16 in TDT1 and 12 in TDT2) groups exchanged electronic messages.45 First,
we separate messages and identify 132 distinct statements.46 We allocate each statement
(sent in either of the two stages) into four main categories: ‘Neutral’ (statements that
do not contain any traceable argument, e.g. ‘Hello, nice game’); ‘Social’ (statements
including arguments against the cooperation in the corrupt transaction mentioning
the negative externality, e.g. ‘We have to consider the effect on the others, we should
not cooperate’); ‘Strategic’ (arguments in favour of the stabilization of the reciprocal
relationship with the objective of payoff maximization, e.g. ‘Let us cooperate, otherwise
we won’t get any profit in the next period(s)’) and ‘Strategic Neg.’ (arguments against
cooperation in a certain period to implicitly demand larger transfers in future periods,
e.g. ‘Do not re-transfer, then he [the briber] will know to give more next time’).47 We
add a 5th category ‘Social/Strategic’ to account for (mostly twisted) statements that
included both, other-regarding (social) and strategic (payoff maximizing) arguments.
Table 2.7 reports the relative frequencies of statements of the respective categories
subdivided by the final outcome of the respective transaction in terms of success and
failure. Of all statements, only 12.2%48 contain other-regarding arguments (Social and
Social/Strategic). Their low frequency is noteworthy, and so is their lack of effectiveness
(only 37.7%49) of transactions finally fail).
44We analyse all electronic chat messages exchanged by officials in the GD treatments.
456 groups either did not encounter a situation of initial disagreement or ignored the possibility of
writing messages.
46A ‘conversation’ between two officials may yield more than one statement since it may be split into
single entries.
47All examples are translated (word by word) into English from the original statements in German.
488.3 + 3.9%, Table 2.7
49 3.1+1.5
12.2 %, Table 2.7
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Table 2.7: Success and Content
Neutral Social Strategic Strategic Neg. Social/Strategic Total
Success 8.3% 0.8% 27.3% 1.5% 6.8% 44.7%
Failure 31.8% 3.1% 12.1% 6.8% 1.5% 55.3%
Total 40.1% 3.9% 39.4% 8.3% 8.3% 100%
Percentages are derived from 132 statements in TDT1 and TDT2
An explanation may be that in more than 75% of all situations a social argument was
followed (in the same chat conversation) by a statement arguing in favour of strategic
reciprocity. 82% of these situations ended with a successful corrupt transaction. The
majority (56.0%50) of statements contained arguments in favour of some kind of strategic
reciprocity. Additional to 63 statements of positive reciprocity there were 11 separate
statements arguing in favour of strategic defection aimed at extracting larger bribes in
future periods. In 19 (out of all 28 or 22 relevant) groups of officials we found at least
one statement in favour of strategic reciprocity (positive or negative).
The dominance of arguments in favour of payoff maximization is demonstrated not
only by the relative frequency but also by the effectiveness as to corrupt success (71.5%51
of statements including an argument for strategic (positive) reciprocity ended in a suc-
cessful corrupt transaction). This provides another piece of evidence for the hypothesis
that the Profit Maximizing Motive is the driving force in the decisions made in groups.
Arguments that seem persuasive in the pursuit of payoff maximizing are adopted and
corresponding suggestions (i.e. maintenance of strategies aiming at payoff maximizing
through corrupt reciprocity) realized, while arguments in favour of social efficiency (and
fairness) are neglected, since they would lead to individually costly strategies. Again the
argumentation is in line with the Persuasive Argument Theory (Pruitt 1971).
We leave it to further research to separate the effect of the decision-making process
from effects stemming exclusively from the nature of the exchange of arguments via
electronic chat messages. For our purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the 4EP the
effort of distinguishing between those two would lead to an even more artificial setting
and therefore would not help to derive conclusions.
5039.4 + 8.3 + 8.3%, Table 2.7
51 27.3+6.8
39.4+8.3%, Table 2.7
Bringing the Four-Eyes-Principle to the Lab 74
2.6 Conclusion
The results of our experiment are interesting in two respects. First, they serve as
an assessment of the usefulness of the Four Eyes Principle. Second, they provide an
insight into the mechanism of group decision-making. With our experiment, using the
framework of a simple 3-Stage game which is standard in the experimental corruption
literature, we show that the introduction of the Four Eyes Principle, which is generally
promoted as one of the most effective tools to curb corruption (Pörting and Vahlenkamp
1998, Rieger 2005, Wiehen 2005), can be counter-productive. We find that it increases the
relative number of successful corrupt transactions as well as the amount of bribes being
transferred resulting in reduced welfare (measured by the sum of participants’ payoffs)
and equality (measured in the distribution of payoffs across participants).
Moreover, we find two opposing effects of the introduction of the Four Eyes Principle.
One, the Bribe Splitting Effect, is caused by the splitting of the transfer between two
officials, which reduces the level of corruption by changing the trade-off between its costs
and its benefits. The other, the Group Decision-making Effect, increases the level of
corruption. We are able to separate these two effects by the use of four different treatments
and show that the Group Decision-making Effect is negative and over-compensates the
Bribe Splitting Effect. This leaves a negative total effect from the introduction of the
Four Eyes Principle with respect to the level of corruption and resulting social efficiency.
To explain the direction and magnitude of the Group Decision-making Effect (leading
to higher conditional rates of reciprocity) we proceeded in three steps. First, the differ-
ences in revealed strategies between groups and individuals (i.e. final outcomes) can be
identified by non-parametric tests and quantified by (parametric) regression analyses of
conditional levels of corruption. Groups of officials reciprocate more often for high trans-
fers and less often for low transfers than individual officials. These functional strategies
lead to a higher number of successful corrupt transactions in the group decision-making
treatments. Second, the analysis of behaviour within the group decision-making process
provides further evidence. Contrary to predictions, in most cases initial disagreement be-
tween jointly deciding officials leads to a successful corrupt transaction despite the veto-
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power of non-corrupt officials. Third, we analyze the content of electronic chat-messages,
exchanged during the decision-making process. Arguments in favour of strategic reci-
procity (i.e. initiating or maintaining only corrupt transactions that yield a large payoff
through high transfers) dominate the decision making-process not only quantitatively
but also in terms of effectiveness (outcomes). The results of this 3-step analysis suggest
the dominance of the ‘Profit Maximizing Motive’ in the group decision-making process
(Kocher and Sutter 2007). This is in line with the Persuasive Argument Theory (Pruitt
1971).
Moreover, we show that the Profit Maximizing Motive drives group decisions further
away from the theoretical predictions in a situation where there is, in contrast to the gift
exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993), a trade-off between unit (group)-level payoff maximiza-
tion and social efficiency. While groups of officials seem to be better in maximizing their
unit(group)-level payoffs through maintaining corrupt relationships based on trust and
reciprocity (explainable by higher cognitive capacity, Chalos and Pickard 1985), they do
not manage to take the negative externalities (produced by successful corruption) into
account, which ultimately aggravates the social dilemma of corruption.
So, policies that prescribe group decision-making should be restricted to situations
for which the pursuit of maintaining reciprocal and payoff maximizing strategies are in
line with the policies’ objectives. Our results cast serious doubt on the usefulness of the
Four Eyes Principle for situations where this condition does not apply. Looking into the
black box of the mechanism that underlies group decision-making through the analysis of
processes in combination with content analyses within controlled laboratory experiments
may help to interpret behavioural patterns and to discover determinants of situations
where the strategic use of group decision-making might reduce social inefficiencies. Fu-
ture research should be directed at the theoretical foundation of the mechanisms found
within group decision-making.
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2.7 Appendix 2
Appendix 2A: Proofs
Equilibrium in the 3-Stage Game
Proof by (backward Induction).
Denote by Ii,n the information set in stage i (i  {1, 2, 3}) of period n (n  {1, 2, ..., 10}).
Let p(Ii,n) be the probability of reaching the respective stage and q(‘s′|Ii,n) the condi-
tional probability of the relevant agent choosing action ‘s’ once reached Stage (i, n). An
information set contains all relevant information about ego’s and alter’s behaviour up to
the respective stage. Furthermore let PO(Ii,n) be the (sum of) payoff(s) gained up to the
arrival of stage (i, n).
First we show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which O chooses ‘co-
operate’ in Stage 3 of the last (10th) period. Consider a Strategy-Set EQU1 =
[s1,1, s2,1, s3,1, s1,2..., s3,10] in which the third stage of period 10 is reached with some prob-
ability (p(I3,10) > 0) and O cooperates with some probability (q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) > 0).
Compare the payoff, resulting from the realization of Strategy-Set EQU1 (PO(EQU1))
to the one of an alternative Strategy-Set EQU1new which consists of the same strategies
up to I3,10 but for which q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) = 0 yielding payoff PO(EQU1new).
Since the payoff for period 10 is larger for EQU1new, since 8 + 3 ∗ b < 12 + 3 ∗ b,
EQU1 cannot constitute a Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Second we show that,
in the last (10th) period, B will never choose any Strategy-Set that includes the action
‘b > 0’ in Stage 1. Consider again a Strategy-Set EQU2 = [s1,1, s2,1, s3,1, s1,2, ..., s3,10]
in which p(I1,10) > 0, q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) = 0 and q(‘b > 0’|I1,10) > 0.52 Again compare
PO(EQU2) to PO(EQU2new), the payoff of a Strategy-Set that differs from the former
only in q(‘b > 0’|I1,10) = 0. Since 12 − b ≤ 12, payoff PO(EQU2) must be smaller
than PO(EQU2new) so that EQU2 cannot constitute an equilibrium. Hence only a
Strategy-Set featuring [s1,1, ..., s9,1, ‘b = 0’, ‘accept’/‘reject’, ‘defect’] can characterize an
equilibrium.
52Given that q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) = 0 must be satisfied, O will never choose ‘reject’ in Stage 2 for
‘b > 0’ and is indifferent between ‘reject’ and ‘accept’ if ‘b = 0’, see Appendix 1C in Chapter 1.
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Consider now a period-set PS = {k, ..., 10} of (the last 10-k) consecutive periods
for which the above stated last period’s equilibrium Strategy-Set is played. Assume
q(‘cooperate’|I3,k−1) > 0 for the period k − 1. By the same line of arguments as for the
last (10th) period we can easily repeat the task up to the point of excluding all strategy
sets that do not exhibit the strategy characteristics of the (Stage Game) equilibrium in
the 10th period [‘b = 0’, ‘accept’/‘reject’, ‘defect’]. Letting k decrease from 9 down to 1,
it is obvious that the Stage Game Nash Equilibrium remains the only Sub Game perfect
Nash Equilibrium in the (finitely) repeated game.
Responsibility and Veto Power
Consider two officials, Oi and Oj, who decide jointly in Stage 3 between ‘cooperate’
(c) and ‘defect’ (d). Consider Oi’s preferences to be represented by the utility function
Ui(s1, s2) where s1 is her own action and s2 that of Oj. Oi’s decision is pivotal only
if s2 = c. If not (s2 = d), the outcome is (d) giving utility Ui(d, d), independent from
Oi’s choice. This means that giving up responsibility works only in the cases where
the socially optimal choice is taken anyway. Therefore, no official who is deciding
jointly in a group can (for herself) deny responsibility for her group’s corrupt behaviour
since this would need the approval of both officials. For these reasons we believe
that a lack of individual responsibility within a group cannot be applied as an argument
in favour of the prediction of higher levels of corruptibility among officials within a group.
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Appendix 2B: Figures and Tables
Extensive forms of games in all treatments
In all treatments except TDT2 both, O and B, decide once in every period. In TDT2
only B decides once per period while each O decides twice.
Figure 2.7: Extensive forms of TDT1 and IDT1
Figure 2.8: Extensive forms of TDT2 and IDT2
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Table 2.8: Model M1, Random effects estimation
Dependent variable: PP
Linear (OLS) Tobit
Coefficient Stand. error Coefficient Stand. error
Constant 22.2525∗∗∗ 1.02 22.1728∗∗∗ 1.92
b 1.8964∗∗∗ 0.28 1.8776∗∗∗ 0.35
b2 −0.2727 -0.29 −0.2734 -0.32
DIDT2 −0.1221 0.19 −0.1456 0.19
DTDT1 −6.3437∗∗∗ 0.84 −6.3332∗∗∗ 1.14
DTDT2 −3.0786∗∗∗ 0.46 −3.1232∗∗∗ 0.65
DIDT2*b 0.1321 0.17 0.1432 0.19
DTDT1*b 2.0542∗∗∗ 0.34 2.0318∗∗∗ 0.42
DTDT2*b 0.7415∗∗∗ 0.19 0.7332∗∗∗ 0.21
D2IDT2*b −0.0208 0.14 −0.0328 0.10
D2TDT1*b −0.2528 0.21 −0.2421 0.28
D2TDT2*b 0.4451 0.31 0.4721 0.52
overall R2 = 0.54 -
Number of periods: 10, Number of observation: 88, Number of
clusters: 64 (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors in OLS
Table 2.9: Model M2
Dependent variable: Payoff
OLS Tobit
Coefficient Stand error Coefficient Stand error
Constant 225.2521∗∗∗ 54.92 224.5843∗∗∗ 44.47
N 15.8923∗∗∗ 2.48 15.5952∗∗∗ 3.11
DIDT2 −7.1245 10.29 −7.0319 8.39
DTDT1 −156.3421∗∗∗ 42.87 −157.2822∗∗∗ 44.27
DTDT2 −133.17∗∗∗ 39.72 −134.0318∗∗∗ 41.90
DIDT2*N −0.8177 1.17 −0.7849 1.06
DTDT1*N 3.1425∗∗∗ 0.73 3.1929∗∗∗ 0.75
DTDT2*N 5.0308∗∗∗ 0.95 5.1121∗∗∗ 0.78
adjusted R2 = 0.43 -
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level; Number of observations: 76;
Number of clusters: 64 (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors
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Table 2.10: Model M4
Dependent variable: SC
transfer level
0 1 2 3 4 5
b 0.026∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
DIDT2*b −0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
DTDT1*b 0.018∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
DTDT2*b 0.015∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
SˆCIDT1 0.093 0.119 0.154 0.198 0.254 0.319
SˆCIDT2 0.092 0.116 0.147 0.192 0.241 0.303
SˆCTDT1 0.013 0.044 0.091 0.172 0.239 0.352
SˆCTDT2 0.009 0.034 0.073 0.146 0.195 0.318
transfer level
6 7 8 9 10 11
b 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
DIDT2*b −0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
DTDT1*b 0.057∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
DTDT2*b 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
SˆCIDT1 0.392 0.471 0.555 0.638 0.715 0.785
SˆCIDT2 0.370 0.445 0.523 0.598 0.672 0.737
SˆCTDT1 0.510 0.627 0.723 0.889 0.921 0.998
SˆCTDT2 0.471 0.542 0.698 0.802 0.897 0.967
Number of subjects: 96
Number of units: 64
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level
Marginal effects are calculated at the respective values of transfer and at the means
of the remaining independent variables
SˆC denotes the estimates for the success probabilities conditional on the respective
transfer levels.
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Appendix 2C: Instructions from TDT2 (translated from German)
Thank you very much for your appearance. In the next 90 minutes you will take part in an
experiment in the laboratory of MELESSA. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can
(depending on your decisions) earn money, additional to the show-up fee of 4 Euros. Additional to the
money you can earn for yourself, you will affect the amount of donation to the public aid organization
‘Doctors without Borders’. The money you will earn during the experiment will be added to the show-up
fee and paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. The money that is going to be donated will be
transferred to the donations account of ‘Doctors without Borders’.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. If you have
questions, please approach one of the experimenters by raising your hand. In the case of violation of
this rule we have to exclude you from any payments.
During the experiment we will refer to Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) instead of Euros. Your
income will be calculated in EMU. In the end of the experiment the total amount will be exchanged in
Euros.
The exchange rate is 1 EMU = 5 Eurocents.
All 24 participants are assigned to groups of four. Neither the experimenters nor the other participants
know which group you are in. Your decisions remain completely anonymous.
The Decision Situation
There are two types in this experiment: type A and type B. The types play different roles and make
decisions that affect their own income, the income of the other participants of the experiment and the
amount of donation transferred to the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’. The type of a participant
is allocated randomly.
A group of four consists of two type A and two type B participants who stay together for the entire
experiment.
The experiment has 10 periods.
Procedure:
All of the 10 periods consist of at most 3 Stages.
Stage 1
In the first Stage, every participant of type A (type A Nr 1 and type A Nr 2) decides on the size of
their transfer (T1 denotes type A Nr 1’s transfer and T2 denotes type A Nr 2’s transfer) which has to
lie between 0 and 12 EMU.
Next, the amount of the transfers is tripled and then split equally between the two type B participants
(type B Nr 1 and type B Nr 2) of the group of four. If T1 is for example 6 EMU, type B Nr 1 receives
9 EMU (0.5 ∗ 6 ∗ 3 EMU) and type B Nr 2 receives 9 EMU.
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Hence there are 2 situations per group in any period:
Situation 1: Type A Nr1 transfers T1 to the two type B participants (where T1 is first tripled and
then shared)
Situation 2: Type A Nr2 transfers T2 to the two type B participants (where T2 is first tripled and
then shared)
Stage 2
In Stage 2 the two type B participants decide jointly on how to react on the transfer of the respective
type A participant. They have (in both situations) two alternatives.
1st Alternative: Both decide (for a specific transfer, e.g. T1) jointly for ‘keep’: In this case Stage 3 is
entered
2nd Alternative: One or both decide in favour of ‘distribute’: In this case, the respective type A partici-
pant (e.g. type A Nr 1) does not get a bonus (and receives only 12 - T1 EMU). The type B participants
both get 6 EMU plus half of the value of the transfer (6 + 0.5 ∗ T1 EMU). Moreover, the amount of
2 ∗ T1 + 24 EMU is transferred as a donation to the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.
A joint decision between the two subjects is found as follows.
First, each of the two type B participants decides individually whether to ‘keep’ or to ‘distribute’ the
particular transfer.
If the decision is not unanimous (one type B participant wants to ‘keep’ and the other wants to
‘distribute’ the transfer), the decision of the fellow participant appears on his or her own screen.
Next, the participants decide once again separately. If there is still no agreement, the two type B
participants can exchange messages via an electronic ‘chat’ (see explanation below) for one minute.
After this the participants decide for the last time.
Note that only if both type B participants decide in favour of ‘keep’ the third Stage is actually reached.
Since there are two type A participants in every group of four (type A Nr 1 and type A Nr 2), each
of the type B participants has to decide (jointly with the other type B participants) in two situations:
once for T1 and once for T2.
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Stage 3
In Stage 3 (which is only reached if both type B subjects have chosen ‘keep’) the two type B participants
decide again jointly whether to initiate a re-transfer or not.
Again, both type B subjects decide separately first.
If the decision is not unanimous (one type B participant wants to initiate the re-transfer and the other
does not), the decision of the other participant is shown on the screen. Then the participants can decide
again separately. If there is still no consent, the participants enter again a ‘chat’ in which they can
exchange electronic messages for one minute. After this, there is a final decision.
1. Case: Both type B participants decide in favour of a re-transfer. Both carry the costs of 2
EMU each (independent of the amount of the respective transfer). They both get 6 EMU plus
one and a half times the value of the transfer, less the costs of 2 (6 + 1.5 ∗ T1 − 2 EMU). The
respective type A participant (type A Nr 1) receives a Bonus of 16 EMU in addition to the 12
EMU of initial endowment (16 + 12 − T1). In this case there is no donation to the organization
‘Doctors without Borders’.
2. Case: One or both type B participants decide against a re-transfer. In this case, there are no
personal costs for the two type B participants (they get 6 + 1.5 ∗ T1 each), the respective type A
participant does not receive a bonus (and gets 12− T1), and the donation to the organization is
20 EMU.
In the end, all participants are shown their personal income in the period. Please note, that the type
A participants can thereby reconstruct whether or not the type B participants chose for or against the
re-transfer.
These (maximal) 3 stages are repeated 10 times (10 periods). Since the members of groups stay together,
participants always interact with the same persons in the same roles for the entire experiment.
(Type A Nr 1 remains type A Nr 1. type A Nr 2 remains type A Nr 2 etc.)
Chat:
Type B subjects potentially have the possibility to communicate via real time electronic messaging
(Chat) with their fellow type B subject to agree on a joint decision (e.g. ‘keep’ or ‘distribute’) in Stage
2 and Stage 3.
The content of the communication is generally free to choose but there are some restrictions. You are
not allowed to make statements about personal characteristics such as your name, age, address, gender,
subject of study or any information that might lead to your identification. Moreover, strong language
is strictly forbidden. Anyone who violates these rules of communication will be automatically expelled
from the experiment and will not get any payments for the entire experiment.
Each participant in the chat can send as many messages to the other participant as he wishes or is able
to send within the time limit of one minute.
Every message appears automatically on the screens of both type B participants of a group of four but
cannot be seen by any other participant of the experiment.
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Payoff table
The following table shows the kind of consequences the decisions of the participants lead to - in terms
of their own payoff, the payoff of the other participants and the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’
(Example for T1).
The following table can be read as follows. Generally we start from the top and go down cell by cell. If
a participant chooses a certain alternative, only those cells that lie directly beneath it are relevant for
the next period.
The payoff table is analogous for situations in which T2 (Transfer of Type A Nr2) is relevant.
Note that each type B participant receives two payments because two situations are relevant for each
of them, one with type A Nr 1 (T1 is relevant) and one with type A Nr 2 (T2 is relevant). These two
are added up for any period.
For the type A participants only one situation per period is relevant so that there is only one payment
per period.
Each participant gets information at the end of each period about his own personal payoff. Type A
subject can infer whether type B subjects have chosen to initiate a re-transfer or not.
Note that the sum of payments (exchanged in Euros) to the organization is actually donated to ‘Doctors
without Borders’.
Timing
Stage 1: Type A Nr1 chooses T1 and Type A Nr2 chooses T2
Stage 2: Type B Nr1 and Type B Nr2 decide (T1 and T2) each time jointly about ‘keep’ or ‘distribute’
Stage 3:
Situation (for T1): Only reached if in this situation, both Type B participants chose ‘keep’ in Stage 2.
In this case, both Type B participants decide jointly whether to initiate a re-transfer or not.
Situation (for T2): is analogous, only for T2.
At the end of each of the ten periods, each participant gets information about his/her own payoff in
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the respective period. At the end of the last (10th) period, participants get to know their final income
and their payment in Euros.
The following control questions will help you to get a better understanding of the situation. All
the necessary information can be found in the payment table.
Please answer all the control questions and raise your hand when you have finished. An experimenter
will come to your place to check your solutions.
Question 1
Assume that you are type A Nr1 and you chose a transfer of 4 EMU (T1). The other participant
of type A (type A Nr2) has chosen a transfer (T2) of 10 EMU.
Situation 1 (T1): One of the participants of type B in your group of four (type B Nr1) decides to
‘distribute’ your transfer (T1). The other participant of type B (type B Nr2) wants to ‘keep’ your
transfer (T1). (Therefore Stage 3 is not reached.)
Situation 2 (T2): Both type B participants chose to ‘keep’ the transfer of type B Nr 2 (T2) in Stage 2
and decide against a re-transfer in Stage 3.
a) What is the payoff of type B Nr1 in the situation (1) with type A Nr1 (you)?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the payoff of type B Nr2 in the situation (1) with type A Nr1 (you)?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is your (type A Nr1) total payoff in this period?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the total payoff of type B Nr1 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
e) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
f) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
g) What is the amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ caused by the situation relevant to you
(type A Nr1)?
Your answer:________________________
h) What is the amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ caused by the situation relevant to
type A Nr2?
Your answer:________________________
i) What is the total amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ in this period?
Your answer:________________________
j) What is the total amount of payoff generated by the decisions of your group of four?
Your answer:________________________
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Question 2
Assume that you (type A Nr1) and type A Nr2 have both chosen a transfer of 0 (T1 is 0 EMU and T2
is 0 EMU). Neither participant of type B (neither type B Nr1 nor type B Nr2) wants to ‘keep’ any of
the two transfers in Stage 2.
a) What is your (type A Nr1) total payoff in this period?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the total payoff of type A Nr2 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the total payoff of type B Nr1 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
e) What is the total amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ in this period?
Your answer:________________________
f) What is the total amount of payoff generated by the decisions of your group of four?
Your answer:________________________
Question 3
Assume that you (type A Nr1) have chosen a transfer of 5 EMU (T1 is 5 EMU) and type A Nr2 has
also chosen a transfer of 5 EMU (T2 is 5 EMU). Both participants of type B (type B Nr1 and type B
Nr2) decide to ‘keep’ the transfer and initiate a re-transfer in Stage 3.
a) What is your (type A Nr1) total payoff in this period?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the total payoff of type A Nr2 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the total payoff of type B Nr1 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
e) What is the total amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ in this period?
Your answer:________________________
f) What is the total amount of payoff generated by the decisions of your group of four?
Your answer:________________________
Chapter 3
Bringing Good and Bad
Whistle-Blowers to the Lab
3.1 Introduction
For several decades, corruption, defined as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’
(Klitgaard 1988), has been considered as a major obstacle to growth and development
(Bardhan 1997, Mauro 1995). A large number of activities falling under this definition
can be modelled as a Principal-Agent-Client relationship between the government, its
imperfectly controlled agents (public officials) and their private clients (individuals or
firms). This relationship can be further divided into two disjoint principal agent prob-
lems, one between the government and its official and the other between the official and
the client. While the first is of less importance, a major objective of the New Institu-
tional Economics (NIE) of corruption (Lambsdorff 2007) is to understand the illegal and
therefore (legally) unenforceable transaction between a private entity (e.g. a firm paying
a monetary bribe) and a potentially corrupt official who may reciprocate a payment with
the delivery of a corrupt service. The goal is to draw conclusions for the design of institu-
tions which will optimally destabilize and hence minimize corruption. Apart from obvious
institutional measures such as applying harsh punishment and increasing detection prob-
abilities of corrupt behaviour (Becker 1968, Klitgaard 1988, von Rose-Ackerman 2006),
an effective way to destabilize corruption is to enable whistle-blowing. In our analysis,
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we define whistle-blowing as ‘the act of disclosing information in the public interest’ 1.
Whistle-blowing can hence be seen as the act of ending a corrupt transaction and all of
its consequences by incurring non-trivial personal costs (Drew 2003).2
In their experimental studies, using the framework of a standard corruption game (see
Chapter 2), Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) and Abbink (2006) find that the possibility of
whistle-blowing leads to an increase rather than a decrease of the number of successful
corrupt transactions.3 These results are at odds with the fact that whistle-blowing policies
are in widespread use and perceived as successful measures in the abatement of the
negative consequences of corruption (Hall and Davies 1999, Spagnolo 2006, Buccirossi
and Spagnolo 2006, Hussein 2005). We explain this by the fact that the standard game
of corruption (as used in Abbink 2006, Lambsdorff and Frank 2010) accounts for only
one of the two main negative consequences of corruption potentially affected by whistle-
blowing. The first consequence of a successful corrupt transaction (which is modelled
explicitly in the standard game of corruption) concerns the direct negative externality
on the public which is directly proportional to the level of corruption (Bardhan 1997,
Rose-Ackermann 1999).4 The second, indirect, consequence (which is disregarded in
the standard corruption game) concerns the ‘crowding out’ of legal productive activities
(Klitgaard 1988). Rampant corruption is likely to drive ‘honest’ clients out of productive
markets, forcing them to engage in alternative activities (of lower productivity).5 This
may be due to individual (firm-level) differences in the moral costs, ability (criminal
energy) or legal framework (foreign versus domestic firms) affecting corrupt transactions
(see Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Egger and Winner 2006, Bardhan 1997).
The direct effect of corruption is independent of who initiates the transaction, the client or
the official, while the indirect effect requires an actively corrupt official. The compactness
1Another definition is ‘the disclosure to the public or to authorities, usually by an employee, of
wrongdoing in a company or government department’ (Drew 2003)
2By assuming that the briber consists of a single decision maker, we shut off considerations on
behavioural interactions within groups of agents (e.g. group pressure). Hence we do not consider that
whistle-blowing may exploit the differences in individual corruptibility within a group of decision makers
(e.g. inside a firm or within a group of officials). In this paper we concentrate on the incentives and
behavioural reactions of decision-makers represented by single individuals only.
3Neither Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) nor Abbink (2006) focus on the mechanism of whistle-blowing
or on the assessment of its effectiveness.
4The most common example is the expected damage to outsiders caused by the deployment of sub-
standard quality in construction projects realized with the help of administrative corruption.
5This line of argument is closely related to the rent seeking literature of corruption (Lambsdorff
2002).
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of the standard game of corruption does not allow for corrupt initiation by the official.
This approach is useful to obtain insights into individual behaviour within a certain
corrupt situation (concentrating on the corruptibility of a public official with respect to
her reaction to a temptation), but it may not be able to capture the indirect consequence
of corruption. In particular, it may fail to account for an honest client who may prefer
to stay away from a productive market for fear of encountering an official who demands
a bribe (and engage in an alternative activity of lower productivity but without the
risk of encountering corruption). The introduction of whistle-blowing may affect the
behaviour of both decision-makers and hence determine the magnitude of both negative
consequences of corruption.
In order to capture both negative consequences of corruption and hence be able to
assess the full impact of whistle-blowing experimentally, we expand the standard game of
corruption in two ways. First, we add an option to the action space of the client in form
of the legal procedure of a first best productive activity. Second, we give both agents,
the client and the official, an opportunity to actively initiate a corrupt transaction. In
the control treatment of our experiment we show that our model is able to capture both
negative effects of corruption. This permits the possibility of whistle-blowing for both
decision-makers and enables us to consider the additional aspect of asymmetry of leniency
policies towards whistle-blowing. We compare three treatments. In the control treatment,
neither of the decision-makers has an opportunity to blow the whistle. In the second,
the symmetric whistle-blowing treatment, both decision makers have the opportunity to
blow the whistle. Blowing the whistle has symmetric consequences in the sense that it
leads to the loss of all privileges obtained by engaging in corruption for both players, the
client and the official, independent of who was the one that blew the whistle. In the third
treatment, we consider leniency for whistle-blowing officials.
Analyzing treatment differences in the outcomes of our extended corruption game
which was played for ten successive periods, we show that symmetrically punished whistle-
blowing has two countervailing effects on the three main performance variables, efficiency
(measured in the number of first best choices), level of corruption (frequency) and so-
cial welfare (measured in total payoff6). On the one hand, symmetric whistle-blowing
6We consider total payoff as a measure for welfare which combines the consequences of efficiency and
the level of corruption.
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increases the level of corruption by providing the stabilizing tool of negative retaliation
after defective behaviour confirming results of Lambsdorff and Frank (2010, forthcom-
ing) and Abbink (2006). On the other hand, whistle-blowing, in both specifications,
increases the number of legal transactions by providing the client with an effective safe-
guard against the attempts of the official to force participation in a corrupt transaction.
These two effects almost keep their balance in terms of resulting payoff levels. Since it
is not straightforward to trade off productivity (efficiency) gains with higher levels of
corruption, a conclusion as to the usefulness of symmetric whistle-blowing is not feasible.
Providing asymmetric leniency for whistle-blowing to the official, allowing the official
to keep most of the benefit from an un-finished corrupt transaction, creates an incentive
for ‘insured’ defection which shuts off the (corruption-) stabilizing effect of whistle-blowing
while the effect of increased productivity remains. Hence, the introduction of whistle-
blowing with asymmetric leniency increases welfare in terms of a higher sum and a more
balanced structure of payoffs. Our results are in line with the theoretical findings of
Lambsdorff and Nell (2007), who show that by allowing asymmetric punishment (inter-
pretable as leniency for the official) within the corrupt deal, the stability of a corrupt
transaction can be weakened as the incentives for cheating (on the side of the official) are
increased.7 Most patterns of behaviour can be explained in terms of payoff maximizing
strategies and first order belief structures.8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates the basic
set-up and explains its main divergences from the existing experimental literature on
corruption. It describes the set up of the control treatment as well as the two treatment
specifications of the experiment in detail. The procedure of the experiment is outlined
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we analyze the model in theoretical terms and derive the
main hypotheses. Section 3.5 interprets the results and tests the hypotheses. Section 3.6
summarizes and concludes.
7Lambsdorff and Nell (2007) propose a legal institution that distinguishes between (self-reported)
corrupt behaviour of the official and of the briber with respect to punishment. In addition, they advocate
different penalties to those who reciprocate a corrupt transaction and those who only pocket a bribe
without providing a corrupt service, thus giving incentives for defection within the corrupt transaction.
8This involves the relaxation of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
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3.2 Model
According to the NIE of corruption, the weakest link of a corrupt transaction is its
lack of legal enforceability.9. A corrupt transaction is usually modelled as a two player,
3-stage game in which a client decides about the amount of bribe (Stage 1) to be sent
to an official who decides whether or not to accept it (Stage 2). If accepted, Stage 3 is
entered, in which the official decides whether or not to reciprocate the bribe by delivering
a (pre-defined) corrupt service. Reciprocation produces a large negative externality to
the public and incurs substantial personal costs (e.g. costs that are caused by keeping
the transaction secret as well as ‘moral’ costs created by harming the public and risking
detection).10 In order to assess the effectiveness of different institutions of whistle-blowing
considering both systematic consequences of corruption, the negative externality and the
crowding out of productive activity, we need to extend the standard game of corruption
in two ways. First, we need to provide a real alternative to corruption for the client
and, second, we enable both, the client and the official, to activate a corrupt transaction.
Therefore we add a third option in Stage 1 and a fourth stage to the 3-stage game.
3.2.1 Representation of the basic game
Figure 3.1 shows the extensive form of the game used as a basis for our analysis.
It does not include the possibility of whistle-blowing and hence serves as the control
treatment.
The first line in the outcome vectors depicts the payoff of the potentially corrupt
client (B). The second line is for the payoff of the official (O). The third line stands for
the monetary (sum of) external effect to the public. In our experiment this means that
the payoff of six randomly chosen participants of the experiment is either increased or
reduced according to the decisions made by the client and the official.11
9Since corruption is illegal in all relevant countries (i.e. countries that rely on some form of legal
administration), legal third parties, i.e. the courts, cannot be used to enforce a corrupt transaction, see
Chapters 1 and 2.
10In most models, especially those that are designed to be tested experimentally, the risk of detection
is modelled as a certainty equivalent rather than a lottery which would add another dimension to the
game. By choosing a certainty equivalent, we do not have to control for differences in risk preferences.
11The model of the negative externality, hitting potentially corrupt actors instead of a real third
party, may be problematic as it may lead to unintended effects on beliefs and thereby on strategies of
participants. In Chapter 2, however, we show that the nature of the public (third party), passive or
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Figure 3.1: Extensive form representation of the basic set-up
Our set-up is best explained using the following example. A private entity (e.g. a
firm) wants to engage in some kind of productive activity for which it needs to obtain a
permit (licence) provided by the authorities through a public official.
In Stage 1, client B chooses between three alternatives. The choice ‘Out’ leads to the
end of the game. We consider this as a failed transaction as it represents a second best
outside option in the sense that both agents’ payoffs as well as the positive externality to
the public12 are relatively low.
The choice ‘Add’ represents B ’s decision to use a transfer T to convince O to provide
preferential treatment, i.e. to realize the corrupt transaction in Stage 4.
The choice ‘Normal’ represents the willingness of B to engage in a legal procedure to
obtain the licence. Only if client B chooses ‘Normal’, Stage 2 is entered and O decides
between providing the licence (option ‘Ok’), which leads to a successful ‘legal’ transaction
(giving moderate payoffs to the deciding agents and a relatively large positive externality
to the public), and demanding a bribe (option ‘Add’). If ‘Add’ is chosen by, either client
B in Stage 1, or official O in Stage 2 (i.e. a corrupt transaction has been initiated), B
decides in Stage 3 about the amount of transfer T, which is restricted to integers between
0 and 20 EMU (budget constraint), to be given to O.
active, does not significantly affect behaviour. Therefore we ignore this issue in our analysis.
12We assume that any kind of productive activity yields positive spill-overs to other agents of the
economy.
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Having received T, it is again O ’s turn to decide in Stage 4.
If O chooses ‘Out’, the corrupt transaction fails, the bribe is transferred back to B and
both agents fall back to their second-best outcome with reduced payoffs (sunk transac-
tion costs). In case O accepts the bribe (chooses ‘Nothing’ or ‘Prefer’), the transfer is
tripled, capturing the assumed difference in marginal utility between a rich client and
poor official.13
By choosing the option ‘Nothing’ O defects on B ’s implicit corrupt demand while keeping
the benefit of the transfer (3 ∗ T ) for herself. B, as well as the public, fall back to their
outside option (reduced by the costs of the transferT for B).
By choosing ‘Prefer’, O reciprocates the transfer, causing substantial costs to herself
(6 EMU)14 and a large negative externality (−48 EMU) to the public while the client
receives a large bonus (28 EMU).
Contrary to the standard (3-stage) game of corruption where the client can only
choose between corruption and an implicit (unattractive) outside option, B has the op-
portunity to enter a relatively attractive honest activity. Since this requires the approval
of the official, the latter is provided with the opportunity to actively initiate a corrupt
transaction by (implicitly) demanding a bribe from an honest client. This captures the
possibility of extortion of ‘honest’ clients by corrupt officials and thereby captures the
indirect negative effect of corruption.
Applying the principle of backward induction within the standard model of payoff
maximization (assuming rationality and common knowledge of rationality), it is easy to
find the unique Sub game perfect Nash Equilibrium (SNE) in pure strategies.
Maximizing her pay-off, O will never choose ‘Prefer’ in Stage 4, since the payoff obtain-
able by choosing ‘Nothing’ is always larger, independent of the history of choices made
before reaching Stage 4.
The choice between ‘Out’ and ‘Normal’ depends on the size of the transfer T. O will
choose ‘Out’ if 8 > 6 + 3 ∗ T . Since only integers can be chosen in our experiment, O
will decide in favour of ‘Out’ as long as T = 0 and ‘Normal’ otherwise. B will anticipate
13The assumption of differences in the marginal utility is standard to the experimental literature of
corruption (Abbink 2004) and links the literature to the trust and gift exchange game (Berg et al. 1995).
14Note that the costs of 6 EMU represent the total costs of reciprocation (delivering the corrupt
service). We may interpret these costs as costs that arise in the effort to conceal information from
colleagues and the authorities in order to keep a corrupt transaction secret or as a certainty equivalent
for the expected monetary loss from possible detection by the authorities (which is not modelled in our
set-up.)
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this in Stage 3 and minimize her losses by choosing T = 1, yielding a payoff of 19 EMU
for B and 9 EMU for O. O will therefore choose ‘Ok’ over ‘Add’, once she has reached
Stage 2 (anticipating B ’s behaviour) and B will therefore choose ‘Normal’ in Stage 1,
yielding the highest possible payoff level.
Proposition 1: The unique SNE is characterized by the strategy set: [‘Normal’; ‘Ok’;
‘T=1’; ‘Nothing’].
See Appendix 3A for the proof of a similar situation.
The standard self-interested model does not predict the occurrence of corruption,
neither in the one shot version of the game nor in a finitely repeated version of it. This
(unrealistic) result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the standard 3-stage
corruption model of single-sided initiation of corruption used in the set-ups of Abbink et
al. (2002), Abbink (2006) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2010).
3.2.2 Treatment specifications
With this paper, we provide the first experimental study on corruption in which both
agents, the official and the briber, have an opportunity to actively initiate a corrupt
transaction (Dusek et al. 2004). Our extensions to the standard game of corruption alone
enable us to explore the systematic effects of the introduction of whistle-blowing on the
relevant performance variables considering asymmetry of its consequences with respect
to punishment (leniency).
In the control treatment (CT), whistle-blowing is not possible. Participants are ran-
domly assigned to their roles (B and O) and then randomly matched in pairs. One
participant in the role of the official and one participant in the role of the client play the
specification of the game, see Figure 3.1, for ten consecutive periods (repeated game in
partner design).
In the symmetric whistle-blowing treatment (SWT), see Figure 3.2, we introduce the
possibility of whistle-blowing to the basic game in the following way. At each relevant
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stage, i.e. a stage after which a player has acted in a way to initiate or to maintain
a corrupt transaction, the other player can blow the whistle or proceed with the cor-
rupt transaction. Whistle-blowing at any stage ends the game and leads to the loss of
all benefits obtained (or obtainable) through the corrupt transaction for both agents.
Whistle-blowing is symmetric in the sense that its consequences (personal losses of the
benefit from the corrupt transaction) are independent of the player who has chosen to
blow the whistle.
Figure 3.2: Extensive form representation of SWT and LT
The first opportunity to blow the whistle is given to B in case O (implicitly) demands
a bribe by choosing ‘Add’ in Stage 2. This decision leads to the failure of the transaction,
leaving both agents with reduced payoffs compared to a Stage 1 failure (transaction
costs). The second opportunity to blow the whistle is for O. Once B has chosen T, O
gets the chance to blow the whistle in addition to the alternatives she holds in the basic
set-up (CT). This ends the corrupt transaction as well. In SWT this is not attractive.
Both agents lose their (potential) benefits. Compared to the choice ‘Out’, ‘Whistle’ does
not increase O ’s own material profit. However, it may be used by O as a punishment
device against B. The last opportunity of whistle-blowing is for B. In the case that O has
chosen to keep the bribe with (action ‘Prefer’) or without (action ‘Nothing’) delivering
the corrupt service, B can decide whether to accept O ’s decision (action ‘Ok’) or blow
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the whistle (action ‘Whistle’). Again blowing the whistle causes the loss of all corruption-
related benefits for both players. O loses the benefit from the transfer (which amounts
to 3T ) and B loses everything except the value of the (reduced15) outside option less the
transfer T.
The leniency treatment (LT), see Figure 3.2, differs from SWT only in O ’s incentives
for whistle-blowing in Stage 5. While the options and consequences of whistle-blowing
remain the same for B, O can keep the full marginal benefits (3 ∗T ) of the transaction in
case she blows the whistle in Stage 5 when offered a bribe T and has to bear costs which
are relatively small (3 EMU) and independent of the size of the bribe. This captures the
idea of exemption from punishment for key witnesses by granting leniency.
Solving both treatment specifications of the 6-Stage-game by backward induction within
the standard self-interested model of payoff maximization (assuming rationality and
common knowledge of rationality) yields the same predictions as in the basic set-up
in terms of the occurrence of successful corruption. All strategy sets that include
any kind of whistle-blowing belong to strictly dominated strategies, since all forms of
whistle-blowing are designed to reduce both decision makers’ payoffs compared to the
immediate alternative. This leaves all forms of whistle-blowing off the predicted and
unique equilibrium path in any (finite) repetition of the game.16
Proposition 2: The unique SNE in SWT as well as in LT is characterized by the strat-
egy set: [‘Normal’; ‘Ok’; ‘Add’; ‘T=1’; ‘Nothing’; ‘Ok’], assuming rationality, common
knowledge of rationality and selfish preferences.
The proof for the specification of LT can be found in Appendix 3A.
3.2.3 Related literature
The main behavioural mechanism of stability in the standard corruption game is
determined by trust and reciprocity. So, the methods used in experiments on corruption
are closely related to those used in the gift exchange and the trust (investment) game
15We assume considerable transaction costs in this case.
16Note that the relevance of the equilibrium critically depends on the assumption of rationality and
common knowledge of rationality which will be relaxed in the arguments of Section 3.4.
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(Fehr et al. 1993, Berg et al. 1995). Rejecting predictions from standard economic models,
countless studies find positive levels of reciprocity in one-shot versions of these games
and even higher levels if participants interact repeatedly (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000,
Gächter and Falk 2002).
The main and most important difference between these games and the corruption
game lies in the fact that cooperation in the form of positive reciprocity is beneficial for
all members of society, whereas in the case of corruption it is only beneficial for the client
and the official. The negative externality to the public caused by a successful corrupt
transaction is (usually) assumed to be high enough to result in a net social loss (i.e. a
negative sum of payoffs) from a corrupt transaction.
While positive reciprocity in the gift exchange or the trust game may be explained by
altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness
and Rabin 2002) or intentions (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and
Fischbacher 2006), the main arguments involved in the respective models are not valid
for the corruption game. Altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2002) would not predict positive
levels of corruption because of its large negative externality creating inefficiencies and
its (potential) reduction of the welfare in general and that of the worst-off in particular.
Inequity aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002) may only help
to explain corrupt reciprocity under very restrictive assumptions. Corrupt reciprocity
may only lead to more equitable outcomes, if all participants of the experiment are
believed to act in a corrupt way.17 The arguments put forth in models based on intentions
(e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 or Cox et al. 2007) are also of limited plausibility
because of the obvious strategic environment. Bribes are not likely to be conceived as
kind actions but calculated behaviour.18 None of the respective models seems to be able
to provide a consistent and convincing theoretical explanation of experimental findings.
In particular, they cannot be used to derive relevant predictions on the behaviour of the
corrupt transaction partners, neither in the standard 3-stage game nor in our (even more
17Consider corruption as the equilibrium of a ‘super-game’ in which the public is not passive but
consists of potentially corrupt pairs of clients and officials. This assumption, however, is contrary to the
findings of Chapter 2 where we show that corrupt reciprocity does not depend on the model of the public
that suggests that inequity aversion is unlikely to provide a comprehensive explanation for the behaviour
in the corrupt game.
18Strassmair (2009) shows that strategic intentions need not spoil the kindness of a gift. However her
results and methodology cannot be used to make point predictions for behaviour in our set-up.
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complicated) set-up.
Reciprocation may be better explained (and predicted) by simple arguments on repu-
tation formation and (off-equilibrium) first order beliefs about the rationality and result-
ing behaviour of fellow participants (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Kreps et al. 1982). In a
series of laboratory experiments using one-shot as well as (finitely) repeated versions of
the standard game of corruption, Abbink et al. (2000, 2002), Abbink (2004, 2006), Ab-
bink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2007, 2010, forthcoming)
find high levels of cooperation between corrupt partners. The unstable corrupt transac-
tion seems to be sustained by some form of reciprocity. The common feature of these
experiments is the trade-off between reciprocity-based maximization of individual long-
term payoffs and a combination of myopic short term maximization of personal gains and
a preference for social efficiency (Dusek et al. 2004).
In our extended set-up, the main mechanism of corrupt stability still relies on positive
reciprocity. The additional options of whistle-blowing may be interpreted as (costly)
punishment devices. Fehr and Gächter (1998, 2000a) as well as Sutter et al. (forthcom-
ing) explicate that direct punishment can be effective in enhancing positive reciprocity
in social dilemmas. In the context of corruption, Abbink (2006) as well as Lambsdorff
and Frank (2010, forthcoming) find that punishment devices designed as whistle-blowing
opportunities may stabilize corrupt reciprocity (being counter-productive). Since their
set-ups are not designed to capture the full negative effect of whistle-blowing in terms of
social efficiency, concentrating on the level of corruption alone, our experimental study
provides the first assessment of whistle-blowing in the corrupt context with respect to
its total effect on social welfare. In addition we test the hypothesis of the usefulness
of asymmetry in leniency rules for whistle-blowing suggested by Lambsdorff and Nell
(2007), who provide theoretical evidence for the effectiveness of asymmetric punishment
in the context of corruption.
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3.3 Procedure
We conducted five sessions (one session for CT and two sessions each for SWT and LT)
programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) at the experimental laboratory (MELESSA)
at the University of Munich. We used the organizational software Orsee (Greiner 2004).
Our experiment included a total of 102 participants (who were randomly picked from the
MELESSA subject pool). Types (B and O) were randomly assigned to subjects who were
randomly matched in pairs (one B and one O per pair). Pairs stayed together for all ten
periods (partner design). Full anonymity was ensured throughout the experiment. All
periods were payoff relevant. The period payoffs were summed up and paid out in private
at an exchange rate of 6 Eurocents per EMU, additional to a show up fee of 4 Euros. The
(potential) negative externalities or positive spill-overs caused by the decisions of other
group members (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) were summed over all 10 periods and subtracted
from the total sum of payoffs at the end of the experiment. By revealing the total
(external) damage or addition only after all decisions were made, allows us to consider any
(B -O-) pair as an independent observation. This implies the assumption of irrelevance
of one pair’s beliefs on the other pairs’ behaviour with respect to the adjustment of its
corrupt behaviour, which is reasonable according to the findings in Chapter 2.19 The
instructions were partly read aloud (See Appendix 3E for the full instructions in SWT).
By providing a sufficient amount of time (approximately 60 minutes) to read and work
through the instructions, including a series of examples and control questions, we made
sure that the rather complicated set-up was fully understood by all participants before
they entered the actual computerized experiment. The entire experiment took less than
90 minutes. A questionnaire containing socio-economic questions was filled out after the
computerized experiment was finished and before payments were conducted in private.20
Payoffs lay between 6 Euros and 25 Euros (excluding a show-up fee of 4 Euros) at an
average of 14.53 Euros. The framing of the instructions was kept neutral throughout,
19Inter-dependencies (with respect to relevant variables) may present a problem when considering
equilibria within the ‘super-game’ regarding strategies of and beliefs on the behaviour of all participants
within a session. In Chapter 2 (which uses a similar set-up with respect to the potential effects of
the model negative externality), we do not find any significant difference in the relevant performance
variables (and treatment effects) between sessions using a reduction in other participants’ payoffs (an
‘active’ public) and sessions using a reduction in the amount of donation for the public aid organization
‘Doctors without Borders’ (a ‘passive’ public) as a model for the negative externality. This indicates the
irrelevance of ‘super-game’ considerations. Therefore we treat pairs as independent observations.
20Payments were made by an assistant who did not appear as an experimenter.
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avoiding any language indicating the subject of research. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt
(2006) find no significant effect of loaded language (framing) on the main variables of the
corruption game, providing an argument for the robustness of the use of neutrally framed
experiments in the context of corruption as long as the essential features of corruption
are salient and explained sufficiently to the participants. A neutral setting allowed the
easiest comparison between the treatments and across studies.
3.4 Analysis and hypotheses
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of whistle-blowing in
general and different institutions of whistle-blowing in particular. Therefore we compare
our three treatments with respect to the following variables.
First, we examine the average fraction of successful ‘legal’ transactions resulting from
the decisions of a pair of O and B participants (‘Normal’ in Stage 1 and ‘Ok’ in Stage
2) over all 10 periods within a treatment. This provides a measure, both for the indirect
consequence of corruption and for the resulting outcomes in terms of efficiency under the
respective institution. Second, we consider the fraction of successful ‘corrupt’ transactions
(‘Prefer’ in Stage 4/5 and ‘Ok’ in Stage 6), which is directly proportional to the sum of
the negative external effects (direct consequence of corruption). Third, we measure social
welfare by considering the average payoff level and its distribution across participants.
Taking average payoffs (alone) as a measure of welfare is problematic, since they are
strictly increasing in the total amount of bribes paid during the experiment (which is due
to the tripling of the transfer stemming from the assumed difference in marginal utilities
between B and O). This may lead to relatively high levels of payoffs in treatments with
high corrupt activity. Using the amount of average payoffs only in combination with
the two other performance variables and its distribution across participants (within a
treatment) as a measure of welfare presents a more comprehensive picture.
With respect to these measures, our experimental study concentrates on two main
motivations for blowing the whistle. Whistle-blowing can be used to avoid (forced) par-
ticipation in a corrupt transaction. This may have several reasons. Participants (both
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B and O) may want to signal unwillingness to cooperate in a corrupt transaction in
order to maximize their own expected payoff, save the public from the damage (altruism,
see Andreoni and Miller 2002), or promote socially efficient ‘legal’ transactions in future
periods. The motivations may be dominated by altruism, efficiency seeking or inequality
aversion (Engelmann and Strobel 2006, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, 2003). However, whistle-
blowing can be intentionally misused by B as a tool for stabilization. Although it is
part of a strictly dominated strategy, the deployment of costly punishment as a form of
negative reciprocity in case O does not deliver the corrupt service (chooses ‘Nothing’ in
Stage 5), and the anticipation thereof, may increase the level of corruption (Abbink 2004,
Lambsdorff and Frank 2010).
In this section we discuss possible systematic effects of whistle-blowing. A strict
separation of the different motivations is neither possible nor intended in our experiment,
since we are ultimately interested in the total effect of the introduction of whistle-blowing.
To form hypotheses on the differences in subjects’ behaviour between the treatments we
restrict ourselves to the use of simple arguments based on individual expected payoff
maximization under varying sets of beliefs, relaxing the assumption of common knowledge
of rationality (Kreps et al. 1982).21
3.4.1 Number of legal transactions
One argument in favour of the introduction of whistle-blowing is that it will hin-
der corruption from discouraging the realization of ‘legal’ transactions (Klitgaard 1988).
Before taking the effect of whistle-blowing into account, regard the mechanism of the
indirect negative effect of corruption in the control treatment. Consider a client B in
the CT who would prefer to choose (at least in the last period in which there are no
strategic considerations stemming from the repetition of the game) the ‘legal’ procedure
(‘Normal’)22. Not believing in the rationality of O, B may fear that O chooses ‘Add’
in Stage 2 (with some probability) to force her to enter the corrupt transaction if she
21We refrain from the analysis of models of strong reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt 2003). Note that
the following analysis has the sole purpose of formalizing simple arguments on the mechanism of whistle-
blowing within the self interested model of payoff maximization. It does not claim to provide a full
description of strategies that may be rationalized (off the equilibrium path) once the assumption of
common knowledge of rationality is relaxed.
22Note that this is consistent with the prediction of the SNE under the assumption of common
knowledge of rationality.
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chooses ‘Normal’ in Stage 1 (O may want to force B to enter the corrupt transaction
hoping for a (large) bribe). Depending on B ’s belief about the probability of O to initiate
the corrupt transaction in Stage 2 and her expected payoff conditional on this initiation,
she may, in expectation, be better off to choose the outside option (‘Out’) in Stage 1,
staying away from the productive market (see Appendix 3B for a details on the set of
beliefs rationalizing such behaviour). Hence, the fear of encountering a corrupt official
may, in CT, lead to a rational choice of the outside option by participants holding a
certain set of (off-equilibrium) beliefs.
The introduction of whistle-blowing may change B ’s belief about O ’s Stage 2 be-
haviour as well as her expected payoff conditional on being forced into the corrupt
transaction (O choosing ‘Add’ in Stage 2). This may in turn change B ’s decision
between ‘Out’ and ‘Normal’ in Stage 1 and hence the magnitude of the indirect negative
consequence of corruption. While B ’s payoff after a request for a bribe in Stage 2 (by
O) is uncertain and can be as low as 14 EMU in the CT (see Appendix 3B), it is at
least 19 EMU (in expectation) in the whistle-blowing (WB) treatments.23 The option
of whistle-blowing in Stage 3 can reduce the expected loss B is risking if she chooses
‘Normal’ in case she encounters a corrupt official (in Stage 2). Hence whistle-blowing
serves as a safeguard against the exploitation of an ‘honest’ client by a corrupt official.
For a relevant set of beliefs (see Appendix 3B), a client who would choose ‘Out’ in CT
(securing 20 EMU) would choose ‘Normal’ in the whistle-blowing treatments (risking
only 1 instead of 6 EMU).24 This yields the following hypothesis.25
Hypothesis 1: “The relative number of observations in which type B participants
choose ‘Normal’ will be higher in both WB treatments compared to the CT, while the
number of Stage 1-failures (‘Out’ choices) will be lower.”
23B can always blow the whistle in Stage 3 and get 19 EMU and therefore will never choose ‘Add’ in
Stage 3, if the expected payoff does not exceed 19 EMU.
24The anticipation of this behaviour by the official and feedback effects (on the beliefs of the client)
may even strengthen this argument.
25The formal argument established in Appendix 3B is valid for the last period and should, by backward
induction feed back to all previous periods.
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3.4.2 Stabilizing corruption
The opportunity of direct punishment as a ‘norm’ enforcement device has been found
to be effective in situations in which subjects act in a selfish way or are insufficiently moti-
vated by positive reciprocity alone (Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr and Gächter 1998). Lambsdorff
and Frank (2010) as well as Abbink et al. (2000) show in an experiment using a one shot
version of the corruption game that the presence of whistle-blowing, as a specific form
of costly punishment, increases the stability of a corrupt transaction (although corrupt
reciprocity is questionable as a social ‘norm’). B may exploit the (threat of) whistle-
blowing in Stage 6 to punish defective26 (opportunistic) behaviour in order to stabilize
the corrupt transaction. O may adhere to a set of beliefs assigning a positive probability
for B retaliating defection with whistle-blowing despite the non-trivial personal costs.27
Consider an official who maximizes her expected payoff in the last period.28 Once O
believes that B will blow the whistle with a certain probability r(T ) (which may depend
on the size of the bribe) after defection (choosing ‘Nothing’ in Stage 5), O may be, in
expected terms, better off when choosing ‘Prefer’ (see Appendix 3B for explications on
critical beliefs). If the official believes the threat of costly punishment to be credible29,
whistle-blowing can serve as a tool of retaliation which stabilizes the corrupt transaction.
Hypothesis 2: “The relative number of successful deals (‘Prefer’ in Stage 5 and ‘Ok’ in
Stage 6) will be higher in SWT than in CT.”
Hypothesis 3: “The relative number of O ’s defection will be lower in SWT than in CT.”
The dependency of r∗(T ) on the level of transfer may not be the only reason for
individuals to condition their reciprocal behaviour on the size of T. Reciprocation after
a high transfer can be interpreted as part of a strategy aimed at triggering high transfers
26O chooses ‘Nothing’ after receiving a bribe
27Alternatively O may adhere to beliefs assigning positive probabilities to the existence of certain
types of B who will (always) negatively retaliate opportunistic behaviour.
28We consider the last period in order to shut off all effects stemming from repetition, ignoring the
consequences of O ’s decisions on B ’s response in future periods.
29Note that whistle-blowing in Stage 6 is costly in both WB treatments and hence belongs to strictly
dominated strategies.
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in future periods. While the argument of strategic reciprocity holds for all treatments,
the additional effect stemming from the threat of retaliation is to be expected only in
SWT, since it is absent in CT and avoidable in LT.
3.4.3 Gender effects
The belief on the punishment probability r(T ) is likely to differ substantially across
individuals. Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) find that female participants are less likely
to engage in costly (hence off-equilibrium) punishment and, as a direct consequence,
anticipate (irrational) negative reciprocity less often than male participants. These results
provide experimental evidence and an explanation for the empirical findings of lower
corruptibility of women in Dollar et al. 2001 and Swamy et al. 2001, while they do not
contradict diverse evidence on women’s attitude towards corruption (Alatas et al. 2006).
The last three stages (Stage 4, 5 and 6) of the set-up in SWT are close to the exper-
iment of Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) with regard to methodology as well as contents.
However, in contrast to their one shot situation, whistle-blowing in our set-up is not
the only tool of negative retaliation for the client. In our repeated game, B can also
(negatively) reciprocate by choosing less cooperative actions in future periods. (Only in
the last period, direct punishment is B ’s only tool of negative retaliation.) Hence we
investigate whether the gender effect found in Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming) sur-
vives the repetition of the game and explore the role of the direct punishment device (i.e.
whistle-blowing in Stage 6) with respect to its interaction with cross-period reciprocity.
Hypothesis 4: “Female participants (in the role of O) will show different levels of
defection compared to their male counterparts only in the WB treatments if the gender
effect depends on the direct punishment device of whistle-blowing (alone).”
This hypothesis is supported by the results of several experimental studies. The
lack of significant differences in the behaviour between female and male participants
with respect to social preferences (Croson and Gneezy 2009), risk attitudes (Dekel
and Scotchmer 1999), or trusting behaviour (Croson and Buchan 1999) suggests that
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the gender effect in corruption may be solely due to differences in the anticipation of
‘irrational’ and costly direct punishment (Eckel and Grossman 1996). According to the
findings of Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming), the gender effect is likely to be found
not only in the anticipation but also in the direct application of punishment behaviour.
Hypothesis 5: “Female participants in the role of B will show lower levels of punishment
in case of O ’s defection in Stage 5 compared to their male counterparts.”
3.4.4 Officials’ whistle-blowing
In SWT, O ’s whistle-blowing in Stage 5 leads to the loss of the transfer-related benefit
from the corrupt transaction (3T ). Although it is unattractive (yielding the same payoff
as ‘Out’) for O, she may blow the whistle in order to signal her unwillingness to engage
in corrupt reciprocity (which is relevant for the situations in which B has chosen ‘Add’
in Stage 1 and for early periods) or to punish B in case of a low transfer (which is
relevant in situations in which O has chosen ‘Add’ in Stage 2, see Section 3.4.1). For
low transfer levels, the options ‘Whistle’ and ‘Out’ yield similar outcomes for O and only
small differences (i.e. the amount of a low transfer) for B. Hence, we do not expect O ’s
possibility to blow the whistle in Stage 5 to be of any relevance in this treatment.
In LT, however, O can keep the benefit from the bribe (3 ∗T ) at a relatively low cost,
i.e. 3 EMU, if she blows the whistle in Stage 5, while she remains safe from the possible
negative retaliation through B ’s whistle-blowing in Stage 6. Thus, the opportunity of
whistle-blowing provides a powerful incentive to defect for those officials whose corrupt
reciprocity is based on a belief that B will punish defection with a high probability (i.e. a
high r(T ), see Section 3.4.2). Again, we use an argument of backward induction ignoring
effects stemming from interactions of behaviour across periods (starting with the last
period).
Once reached Stage 5, payoff maximizing officials would always prefer ‘Whistle’ over
‘Prefer’ if EP (‘Whistle′|HI5) = 3 + 3 ∗ T > EP (‘Prefer′|HI5) = 3 ∗ T for any T
and ‘Whistle’ over ‘Nothing’ if EP (‘Whistle′|HI5) = 3 + 3 ∗ T > EP (‘Nothing′|HI5) =
(1−r(T ))∗(6+3T )+r(T )∗8. This is the case if r(T ) ≥ 3
3T−2 = r
∗
LT . Hence those officials
who hold a belief r(T ) that would make it optimal for them to reciprocate the bribe
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in Stage 5 of SWT (All officials holding r(T ) ≥ 6
3T−2 = r
∗
SWT ), would blow the whistle
in LT since r(T ) must then be larger than the critical bribe r∗LT (=
3
3T−2 < r
∗
SWT )30.
Though irrelevant for those participants who reciprocate for strategic reasons, providing
leniency of O ’s Stage 5 whistle-blowing may reduce the stability of the reciprocal corrupt
transaction by giving an incentive to defect to those who reciprocate for fear of B ’s direct
negative retaliation.
Hypothesis 6: “In Stage 5 of LT, the relative number of ‘Prefer’ choices will be lower
and the relative number of ‘Whistle’ choices higher than in SWT.”
While we expect the negative effect of whistle-blowing, i.e. the stabilization of the
corrupt transaction through the threat of retaliation (by the client), to be substantially
diminished through asymmetric leniency, we expect the positive effects (i.e. higher num-
bers of ‘Normal’ choices in Stage 1) to remain. The total effectiveness of the introduction
of whistle-blowing depends on the magnitude of the positive effect, the magnitude of
the negative effect and the extent to which the latter can be contained by providing
asymmetric leniency.
3.5 Results and Interpretation
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
The main questions addressed in this paper can be essentially answered by considering
the differences in the main performance variables, the average relative number of success-
ful ‘corrupt’ transactions (Corrupt Deals), the average relative number of successful ‘legal’
transactions (Legal Deals, out of ten situations/periods), the average payoff (Payoff, total
income in Euros) and the average transfer level (Transfer, over all ten periods and pairs
of participants, in EMU) shown in Table 3.1.
30Note that this holds only for the last period and for situations in which the concerns about immediate
direct punishment dominate strategic considerations.
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Table 3.1: Main Results
Treatment CT SWT LT
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Legal Deals 1.75 1.11 3.48 1.67 3.39 2.19
Corrupt Deals 2.83 1.24 3.57 1.58 2.37 0.99
Payoff 13.04 2.44 14.83 4.19 16.08 3.45
Transfer 4.18 1.40 4.67 2.27 4.74 2.36
All figures are averages across individuals for the relevant types and over all 10
periods within a treatment.
As we have expected (Hypothesis 1), we find a large positive effect of whistle-blowing
on the relative number of legal successful deals. On average 1.75 out of 10 potential trans-
actions in CT end in the (socially) first best option, compared to 3.48/3.39 in SWT/LT
(differences: CT vs. SWT/LT tested with pair-wise, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests31:
p = 0.002/0.001; N = 33/30).
Corruption levels are by 0.74 (3.57− 2.83) significantly (p = 0.089; N = 33) higher in
SWT than in CT, confirming the effect of symmetric whistle-blowing on corrupt stability
(Hypothesis 2). The low level of corruption in LT (2.37 in LT vs. 3.57 in SWT: p =
0.064; N = 39) indicates the effectiveness of asymmetric punishment of whistle-blowing
(leniency) with respect to the incentives for defection (Hypothesis 6).
There is no significant difference in the total payoff levels between CT and SWT (13.04
Euros compared to 14.83 Euros: p = 0.23; N = 33), while the differences in payoff levels
between LT (16.08 Euros) and both other treatments are highly significant (p < 0.001;
N ≥ 30). Not only does the value of total payoffs differ substantially across treatments
but also their composition. The difference in average payoffs between type O and type
B participants is lowest in LT at 1.52 (16.84− 15.32) Euros, 2.18 (14.18− 11.90) Euros
in CT and highest in SWT at 5.88 (16.77− 12.89) Euros.
LT not only yields the lowest rate of corruption and a high number of successful
legal transactions (see Table 3.1), it also generates the highest per capita payoff level
over all 10 periods with the most desirable outcomes in terms of the distribution of
31If not stated otherwise, reported p-values are all for two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests.
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income. When we compare the Gini-coefficients32, we obtain the lowest level for LT
(0.12) compared to 0.15 for SWT and 0.14 for CT. This distributional effect stems from
the fact that corruption increases inequality by allowing the corrupt partners to extract
large benefits while causing a negative externality to the public. Hence participants who
do not engage in corruption receive only moderate payoffs (engaging in legal transactions
or falling back to the outside option) which may be further reduced by the negative
external effect caused by their fellow participants (of their session) who are corrupt. A
large number of legal and a low number of corrupt transactions not only maximize the
sum of payoffs but also flatten their distribution.
Efficiency
As explicated in Section 3.4, corruption indirectly reduces productive activity and thereby
efficiency. The risk of being forced into a corrupt transaction may hinder honest clients to
enter productive markets. In our set-up, the presence of corruption causes participants to
choose the sub-optimal outside option (‘Out’) in Stage 1, although any strategy set that
includes this choice is strictly Pareto-dominated (with respect to outcomes) by the strat-
egy set predicted by the SNE ([‘Normal’; ‘Ok’; ‘T=1’; ‘Nothing’] in CT and [‘Normal’;
‘Ok’; ‘Add’; ‘T=1’; ‘Nothing’; ‘Ok’] in both WB treatments, see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2).
We show that the opportunity to blow the whistle offers a mechanism that is suitable to
decrease this effect by providing the client with a safeguard against the exploitation by
a corrupt official (Hypothesis 1). There are two conditions for a ‘legal’ transaction to
be successful.
First, B has to choose ‘Normal’ in Stage 1. Figure 3.3 shows that, while clients seem
to be equally willing to initiate the corruption transaction across all three treatments
(31% ‘Add’ choices in CT, 38% in SWT and 35% in LT, differences between treatments,
CT vs. SWT, CT vs. LT, and SWT vs. LT, are not significant: p ≥ 0.312; N ≥ 30),
they choose to enter the legal procedure significantly more often in the WB treatments,
62% in SWT and 57% in LT compared to 46% in CT (SWT vs. CT and LT vs. CT:
p < 0.01; N ≥ 30). The fraction of cases in which the outside option is taken in Stage
1 is drastically reduced through whistle-blowing, from 23% in CT to 5% in SWT and
32The Gini-coefficient measures the distribution of wealth within a certain population on a scale
between 0 and 1, where a value of 0 corresponds to complete equality and a value of 1 signifies complete
inequality.
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3% in LT (supporting Hypothesis 1). The differences between CT and SWT as well as
between CT and LT are significant on the 1%-level (p < 0.001; N ≥ 30).
Figure 3.3: Shares of choices in Stage 1
Second, O has to choose ‘Ok’ in Stage 2. The rates of acceptance (‘Ok’ in Stage 2)
differ significantly between WB treatments, at 61% in SWT and 55% in LT, and CT
(38%). Pair-wise U-tests for SWT vs. CT and LT vs. CT yield p < 0.001 with N ≥ 30.
Officials seem to anticipate their clients to blow the whistle in Stage 3 (which they do
in 22% of possible cases in SWT and in 21.5% in LT) after being forced to enter the
corrupt transaction and therefore choose the legal procedure more often. According to
the argumentation of Section 3.4.1 (and Appendix 3B), the choices in Stage 1 depend
critically on the expected payoff which are determined by B ’s beliefs on O ’s behaviour
in Stage 2 and Stage 4/5 (CT/WB treatments).
The high frequency (18%) of O choosing ‘Out’ (given that B has chosen ‘Normal’ in
Stage 1) in Stage 4 of CT, signifies the relevance of this option as a (costly) punishment
device. The rational expectation of this behaviour determines B ’s expected payoff
conditional on being forced by O to enter the corrupt transaction in Stage 2. Even if
we assume that B ’s belief on the probability of O choosing ‘Ok’ in Stage 2 is constant
over the treatments, this creates a gap in B ’s expected payoff when choosing ‘Normal’
between CT and the WB treatments.33 It may be just this expected gap (which is
33To put it differently, given 1 − q = 0.18, B ’s belief on O choosing ‘Out’ in Stage 4, the gap in B ’s
critical beliefs on O choosing ‘Ok’ in Stage 2 (p) between CT and the WB treatments is substantial,
see Figure 3.8 in Appendix 3B. Using the argumentation of Section 3.4, the critical belief in CT is
p∗CT =
6−5∗0.18
11−5∗0.18 = 0.51 while it would only be p
∗
WB =
1
6 = 0.17 in the WB treatments. This means
that B has to expect O to choose ‘Ok’ in Stage 2 with a probability of at least 51% to make her choose
‘Normal’ in Stage 1 of CT while she would already do so in the WB treatments as long as she expects
O to choose ‘Ok’ with a probability of more than 17%. Note that the actual ‘probability’ of O choosing
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based on realistic beliefs) that leads to the large differences in the fractions of ‘Out’
and ‘Normal’ choices in Stage 1 between the treatments (see Figure 3.3). The gap in
outcomes (successful legal choices, see Table 3.1) is even wider due to the differences in
behaviour of O in Stage 2. Our results suggest that whistle-blowing equips the client
with a useful safeguard against the official’s threat of exploitation, allowing her to initiate
a ‘legal’ transaction at a low(er) risk. This makes it, in expectation, more attractive for
the client to enter (or stay) in the productive market.
Corruption levels
Figure 3.4 depicts the composition of O ’s choices in Stage 4/5 (CT/WB treatments).
Having received a bribe (reaching Stage 4/5), officials in LT as well as in CT choose to
be corrupt (‘Prefer’) in 43% of cases, which is substantially less than the percentage of
conditional ‘Prefer’ choices in SWT, 71% (U-tests; CT vs. SWT: p = 0.071; N = 33, LT
vs. SWT: p = 0.002; N = 39).
Figure 3.4: Shares of choices in Stage 4/5
In contrast to the case of CT, defection (‘Nothing’) is risky in terms of expected
payoffs in both WB treatments and therefore occurs (significantly) less often (U-tests:
CT vs. SWT and CT vs. LT: p < 0.001; N ≥ 30). The high fraction of the (conditional)
success of corruption in SWT (71%) can be explained by payoff maximizing motives of
officials. In SWT, O can only benefit with certainty from a received bribe (get 3∗T ) if she
‘OK’ in Stage 2 is 0.38 in CT and thereby lies in the relevant range to expect a treatment effect.
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cooperates in the corrupt transaction. If she does not, she faces the risk of punishment
(Hypothesis 3). Officials adhering to a belief structure that makes them defect in CT
may reciprocate in SWT rather than face the threat of punishment (which results in the
loss of the benefit from the bribe). In LT, most officials (60%)34 who decide not to deliver
the corrupt service, ‘insure’ themselves against the possibility of retaliation by the client
and substitute risky defection by whistle-blowing. The difference in O ’s payoffs between
the options ‘Whistle’ and ‘Nothing’ (which amounts to 3 EMU) can be interpreted as an
insurance fee.
While whistle-blowing does not provide any real benefit for the official (in direct
comparison to the option ‘Out’) in SWT, it enables officials in LT to benefit from the
transfer without risk and without collaborating in the corrupt transaction.35 The results
suggest that the institution of asymmetric leniency for O ’s whistle-blowing is successful
in the sense that a considerable number of officials can be incentivized to blow the whistle
rather than reciprocate in the corrupt transaction (Hypothesis 6).
Transfer levels
The differences in the average transfer levels between the treatments (see Table 3.1) can
be explained by path-dependency of B ’s behaviour with respect to reaching the bribing
stage (Stage 3 in CT and Stage 4 in the WB treatments). Table 3.2 shows four different
types of average transfer levels. Transfermean measures the average transfer level across
periods (and thereby treats transfers in situations for which the bribing stage has not
been reached as 0 values). Transfercond only considers average transfers of situations
for which the bribing stage has been reached. These situations are further divided into
those for which B has reached the relevant stage voluntarily (as her first choice i.e. by
choosing ‘Add’ in Stage 1) and those for which B has revealed to prefer the legal option
(by choosing ‘Normal’ in Stage 1) and hence has entered the bribing stage ‘involuntarily’.
Transfervol is relevant for the former set of situations, Transferinvol for the latter.
34The fraction is calculated by 0.340.34+0.14+0.09 ∗ 100%, see Figure 3.4.
35This assumes that choosing ‘Prefer’ also yields a riskless return to O since B has no reason to blow
the whistle in this case.
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Table 3.2: Transfer levels
Treatment CT SWT LT
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev
Transfermean 4.18 1.40 4.67 2.27 4.74 2.36
Transfercond 6.77 0.27 8.61 1.10 8.71 1.21
Transfervol 9.07 1.04 9.11 1.18 9.44 1.15
Transferinvol 5.36 1.13 5.92 1.07 5.61 1.22
All figures are averages across subjects in the relevant periods.
Among these four types of transfers, we find a significant difference between the CT
and the WB treatments only in the average transfer level conditional on reaching Stage
4, Transfercond (CT vs. SWT: p = 0.089; N = 33 and CT vs. LT p = 0.007; N = 30).
Neither of the other three levels (Transfermean, Transfervol and Transferinvol) show any
significant difference between the treatments (p ≥ 0.452; N ≥ 15). Within all three
treatments, the differences between Transfervol and Transferinvol are all highly significant
(Wilcoxon signed ransum tests: Transfervol vs. Transferinvol: p < 0.001; N ≥ 8)36. We
infer that clients who have been forced to enter the corrupt transaction seem to be
less inclined to transfer high bribes.37 The treatment difference in Transfercond can be
explained by differences in the ‘voluntariness’ of reaching the bribing stage (shares of
clients reaching the bribing stage ‘voluntarily’ or ‘involuntarily’) between CT and the
WB treatments. In CT, only 52% of clients who reach the bribing stage are of the
‘voluntary’ type, compared to 78% in SWT and 71% in LT.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of transfers conditional on reaching Stage 4/5.
Since the number of observations is limited for some transfer levels (e.g. transfer levels 3,
9, 17 and 18 were not chosen at all), we illustrate the frequency of transfers in two ways.
The upper panel of Figure 3.5 shows the frequency of transfers separated in exact levels.
For reasons of clarity we pool situations in which transfers were ‘very low’ (0− 4 EMU),
‘low’ (5 − 9 EMU), ‘medium’ (10 − 14 EMU) and ‘high’ (15 − 20 EMU) in respective
categories in the lower panel of Figure 3.5.
36Here we loose the observation by those pairs who have either made only voluntary or only involuntary
transfers.
37This may be due to differences in beliefs on O ’s willingness to reciprocate or differences in social
preferences etc.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of transfer levels and categories
In the upper panel (of Figure 3.5) we see a large mode at the transfer level of 12
EMU in all treatments. We interpret this as evidence for the presence of ‘fairness’
considerations (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) between B and O, since a transfer of 12 EMU
followed by positive reciprocity by O equalizes payoffs between the two in all treatments
(since 48− 12 EMU = 36 EMU = 3 ∗ 12 EMU, see Figure 3.1 or 3.2). The second mode
for all treatments at a transfer of 10 EMU may be explained by the focal character of the
number 10 or its proximity to the payoff equalizing transfer level (12 EMU) and a self-
serving bias. Neither of the treatments shows substantial activity at the high end of the
transfer scale (b > 12). Considering the lower panel ( of Figure 3.5), transfers are almost
equally distributed in the ‘medium’ and ‘high’ range across treatments, while subjects’
transfers in CT lie significantly more often in the ‘very low’ and significantly less often in
the ‘low’ range than those in the WB treatments (CT vs. SWT/LT: p < 0.01; N ≥ 11).
We attribute this finding to differences in the fractions of situations of ‘voluntary’ and
‘involuntary’ bribing between the treatments.
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3.5.2 Conditional reciprocity
In our experiment, the occurrence of corruption mainly relies on (strategic) reciprocity
between B and O. Confirming results from previous experiments on corruption (e.g. Ab-
bink 2004, Lambsdorff and Frank 2010), the spearman rank correlation coefficients of
ρs(CT ) = 0.62, ρs(LT ) = 0.60 and ρs(SWT ) = 0.69 support a strong positive correla-
tion between the transfer levels and the probability of corrupt success (‘Prefer’) in all
treatments. Independence can be rejected at the 1% -level (p < 0.003; N ≥ 61).
Figure 3.6: Corrupt success conditional on transfer levels
Figure 3.6 shows the probability of corrupt success conditional on transfer level cate-
gories.38 We confine our analysis of conditional corruption to non-parametric tests.39 The
difference in the correlation coefficients between CT and SWT in combination with the
differences in average levels of corrupt success conditional on transfer levels (Figure 3.6)
38A figure without clustering in categories shows a qualitatively similar pattern but decreases clarity
because of spikes and flat spots for transfer levels with no or few observations.
39An identification of treatment differences in the causal relationship between the transfer level and
the probability of success (or defection) in a regression is not possible. The selection process of (officials)
reaching the bribing stage (only about 60% of possible cases in CT and about 50% of cases in the WB
treatments reach Stage 4/5) cannot be explained by our data in a way that would satisfy the conditions
of a Heckman correction process (Heckman 1979). In our experiment most B -O pairs of participants
reach the bribing stage for some periods and not for others. This makes it impossible to find a set of
variables that explains the selection process and, at the same time, is irrelevant for the choice of the size
of the transfer.
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suggests that symmetric whistle-blowing strengthens the reciprocal relationship between
the briber and the official. While the conditional probability of corrupt success in SWT
is not significantly different from the ones in LT and CT for very low, medium and high
transfer levels (SWT vs. CT, SWT vs. LT: p ≥ 0.342; N ≥ 33), it is significantly higher
for low transfer levels (p ≤ 0.008; N ≥ 33). For low transfer levels (which are relevant
for about 30% of all observations) the rate of success is 74% in SWT compared to 33%
in CT and 18% in LT.
Corrupt reciprocity is likely to be motivated not only by securing the present period’s
payoff (avoiding whistle-blowing as a form of punishment in the WB treatments) but also
by strategic considerations (triggering B ’s positive reciprocity, i.e. high transfers in future
periods). The lower the transfer levels, the lower the expected flow of future transfers
(of the same magnitude) and hence the less important strategic considerations become,
compared to immediate concerns about B ’s direct negative reciprocity. For ‘medium’
and ‘high’ levels of transfer, strategic considerations are strong enough to cause high
levels of corruption in all treatments, making any other potential motivation redundant.
For ‘very low’ transfer levels, the motivation to secure the present period’s payoff is weak
and hence does not lead to a treatment difference. Only for ‘low’ levels of transfers, for
which strategic considerations are not sufficient to trigger positive reciprocity for most
officials (in most situations),do participants in SWT show significantly higher success
rates than those in CT and LT. We attribute this to O ’s fear of B ’s retribution (through
WB in Stage 6), which is absent in CT and avoidable40 in LT.
3.5.3 Whistle-blowing and gender
We want to test whether the gender difference in corrupt behaviour (found e.g. in
Swamy et al. 2001 or Sung 2003) can be demonstrated experimentally in a repeated
game. In a one shot game, Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming) show that gender effects
in corrupt reciprocity can be attributed to differences in the tendencies to engage in
costly punishment and to anticipate direct negative retaliation. In our set-up, strategic
considerations may crowd-out effects stemming from differences in belief structures and
40O can avoid retaliation in Stage 6 by choosing ‘Whistle’ in Stage 5
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hence cut out potential gender effect.
Gender and defection
In CT we do not find any significant difference in the rate of defection (fraction of
‘Nothing’) between female and male officials. Both genders defect in 44% (female:
0.24
0.55
= 0.44; male: 0.20
0.45
= 0.44) of possible cases, see Table 3.6 in Appendix 3C. In SWT,
female officials choose ‘Nothing’ in 38% (0.12
0.32
= 0.0.38) of cases (which is not significantly
different from the rates of defection for both genders in CT, p = 0.295; N = 15), while
male officials defect in only 10% (0.07
0.68
= 0.10) of relevant situations, see Table 3.7 in
Appendix 3C. The defection rates in LT show a similar pattern as in SWT, however, the
gender difference is slightly smaller and statistically insignificant (p = 0.283; N = 12),
see Table 3.8 in Appendix 3C. Only in SWT do female officials defect significantly more
often than their male counterparts (female vs. male: p = 0.002; N = 20). The lack of
a significant gender effect in CT suggests that female and male officials do not differ in
the consideration of the effect of defective behaviour on the clients’ future behaviour
(with respect to transfers in future periods). They do not seem to follow systematically
different approaches with respect to their strategies in the corrupt context. We inter-
pret the strong gender effect in SWT as evidence for the hypothesis that male officials
show a stronger reaction to the possibility of getting punished for defection (through
whistle-blowing in Stage 6) than female officials. As a consequence, pairs of participants
involving a male official show significantly higher success rates of corruption than those
with a female official (Hypothesis 4).41 This confirms the validity of the argumentation
of Eckel and Grossman (1996) with respect to gender differences in anticipation behaviour.
Gender and punishment
In both WB treatments a substantial number of clients are found to punish defective
behaviour of the official (by choosing ‘Whistle’ in Stage 6). In 40% (SWT) and in 38%
(LT) of all relevant situations (i.e. O chose ‘Nothing’ in Stage 5)42 the client accepted
substantial costs (6 EMU, independent of the size of T ) to blow the whistle. In our
41Note that the gender of the transaction partner is neither known nor noticeable to any of the
participants.
42As expected, not a single participant of type B chose ‘Whistle’ in Stage 6 after O had chosen ‘Prefer’
in Stage 6
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experiment, whistle-blowing in Stage 6 is designed in a way that the impact of punishment
depends positively on the transfer (Pun(T ) = 3∗T−2), while the cost remains constant at
6 EMU making punishment at high rates of T relatively cheap. Hence it is not surprising
to find a strong correlation between the frequency of punishment and the transfer level T
(Spearman Rank correlation coefficient; ρp(WB)/T = 0.62; p = 0.004; N=63: observations
from both WB treatments). The pattern of whistle-blowing in both SWT and LT along all
10 periods is shown in Figure 3.7.43 Slightly higher punishment rates in early periods may
Figure 3.7: Probability of whistle-blowing in Stage 6
be due to the (strategic) signalling purpose of negative retaliation. The high punishment
rate in the last period emphasizes the existence of pure retaliation (possibly motivated by
fairness considerations) as a motive for defective behaviour, since punishment in the last
period is unlikely to target reputation formation (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Bochet et al.
2006). Table 3.3 shows the average conditional punishment rates in the WB treatments.
Rates are presented for both genders as well as separated for female and male participants.
As expected, female clients punish defection less often than their male counterparts
(25%/33% compared to 55%/46% in SWT/LT). Only in SWT is the difference in punish-
ment behaviour between male and female clients significant (female vs. male: p = 0.052;
N = 16). This result further strengthens the hypothesis that the gender effect found
in O ’s behaviour (Hypothesis 5) critically depends on differences in the anticipation
of immediate and costly direct punishment, which is likely to be strongly related to the
‘own’ (gender specific) preferences towards punishment behaviour. Our evidence confirms
43A separation into SWT and LT is not informative because of the low number of total observations.
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the findings in Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming) and supports the interpretation of
the gender effect being mainly determined by differences in O ’s belief on B ’s behaviour
with respect to direct (off-equilibrium) punishment of defective behaviour (Hypothesis
4). The differences in defection rates of officials and in actual punishment behaviour of
clients between genders are also in line with the experimental findings of the literature
on the gift exchange and trust game (see e.g. Croson and Gneezy 2009, Andreoni and
Vesterlund 2001, Cox 2002). However, we find that men tend to be more reciprocal and
women act more equitably only in the situation where a direct costly punishment device
is present (as in SWT).
Table 3.3: Gender and punishment
Treatment SWT LT
Whistling after Defection 0.40 0.38
female male female male
0.25 0.55 0.33 0.46
Acceptance after Defection 0.60 0.62
female male female male
0.75 0.45 0.67 0.54
All figures show averages of shares across subjects and periods for
the relevant situation (O has chosen ‘Nothing’ in Stage 5)
The higher level in the application of costly punishment (and consequently the
anticipation thereof) by male participants may be interpreted as a tendency of men
to stick to their principles (Eckel and Grossman 1996). In our experiment this would
mean that men consider bilateral reciprocation as their behavioural target even though
this leads to aggregate inefficiencies and potentially unfair outcomes with respect to the
distribution of payoffs. The gender difference in behaviour may also be explained by
the finding that men are more inclined to maximize joint payoffs than women (efficiency
seeking in Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). This argument may only be conceded if we
consider joint payoffs on (O-B) ‘pair’-level alone, but not if we regard aggregated payoffs
on session or treatment levels. Ignoring the behaviour of other pairs, punishment and
the anticipation thereof leads to higher levels of corruption yielding larger payoffs for B
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and O but reducing aggregated payoffs within a session (and thereby a treatment) by the
resulting negative externality. In this sense, the argument of joint payoff maximization
cannot be extended to the social dilemma of inefficient corruption. We leave the question
on the particular reasons for the gender differences to future research.
3.5.4 Path-dependent behaviour
Decisions made in later stages of the game may depend on whether it was B or O who
has initiated the corrupt transaction. For example B ’s behaviour of punishing defective
behaviour (choose ‘Whistle’ in Stage 6 of the WB treatments) may depend on the ‘vol-
untariness’ of corrupt participation. Considering the rate of punishment, we do not find
any indication of a difference between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ participation when
we control for transfer levels (separate U-tests in the four transfer categories, averag-
ing all relevant observations on the individual subject level; ‘voluntary’ vs. ‘involuntary’:
p ≥ 0.225; N ≥ 12). This contradicts the presumption that clients who reveal to be
committed to choose the corrupt path, may be more inclined to punish defection. In line
with our argumentation concerning the gender effect in corupt behaviour, our data pro-
vides clear evidence that the voluntariness of participation in corruption is independent
of B ’s gender (the Spearman correlation coefficient between gender and voluntariness
ρvol/gender = 0.21 is not significantly different from 0; p = 0.543, using observations of
both WB treatments).
Those officials who have been able to choose whether or not to enter the corrupt
transaction (passing Stage 2) may systematically differ in their willingness to reciprocate
from those who are sent straight into Stage 4/5 (by B choosing ‘Add’ in Stage 1). Again
we test for the difference in the mean probability of defection and reciprocation between
the two sub-samples separately for the four transfer categories. The rates of defection
and reciprocity do not differ significantly in either of the three treatments (‘voluntary’
vs. ‘involuntary’ within transfer categories: pCT ≥ 0.311; pSWT ≥ 0.218; pLT ≥ 0.342;
N ≥ 12). We conclude that O ’s reciprocity is not affected by the way Stage 4/5 has been
reached other than (indirectly) by the effect on the size (category) of the transfer.
In the following we assess the effectiveness of corrupt and non-corrupt strategies for
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both types of players in terms of payoff maximization.
Payoff maximizing strategies (client)
While it is (by design) never socially optimal for the participants to engage in corruption,
it may be individually optimal for B to initiate a corrupt transaction in Stage 1 (assuming
self interested payoff maximization). To determine the effect of all relevant decisions
on individual payoffs we run three linear random effects panel regressions separately for
observations for the three treatments. For all three estimations we use the following
specification.
(M1) PPit = β0 + β1Addit + β2Legalit + β3Bribeit + β4Addit ∗Bribeit + it
Index i stands for type B participants, index t for periods (t=1,2,...,10). We use
individual ‘period payoffs’ (PP , measured in EMU) as the dependent variable. Add rep-
resents a dummy variable for B ’s decision whether or not to activate a corrupt transaction
in Stage 1. Legal is a dummy variable for choosing ‘Normal’ in Stage 1 and Bribe is a
variable measuring the amount of bribe (in EMU) transferred in Stage 3/4. The inter-
action term Add ∗ Bribe measures the difference in the marginal effect of an additional
unit of bribe on the period payoff between situations in which bribing has been chosen
by B in Stage 1 and situations in which B has been forced into the corrupt transaction
(passing Stage 2). Table 3.4 reports the output of the three regressions.
Choosing the legal path (‘Normal’ in Stage 1) significantly increases period payoffs
compared to the outside option (choosing ‘Out’ in Stage 1) only in the WB treatments
(H0: β2 = 0: pSWT = 0.071, pLT = 0.065). The lack of a significant positive effect of
a ‘legal’ choice in CT explains the high percentage of situations in which the (Pareto-
dominated) outside option is chosen in this treatment (see Figure 3.3 in Section 3.5.2).
In all treatments, initiating a corrupt transaction is worthwhile only in combination with
a relatively large transfer. On average, it needs a bribe larger than 4.55 (6.28
1.38
) EMU in
CT, 2.32 (2.69
1.16
) EMU in SWT and 4.41 (3.00
0.68
) EMU in LT to yield an expected period
payoff greater than the one obtained by choosing the outside option.
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Table 3.4: Output for random effects estimation (M1)
Dependent variable: PP
CT SWT LT
Coeffs Std. dev Coeffs Std. dev Coeffs Std. dev
Constant 20.16∗∗∗ 1.47 20.00∗∗∗ 2.37 20.00∗∗∗ 4.07
Add −6.28∗∗ 2.49 −2.69∗∗∗ 0.57 −3.00∗∗ 1.45
Legal 0.21 1.69 2.95∗ 1.59 3.04∗ 1.85
Bribe 1.38∗∗∗ 0.20 1.16∗∗∗ 0.21 0.68∗∗∗ 0.14
Add ∗Bribe 0.09 0.31 0.03 0.31 0.15 0.21
Overall R2 R2 = 0.53 R2 = 0.47 R2 = 0.34
Number of Subjects Ni = 12 Ni = 21 Ni = 18
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, and * denotes
significance at the 10%-level. Number of periods: 10
In terms of period payoff maximizing, bribing is not significantly more effective in
situations in which the bribing stage has been reached voluntarily (β4 (Add ∗ Bribe) is
not significantly different from 0 in any of the three treatments; p ≥ 0.284). To check
for robustness we proceeded in two dimensions. First, we included several combinations
of variables of individual characteristics from the demographic data obtained in the
questionnaire (e.g. dummy variables for B ’s and O ’s gender) and the variable Bribe2
(the squared transfer level) in order to control for the possibility of diminishing marginal
returns of the transfer on period payoffs. Second, we used two alternative models to
estimate our regression. In addition to the linear random effects model we applied pooled
OLS with dummy variables for periods (to account for dynamic effects) and a Tobit
model to account for the censored structure of the dependent variable (PP is restricted
to integers between 0 and 48 EMU). None of the alternative models, nor the inclusion
of additional explanatory variables, yields qualitatively different results with respect to
direction and significance of the coefficients reported in Table 3.4. We interpret the lack
of a significant effect of the variable Bribe2 in all specifications (p > 0.378) as strong
evidence for the absence of a decreasing marginal effectiveness of the amount of transfer.44
44For reasons of parsimony we do not report detailed results of (any of) these estimations.
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Payoff maximizing strategies (official)
If B chooses the legal path, a situation reaches Stage 2 and O has to decide between
agreeing to the legal proposal (‘Ok’) and demanding a bribe (‘Add’). In order to obtain
a crude measure of the effectiveness of O initiating a corrupt transaction with respect
to payoff maximization we calculate the average payoff generated by O ’s respective
decisions in Stage 2. Using observations for which Stage 2 is reached (B has chosen
‘Normal’ in Stage 1), we run OLS regressions with period payoff (PP ) as the dependent
variable and a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if O initiates a corrupt transaction
(‘Add’) and 0 for O ’s acceptance of the legal procedure (‘Ok’) as the only explanatory
variable, separately for all three treatments.45 The results for the OLS regressions (M2)
to (M4) for observations in the respective treatments are shown in the following equations.
CT (M2): ˆPPi = 18.65∗∗∗ + 5.00∗∗Addi (R2 = 0.53; Nobs = 55; Clusters = 12)
SWT (M3): ˆPPi = 20.59∗∗∗ − 4.89∗∗Addi (R2 = 0.45; Nobs = 113; Clusters = 21)
LT (M4): ˆPPi = 20.13∗∗∗ − 0.54Addi (R2 = 0.47; Nobs = 111; Clusters = 18)
*** stands for significance on the 1%−level, ** for significance on the 5%−level.
In CT, it pays off for O to force B into a corrupt transaction in Stage 2. On average,
this yields additional 5 EMU per period compared to accepting the legal proposal
(βCT1 = 5.00, p < 0.001). In contrast, it is counterproductive in SWT (significantly nega-
tive effect of corrupt initiation) for O to initiate a corrupt deal in Stage 2 (βSWT1 = −4.89,
p < 0.001) and does not make any significant difference for O in LT (βLT1 = −0.51,
p = 0.328) with respect to payoff levels. We conclude that in our model of corruption,
whistle-blowing (of both types) is effective in extinguishing the incentive for O to engage
in corruption under rational expectations as to her monetary payoff.
45We use robust standard errors, clustered on subject level. As a robustness check we also ran
respective specifications of the Tobit model to account for the censored dependent variable, which did
not yield qualitative different results. So we did not report the results of these regressions.
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3.6 Conclusion
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the introduction of (various set-ups
of) whistle-blowing with respect to its effect on the two negative consequences of corrup-
tion. We expand the standard game of corruption, which is often used as a vehicle to
study individual behaviour in the experimental corruption research, in two ways. First,
we provide subjects with a true ‘legal’ alternative to corruption and second, we allow
both deciding agents, the client and the official, to choose to actively initiate a corrupt
transaction. This allows us to consider not only the ex-post problem of a realized cor-
rupt transaction causing damage to members of the public (who are not involved in the
corrupt transaction), but also the ex-ante problem of corruption keeping ‘honest’ clients
away from productive markets. Since whistle-blowing may have (opposing) effects on
the two negative consequences of corruption, an analysis focusing on only one aspect (as
in the standard game of corruption) may lead to the wrong conclusions. We show in a
controlled laboratory experiment that our model is able to capture both consequences,
enabling us to study the total effect of two institutions of whistle-blowing differing with
respect to the symmetry of leniency.
Using three different treatments of a repeated version of an extended multi-stage
corruption game we are able to show that there are two opposing effects of the introduction
of symmetrically punished whistle-blowing. First, giving the client an opportunity to blow
the whistle on an official who attempts to force her into a corrupt transaction leads to
a higher number of legally proceeded successful transactions (the ‘true’ alternative to
corruption which is first best in terms of aggregated payoffs) compared to the control
treatment where whistle-blowing is not possible. This behaviour can be explained by
arguments based on the structure of a payoff maximizing client’s set of (realistic) first
order beliefs on the (off-equilibrium) behaviour of the official. Moreover, we can show that
whistle-blowing helps to decrease the attractiveness of the outside option. In this respect
whistle-blowing serves as a client’s safeguard against the exploitation through a corrupt
official and thereby enables productive activity. Second, we find that the possibility
of ‘post-transaction’ whistle-blowing by the briber (occurring after the decision of the
official) can be misused as a tool to stabilize the corrupt transaction. Despite the personal
costs, clients show a substantial amount of whistle-blowing in order to punish the official
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for not delivering the (implicitly) demanded corrupt service. The (realistic) anticipation
of this behaviour leads to an increase in the success-rate of corrupt transactions (both
conditional and un-conditional on reaching the relevant stage of the game). The second
effect confirms experimental evidence from Lambsdorff and Frank (2010, forthcoming)
and Abbink (2006). For a relevant range of transactions (i.e. for relatively small transfer
levels) the possibility of direct retaliation is shown to matter despite the obvious relevance
of strategic considerations.
We are able to show that the effect of stabilization is stronger for transactions involving
a male official. Men punish defection more often than their female counterparts in the role
of the client and act accordingly with respect to (revealed) anticipation of this behaviour
in the role of the official. In the control treatment we do not find any significant gender
effects. This provides further support for the hypothesis that the gender effect in corrupt
behaviour found in a series of experimental and empirical studies (Lambsdorff and Frank
2010, Croson and Gneezy 2009) can be attributed to the reactions to the existence and
anticipation of direct and costly negative retaliation (and not to patterns of general
differences in preferences, e.g. risk aversion, Dekel and Scotchmer 1999). We demonstrate
that asymmetric leniency can at least partly offset the stabilization effect, giving the
official an opportunity to defect on the client while still benefiting from the bribe and
being safe from the client’s negative retaliation. Leniency for whistle-blowing can be
used by the official as an ‘insurance’ against punishment after defection and undercuts
the stabilization effect of the anticipation of punishment found under symmetric whistle-
blowing.
Only under asymmetric leniency for the official does the introduction of whistle-
blowing yield consistently positive effects with respect to all performance variables, the
average level of payoff, the relative number of corrupt transactions and the relative num-
ber of successful legal transactions. Asymmetric leniency policies, providing incentives
for defection while protecting the official from retaliation, can enhance the effectiveness
of the institution of whistle-blowing, offering a strong argument for its use and consider-
ation in the design of anti corruption laws. Our results relate strongly to the theoretical
findings of Lambsdorff and Nell (2007) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006), who advocate
the effectiveness of well designed asymmetric punishment policies with respect to illegal
activities. The findings with respect to behavioural gender differences in the reactions to
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whistle-blowing may serve to fine-tune these policies. In particular, asymmetric punish-
ment for whistle-blowing may be especially effective for male officials which is in line with
the argumentation of Lambsdorff and Frank (forthcoming) and Krajcova and Ortmann
(2008).
Future theoretical as well as experimental corruption research with respect to the
optimal design of institutions of whistle-blowing may be directed at taking heterogeneity
of decision-makers into account. Especially for large private or public entities, decision-
making agents involved in corruption may consist of a group rather than individuals.
Exploiting the heterogeneity of individuals, asymmetrically punished whistle-blowing
may not only serve as a tool to incentivize and secure defection between briber and
official (as shown in our experiment) but also as a tool to take advantage of weaknesses
in the corrupt complicity between individuals within a decision-making group.
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3.7 Appendix 3
Appendix 3A: Proof of Equilibrium in the 6-Stage Game
We include the proof of Proposition 2 only for the specification of LT. The proofs
for the respective propositions in the treatment specifications of SWT and CT (e.g.
Proposition 1) are similar in structure. The proof is by backward induction.
Denote by Ii,n the information set in stage i of period n, where i  {1, 2, ..., 6} and
n  {1, 2, .., 10}. Let p(Ii,n) be the probability of reaching the respective stage and
q(‘s’|Ii,n) the conditional probability of the relevant agent choosing ‘s’ once she has
reached stage i, n having access to the respective information set.
An information set contains all relevant information about ego’s and alter’s decisions in
all relevant stages up to the respective stage (i, n). Information sets I1,n I3,n I4,n and I6,n
are relevant for type B, I2,n and I5,n for type O participants. Moreover, let PO(‘Set’) be
the payoff by realizing the strategy set ‘Set’.
First, we show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which B chooses ‘Whistle’ in Stage
6 of the last (10th) period.
Consider a strategy set Set1 = [s1,1, s2,1, ..., s6,1, s1,2..., s6,10] in which p(I6,10) > 0 and
qw = q(‘Whistle’|I6,10) > 0. Compare the expected payoff, resulting from this set
(PO(‘Set1’)) to that of an alternative which consists of equal strategies up to I6,10 but
for which q(‘Whistle’|I6,10) = 0 and call it PO(‘Set10’). Irrespective of the history up to
I6,10, it is better for B not to blow the whistle since qw(14−T )+(1−qw)(21−T ) < 21−T
(for the case O has chosen ‘Nothing’) and qw(14 − T ) + (1 − qw)(48 − T ) < 48 − T (for
the case O has chosen ‘Prefer’), hence PO(Set1) < PO(‘Set10’), so that Set1 cannot
constitute an equilibrium (Sub game perfect Nash Equilibrium). A rational B will never
play ‘Whistle’ in Stage 6.
Second, we show that, in the last (10th) period, O will never choose ‘Prefer’ in Stage 5.
Consider a strategy set Set2 = [s1,1, s2,1, ..., s6,9, s1,10..., s6,10] in which p(I5,10) > 0,
q(‘Whistle’|I6,10) = 0 (as shown above) and q(‘Prefer’|I5,10) > 0.
Again, compare PO(Set2) to PO(Set20) which differs from the former only in
q(‘Prefer’|I5,10) = 0. Since 3∗T < 6+3∗T , the expected payoff PO(Set2) < PO(Set20),
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if probability mass q(‘Prefer’|I5,10) is shifted to q(‘Nothing’|I5,10) > 0.46 Hence Set2
cannot be an equilibrium.
It is easy to show by similar argumentation that any strategy set exhibiting
q(‘T = 0’|I4,10) = 0, q(‘Prefer’|I5,10) = 0, q(‘Whistle’|I5,10) > 0 or q(‘Out’|I5,10) > 0
cannot constitute an equilibrium when compared to the expected payoff of a strat-
egy set that is similar except that it excludes the possibilities of ‘Whistle’ and ‘Out’
choices in Stage 5 of the 10th period. If T=0, the expected payoff from any of these
strategy sets is strictly smaller than that of a strategy set being similar but exhibiting
q(‘Nothing’|I5,10) = 1
Third, it is straightforward to see that any strategy set for which q(‘T = 1’|I4,10) < 1,
(q(‘Whistle’|I5,10) = 0, q(‘Out’|I5,10) = 0, q(‘Whistle’|I6,10) = 0) is strictly dominated by
a strategy set with the same characteristics except q(‘T = 1’|I4,10) = 1. This is because
setting T > 1 wastes B ’s payoff as it leads to the same behaviour of O. T = 0 leads to a
lower expected payoff since in this case q(‘Out’|I5,10) = 1 and 14 < 20− T = 19.
In Stage 3, we cannot exclude any strategy set given the above argumentation since B
will be indifferent between strategy sets that differ only in q(‘Add’|I3,10) (if p(I3,10) > 0)
since both actions ‘Add’ or ‘Whistle’lead to an expected payoff of 19 EMU.
It is clear that an equilibrium exhibiting p(I2,10) > 0 has to include the acceptance of
O, q(‘Ok’|I2,10) = 1 since this yields strictly greater payoffs for O under the equilibrium
properties derived above (15 > 9).
Choosing ‘Normal’ for any information set I1,10, setting q(‘Normal’|I1,10) = 1, leads to
the maximum payoff for B.
An equilibrium Strategy must therefore fulfill the following characteristics of actions in
the last period: q(‘Whistle’|I6,10) = 0 if p(I6,10) > 0, q(‘Nothing’|I5,10) = 1 if p(I5,10) > 0,
q(‘T = 1’|I4,10) = 1 if p(I4,10) > 0, q(‘Add’|I3,10) = [0, 1] if p(I3,10) > 0, q(‘Ok’|I2,10) = 1
and q(‘Normal’|I1,10) = 1. We call this set of actions the Stage Game Equilibrium. Hence
Setequ = [s1,1, s2,1, ..., s6,9, ‘Normal’, ‘Ok’, ‘Whistle’/‘Ok’, ‘T = 1’, ‘Nothing’, ‘Ok’].
Consider a period-set PS = {k, ....9} of the last 10− k consecutive periods for which the
Stage Game Equilibrium of the last (10th) period is played and regard period k − 1. By
the same line of arguments for the equilibrium properties of the Stage Game Equilibrium,
46This is because q(‘Whistle’|I5,10) ∗ 8 + q(‘Out’|I5,10) ∗ 8 + q(‘Nothing’|I5,10) ∗ (6 + 3T ) + (1 −
q(‘Whistle’|I5,10)− q(‘Out’|I5,10)− q(‘Nothing’|I5,10)) ∗ 3T < q(‘Whistle’|I5,10) ∗ 8 + q(‘Out’|I5,10) ∗ 8 +
(1− q(‘Whistle’|I5,10)− q(‘Out’|I5,10)) ∗ (6 + 3T ).
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we can repeat excluding all sets of strategies in period k − 1 that do not exhibit the
strategy characteristics of the Stage Game Equilibrium.
Letting k decrease from 9 one by one until it reaches 1, it is easy to see that the
Stage Game Equilibrium of the last period remains the only Sub game perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SNE) in the finitely repeated game.
Appendix 3B: Clarifications to hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
The following argument in favour of a positive effect of giving B an opportunity to blow
the whistle builds on the consideration of payoff maximizing strategies under a reasonable
set of first order beliefs derived by induction. Consider first the considerations of B in the
CT. Departing from the actions predicted in the SNE, a risk neutral payoff maximizing
client B will (in the last period of the repeated game) choose ‘Out’ in Stage 1 if her
beliefs about O ’s behaviour are structured such that her expected payoff from choosing
‘Normal’ is smaller than 20 EMU, the value of the outside option.
If she chooses ‘Normal’ in Stage 1 O may her (by choosing ‘Add’) to enter Stage 3. Not
aiming at initiating corrupt reciprocity, B would either choose ‘T = 0’, in which case she
would (most likely) end up with 14 EMU, or ‘T = 1’, in which case she would expect to
get 19 EMU with some probability (q) and 14 EMU with the residual probability (1− q).
A belief of q < 1 is justified by B expecting O to punish a low transfer at relatively low
costs. We assume that B ’s belief on the probability of O choosing ‘Prefer’ after receiving
a low transfer is 0. Hence, B ’s expected payoff from choosing ‘Normal’ in Stage 1 (when
choosing a low transfer in Stage 3) is EP (‘Normal′|T ≤ 1) = 25p + (19q + 14(1 − q)) ∗
(1− p) = 25p+EP (Bribe) ∗ (1− p), where p is B ’s belief on the probability that O will
choose ‘Ok’ in Stage 2 and EP (Bribe) is B ’s expected payoff after leaving Stage 2.
The higher the probability of O choosing ‘Out’ in Stage 4 (1−q), the lower EP (Bribe) and
hence the lower the belief of the probability of O choosing ‘Add’ (1−p) in Stage 2 needs to
be in order to cause B to choose ‘Out’ in Stage 1 of CT, leaving EP (‘Normal′|T ≤ 1) < 20
EMU. In CT B ’s belief on O ’s Stage 2 honesty (‘Ok’) must be pCT ≤ 6−5q11−5q . Hence those B
participants characterized by the belief structure defined above will choose ‘Out’ instead
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of ‘Normal’ in Stage 1.
When introducing whistle-blowing (SWT or LT), the expected payoff from choosing
‘Out’ remains 20 EMU, while the expected payoff after leaving Stage 2 is at least 19
EMU, EP (Bribe)WB = min[EP (Bribe); 19] = 19 EMU, since B can always blow the
whistle in Stage 3. Hence participants holding the same belief structures as described
above, will choose ‘Out’ in the WB treatments only if 20 > 25p + 19(1 − p), hence
pWB ≤ 16 . The larger the belief on the probability of O punishing a low T by choosing
‘Out’ (1− q), the larger the difference between the expected payoff after leaving Stage 2
in the CT and the WB treatments. Hence participants who hold belief structures about
O ’s Stage 2 honesty that satisfy P ∗WB =
1
6
< p < 6−5q
11−5q = p
∗
CT will choose ‘Out’ in CT
but ‘Normal’ in the WB treatments. The relationship between the believed probabilities
p and q is illustrated in Figure 3.8. Especially for low values of q (B expecting O to
punish a low transfer with a high probability) there is a wide range of values for p (‘rele-
vant area’) for which we would expect a treatment difference according to Hypothesis 1.47
Figure 3.8: Relation between p and q
The opportunity to blow the whistle in Stage 3 allows B to bail on a corrupt trans-
action initiated by O at a small cost. By the same line of arguments, O may, in the WB
47Note that the arguments is at least valid for the last period as it implicitly assumes a restrictive
set of first order beliefs that prevents the individual from considering future payoff through corrupt
reciprocity and reputation-building. According to the argument of backward induction, however the
argument should go through to earlier periods.
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treatments, anticipate B ’s willingness to blow the whistle in Stage 3 (if forced to enter
the corrupt transaction). The higher the believed probability of such behaviour, the less
likely it is that O will try to initiate a corrupt transaction in Stage 2. Hence O will
choose ‘Ok’ with a higher probability in Stage 2 of the WB treatments (pWB > pCT ).
A cascade of belief-anticipation and updating would yield expectations of even stronger
treatment effects in O ’s and B ’s Stage 1 and 2 behaviour.
Hypothesis 2
We can calculate the critical belief (conditional on the level of transfer) that causes O to
choose ‘Prefer’ rather than ‘Normal’ for a bribe T > 1 in Stage 5 (For T = 0 the choice
of ‘Out’ would be always preferable to O).
Let EP (‘Prefer′|HI5) = 3T and EP (‘Nothing′|HI5) = (1 − r(T )) ∗ (6 + 3T ) + r(T ) ∗ 8
be the expected payoffs resulting from O ’s Stage 5 choices, given a certain history HI5
which contains the information of all relevant choices up to Stage 5. An official will
deliver the corrupt task (choose ‘Prefer’) if:
EP (‘Prefer′|HI5) > EP (‘Nothing′|HI5), hence 3T > (1− r(T )) ∗ (6 + 3T ) + r(T ) ∗ 8.
Solving for r∗(T ), the critical belief above for which O will deliver, yields r(T )∗ ≥ 6
3T−2 ,
which is strictly decreasing in T (∂r(T )
∗
∂T
= − 18
(3T−2)2 > 0).
This means, the larger the transfer T , the lower the critical belief r∗(T ) and hence the
more likely O will reciprocate in the transaction because of the immediate threat of
retaliation.
For bribes T ≥ 3 EMU, (‘Out’ and ‘Whistle’ are strictly dominated by ‘Prefer’), those
subjects of type O who hold respective beliefs with respect to the punishment probability
will choose ‘Prefer’ instead of ‘Nothing’ in the SWT (fearing B ’s retaliation). By the
argument of backward induction this argument is valid for all earlier periods as well.
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Appendix 3C: General Outcomes
Table 3.5: All relevant Variables
CT SWT LT
‘Out’ in Stage 1 2.25 0.53 0.33
‘Normal’ in Stage 1 4.63 5.71 6.17
Conditional ‘Ok’ in Stage 2 38% 61% 55%
Conditional ‘Whistle’ in Stage 3 - 22% 22%
Reaching Stage 3/4 60% 49% 48%
‘T’ 4.18 4.67 4.74
Conditional ‘T’ 6.77 8.61 8.71
Whistling after Defection - 40% 38%
Whistling after Success - 0 0
Total Corrupt Success 2.83 3.57 2.37
Total Legal Success 1.75 3.48 3.39
Total Failures 5.42 2.95 4.24
Payoff 13.04 Euros 14.83 Euros 16.08 Euros
All figures are averages across subjects and periods within treatments
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Appendix 3D: Defection across genders
The following tables show gender differences with respect to defection in CT, SWT and
LT. Rates of defection are conditional on reaching the bribing stage (Stage 4/5).
Defection in CT
Defection No Defection
Female 0.24 0.31 0.55
Male 0.20 0.25 0.45
0.44 0.56 1
In CT male as well as female officials defect in 44% of cases.
Defection in SWT
Defection No Defection
Female 0.12 0.20 0.32
Male 0.07 0.61 0.68
0.19 0.81 1
In SWT female officials defect in 38% of cases compared to 10% in the male population
of officials.
Defection in LT
Defection No Defection
Female 0.11 0.29 0.40
Male 0.04 0.56 0.60
0.15 0.85 1
In LT female officials defect in 28% of cases compared to 7% in the male population of
officials.
Bringing Good and Bad Whistle-Blowers to the Lab 133
Appendix 3E: Instructions for the SWT treatment (translated
from German)
Thank you very much for your appearance. In the next 90 minutes you will take part in an experiment
in the laboratory of MELESSA.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can (depending on your decisions and the decisions of
other participants of the experiment) earn money, additional to the show-up fee of 4 Euros. The money
you will earn during the experiment will be added to the show-up fee and paid out in cash at the end of
the experiment.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. If you have
questions, please approach one of the experimenters by raising your hand. In the case of violation of this
rule we have to exclude you from any payments.
During the experiment we will refer to Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) instead of Euros. Your
income will be calculated in EMU. At the end of the experiment the total amount will be exchanged in
Euros.
The Exchange rate is 1 EMU = 6 Eurocents.
All 24 participants are distributed into groups of two. Neither the experimenters nor the other
participants know which group you will be in. Your decisions remain completely anonymous.
The Decision Situation
There are two types in this experiment: type A and type B. The types play different roles and make
decisions that affect their own income and potentially the income of the other participants of the
experiment. There will be as many type A participants as type B participants. The type of a participant
is allocated randomly. The probability to play the role of B is therefore equal to the probability of
being an A type.
A group of two consists of one type A and one type B participant. The members of a group stay together
for the entire duration of the experiment. The experiment consists of 10 periods.
Procedure:
Each of the 10 periods has at most 6 Stages:
Stage 1 : In the first Stage each participant of type A has 3 Alternatives.
If he/she chooses End the period ends. In this case, type A gets 20 EMU, and type B gets 10 EMU, and
6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment get 2 EMU each.
If he/she chooses Add, Stages 2 and 3 are skipped.
If he/she chooses Normal, Stage 2 is reached.
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Stage 2 : In Stage 2 (which is only reached if type A has chosen Normal in Stage 2) type B can
choose between the alternatives OK and Add.
If type B chooses OK, the period ends and type A receives 25 EMU, type B 15 EMU, 6 randomly chosen
participants of the experiment get 3 EMU each.
If type B chooses Add, Stage 3 is reached.
Stage 3 : In Stage 3 (which is only reached in case type B has chosen Add in Stage 2) type A can
choose between Report und Add.
If he chooses Report, the period ends, and type A receives 19 EMU and type B 9 EMU.
If he chooses Add, Stage 4 is reached.
Stage 4 : In Stage 4 (which is only reached in case type A has chosen Add in Stage 3) type A chooses
the level of Transfer T (which has to be an integer between 0 and 20 EMU).
Stage 5 :In Stage 5 type B learns the level of transfer T of type A and has four alternatives:
Alternative 1: Type B chooses End. In this case type A receives 14 EMU and type B 8 EMU for this
period.
Alternative 2: Type B chooses Report. In this case type A receives 14 − T and type B: 8 EMU for
this period.
Alternative 3: Type B decides for Nothing. In this case Stage 6 is reached.
Alternative 4: Type B chooses Prefer. In this case Stage 6 is reached.
Stage 6 : In Stage 6 it is again type A who decides. Note that this stage is only reached in case
type B has chosen Nothing or Prefer in Stage 5. In both cases type A has 2 options: Report or OK.
1st Case: Type B has chosen alternative Nothing in Stage 5:
A) If type A chooses Report, he receives 14 EMU less the transfer T : (14− T EMU), type B receives 6
EMU, and 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment get 2 EMU each.
B) If type A chooses OK, type A receives 21 EMU less the transfers T : (21− T EMU), type B receives
6 EMU in addition to the tripled value of T (6 + 3 ∗ T EMU). 6 randomly chosen participants of the
experiment get 2 EMU each.
2nd Case: Type B has chosen alternative Prefer in Stage 5:
A) If type A chooses Report, he receives 14 EMU less the transfer T : (14− T EMU), type B receives 6
EMU, and 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment get 2 EMU each.
B) If type A chooses OK, type A receives 48 EMU less the transfers T : (48− T EMU), type B receives
the tripled value of T (3 ∗ T EMU). The payment of 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment
is reduced by 8 EMU.
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Example
The following example will help you to better understand the situation.
Assume type A chooses Normal in Stage 1 of the experiment. This means we consider the middle cell
of the first line in the payment table (see the last page of the instructions).
Now we consider those cells that are directly beneath the chosen cell: In the second Stage (represented
by the second line) type B decides. We see that he has 2 alternatives: OK and Add. Assume that he
chooses Add.
The cells lying directly beneath this choice (in line 3) are the alternatives Report and Add for type A.
Assume again, type A chooses Add. This means that we reach the fourth Stage in which type A decides
about the Transfers T . Assume type A chooses a transfer of T = 10 EMU.
In Stage 5 type B learns about the transfer (sees it on his screen) and decides between four alternatives:
End, Report, Nothing und Prefer. Assume he chooses Prefer which means we reach Stage 6.
In Stage 6 type A decides between Report and OK. Assume he/she chooses OK.
Then the period ends and we can infer from the payment table what the payment of the respective
participant is:
Type A receives: 48− T . Since T is 10, his income is 48− 10 = 38 EMU
Type B receives: 3 ∗ T . Since T is 10 EMU his income amounts to: 3 ∗ 10 = 30 EMU
The last line contains the income generated through the situation for 6 randomly chosen participants of
the experiment. In our example their total income is reduced by 8 EMU each.
Timing
Stage 1: Type A chooses between End, Normal and Add.
Stage 2: Is only reached if type A has chosen Normal in Stage 1. Type B chooses between OK and
Add.
Stage 3: Is only reached if type B has chosen Add in Stage 2: Type A decides between Report und
Add.
Stage 4: Is only reached if type A has chosen Add in Stage 1 or in Stage 3. Type A chooses Transfer
T (between 0 and 20 EMU).
Stage 5: Type B learns the value of Transfer T and decides between End, Report, Nothing and Prefer.
Stage 6: Is only reached if type B has chosen Nothing or Prefer in Stage 5. In these cases type A
decides between Report and OK
At the end of each period every participant gets to know his/her income in this period. Note that type
A as well as type B can infer from this information what the decision of the other participant was.
Note that this income does not include the additional payments or reductions potentially caused by the
decisions of other participants of the experiment.
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The following control questions will help you to better understand the situation. Please answer
all control questions and raise your hand when you have finished. An experimenter will come to your
place and check your solutions.
Question 1
Assume that you are type A. In Stage 1 you have chosen Add. Therefore Stage 2 and 3 were
skipped, and you proceeded with Stage 4, where you chose a transfer of 3 EMU (T is 3). In Stage 5
type B has chosen Nothing and you chose OK in Stage 6.
a) What is your income (type A) in this period (without additional payments or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the sum of additional payments or reductions of income caused by your (and your
partner’s of type B) decisions for 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the income of type B in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the sum of all payments caused by your (and your partner’s of type B) decisions?
Your answer:________________________
Question 2
Assume that you are type B. In Stage 1 type A has chosen Normal. In Stage 2 you have chosen Add.
Type A chose Add in Stage 3 and a transfer of 0. (T is 0). Then you chose End in Stage 5. a) What
is your income (type B) in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income caused by
other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the sum of additional payments or reductions of income caused by your (and your
partner’s of type A) decisions for 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the income of type A in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the sum of all payments caused by your (and your partner’s of type A) decisions?
Your answer:________________________
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Question 3
Assume that you are type B. In Stage 1 type A has chosen Add. Stage 2 and 3 are therefore
skipped. In Stage 4 type A chooses a transfer of 12 EMU (T is 12). You chose Prefer in Stage 5.
Type A chose OK in Stage 6.
a) What is your income (type B) in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the sum of additional payments or reductions of income caused by your (and your
partner’s of type A) decisions for 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the income of type A in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the sum of all payments caused by your (and your partner’s of type A) decisions?
Your answer:________________________
Question 4
Assume that you are type A. You chose Normal in Stage 1. In Stage 2 type B decides for OK. Stage
3, 4, 5 and 6 are therefore not reached.
a) What is your income (type A) in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the sum of additional payments or reductions of income caused by your (and your
partner’s of type B) decisions for 6 randomly chosen participants of the experiment?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the income of type B in this period (without additional payment or reductions of income
caused by other participants of the experiment that you cannot know)?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the sum of all payments caused by your (and your partner’s of type B) decisions?
Your answer:________________________
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Payment table
This table can be read as follows. Generally we always start from the top and proceed downwards, cell
by cell. If a participant chooses a specific alternative, only those cells that are located directly beneath
this cell are relevant in the next stage (represented by the next line of cells).
Chapter 4
Cooperation with Uncertain
Endowments
4.1 Introduction
It has long been the goal of numerous public goods experiments to identify factors
that increase or decrease cooperation among individuals. It is important to know these
factors in order to set up institutions that can enhance cooperative behaviour. Several
factors have been analyzed that try to capture a more realistic environment of situations
where cooperation is important, like heterogeneous endowments, varying group size, com-
munication, or punishment. Surprisingly, there is little evidence how uncertainty about
endowments influences cooperative behaviour. One can think of many situations where
cooperation is important and where individuals usually do not know the endowment of
others. Charitable giving, for example, usually occurs without any knowledge about the
income of those who donated, but donations become known.1 Team work often allows
the observation of contributions by individual team members while these do not know
how much disposable time each of the other team members actually has.
Making endowments uncertain necessarily involves the possibility of heterogeneous in
addition to homogeneous endowments. In contrast to uncertain endowments, the litera-
ture on heterogeneous endowments is relatively large.2 Besides investigating the effects
1Gächter (2007) lists campaigns where it was practice to reveal the donated amounts of all donators.
2Studies investigating the effects of heterogeneous endowments include Marwell and Ames (1979),
Aquino et al. (1992), Rapoport and Suleiman (1993), van Dijk and Wilke (1994), Ledyard (1995), Carde-
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of heterogeneous and uncertain endowments on contributions in a repeated linear public
goods game, we further explain these effects with conditional cooperation preferences3
elicited separately. Our experimental design builds upon the design of Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010). They used conditional cooperation preferences elicited in the so-called
P-Experiment to explain declining cooperation in a repeated linear public goods game,
the so-called C-Experiment. We take their setup to a more realistic environment by
investigating and explaining cooperative behaviour under heterogeneous and uncertain
endowments. Our C-Experiment consists of two treatments, the certainty and the un-
certainty treatment. In both treatments subjects played a repeated linear public goods
game. There were homogeneous as well as heterogeneous groups. While subjects know
others’ endowments in the certainty treatment they know neither the others’ endowments
nor the total group endowment in the uncertainty treatment. In our P-Experiment we
ask subjects (using the strategy method) to indicate their own contribution for all com-
binations of others’ contributions and endowments. Besides explaining our results from
the C-Experiment, our P-Experiment allows us to investigate open questions concerning
conditional cooperation preferences.4
Overall, we find only a small effect of endowment uncertainty on cooperation in the C-
Experiment. Contributions decrease slightly when endowments are uncertain. However,
we further show that this is due to two opposing effects that partly cancel each other.
Low endowed individuals (L types) contribute substantially less to the public good and
high endowed individuals (H types) slightly more under endowment uncertainty. This
behaviour causes groups with a majority of L types to lose and groups with a majority
of H types to gain under uncertainty. While homogeneous groups are more efficient than
heterogeneous groups under certainty (which is consistent with the existent literature),
under uncertainty this relationship breaks down, and we find that a group becomes more
nas (2003), Zelmer (2003), Cherry et al. (2005), Buckley and Croson (2006), and Anderson et al. (2008).
Most of these studies indicate that making endowments heterogeneous decreases cooperation. The only
studies we are aware of that consider the effect of uncertain endowments (although with a focus different
from ours) are Isaac and Walker (1988), van Dijk and Grodzka (1992), Chan et al. (1999), and Levati et
al. (2007). We discuss how these studies relate to ours at the end of the paper.
3Conditional cooperation describes the preference to contribute to the public good if others con-
tribute as well. Gächter (2007) provides an overview to this literature.
4With the design of our P-Experiment we can first answer the question whether the assumption made
in all other experiments that investigate conditional cooperation preferences, i.e. the assumption that
subjects condition their own contribution on the average of others’ contribution, can be justified. The
second question we investigate (which is more important for our results) is whether subjects condition
their own contribution on others’ relative or absolute contributions.
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efficient the richer it is. Although there is almost no effect of uncertainty on the aggregate
level, uncertainty causes the inequality of the income distribution to increase.
We further explain these treatment effects with individual preferences elicited in the
P-Experiment. The existing literature on conditional cooperation preferences showed
that subjects are on average imperfect conditional cooperators who match others’ contri-
butions with a self-serving bias. Nothing has been said on whether they match absolute
or relative contributions. With homogeneous endowments these two forms of conditional
cooperation coincide. However, with heterogeneous endowments it becomes important
whether subjects are on average absolute or relative conditional cooperators. We show
that subjects are imperfect relative conditional cooperators who match others’ relative
contributions with a self-serving bias. It is exactly this preference that can explain our
treatment effects in the repeated public goods game played in the C-Experiment in the
following two ways.
A direct effect of a preference for relative conditional cooperation is that it implies
that subjects contribute more in absolute terms the poorer their group members are
(holding their absolute contributions constant). Thus, under uncertainty it becomes
important whether subjects believe their group members are poorer or richer than they
actually are. In the C-Experiment we elicited beliefs about both others’ contributions (in
both treatments) and others’ endowments (only in the uncertainty treatment). Subjects
in poor groups think they are in a richer group than they actually are (since half the
subjects were L types and the other half H types) and therefore give less than their
counterparts under certainty. Subjects in rich groups believe to be in a poorer group
than they actually are and therefore give more than under certainty. This explains why
poor groups lose and rich groups gain through uncertainty. Moreover, in rich groups
subjects can better update their beliefs over time since they get informative signals. This
is one reason why poor groups suffer more than rich groups benefit.
Similar to previous studies we observe (strategic) over-contribution5 in the repeated
public goods game with homogeneous endowments under certainty. There is, however,
5Over-contribution occurs when the actual contribution in the public goods experiment (the C-
Experiment) exceeds the predicted contribution that is derived through the individual preferences
(elicited in the P-Experiment) and beliefs about others’ contributions and endowments (elicited in the
C-Experiment). Similar to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), we observe over-contribution under certainty
for homogeneous groups.
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no over-contribution observed in heterogeneous groups, neither under certainty (which
explains why homogeneous groups are more efficient than heterogeneous groups) nor
under uncertainty. For homogeneous groups under uncertainty we find that only rich
groups still over-contribute. Poor groups do not over-contribute under uncertainty. A
possible reason for this observation and indirect effect of a relative conditional cooperation
preference is that L types may anticipate that others are relative conditional cooperators.
Given this anticipation they fear sending signals that may misidentify them as H types
and hence drive down contributions by others. So, L types will not over-contribute under
uncertainty because they anticipate that others are relative conditional cooperators as
well. H types do not stop over-contributing under uncertainty in order to send L type
signals. Perhaps surprisingly, this suggests that H types do not mimic being L types
under uncertainty and thus do not exploit their private information. Since poorer groups
consist of more L types, this is another reason why only poor groups lose through the
uncertainty.
Both effects of a preference for relative conditional cooperation, the direct effect caused
by the deviation of beliefs from reality and the indirect effect due to the absence of
strategic over-contribution in poor groups, indicate why poor groups lose more than
rich groups gain through endowment uncertainty (leading to the small negative overall
treatment effect). We further show that these two effects can explain a substantial part
of our quantitative treatment effects from the C-Experiment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes our experimental design. In
Section 4.3 we discuss our experimental results. In Section 4.3.1 we present the results of
the C-Experiment showing what our treatment effects are and in Section 4.3.2 we explain
these treatment effects and present the results from the P-Experiment. In Section 4.4 we
relate our results to the relevant literature and conclude.
4.2 The Experiment
The experiment was computer-based and was conducted at the experimental labora-
tory MELESSA of the University of Munich. It used the experimental software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner 2004). 180 subjects
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(graduate students were excluded) participated in 8 sessions and earned 14.76 Euros (in-
cluding 4 Euros show-up fee) on average (with a minimum of 10.14 Euros and a maximum
of 22.56 Euros). The experiment took approximately 90 minutes. At the beginning of
the experiment subjects received written instructions that were read privately by them.6
At the end of these instructions they had to answer test questions that showed whether
everything was understood. There was no time limit for the instructions, and subjects
had the opportunity to ask questions in private. The experiment started on the computer
screen only after everybody had answered the test questions correctly and there were no
further questions.
Contributions in the public goods game were modeled through a standard linear vol-
untary contribution mechanism (VCM). In each period, the payoff of player i was given
by
Πi = E
k
i − gi + 0.6
n=3∑
j=1
gj (4.1)
where Eki is player i’s endowment, gi her individual contribution, n is the number of
group members (with i, j = {1, 2, 3}), and 0.6 is the efficiency factor that determines how
valuable the public good is. Under standard selfish preferences subjects would choose
gi = 0, whereas gi = Eki is the social optimum.
In each session of the experiment, half of the subjects had a low endowment of 4
EMU (Experimental Monetary Units, where the exchange rate was such that 1 EMU
corresponded to 0.10 Euros) and the other half of the subjects was high endowed with
8 EMU. Hence, k = {L,H} with ELi = 4 and EHi = 8. All groups in the experiment
consisted of three subjects and thus n = 3. Endowments were randomly assigned to
subjects (via the instructions7) and everybody knew that each subject had the same
chance to be low or high endowed, since they knew that half of the subjects in their
6The instructions of the experiment can be found in Appendix 4B.
7The instructions were given in three sets. The first set of instructions at the beginning of the
experiment gave information about the general setup and how the VCM worked. The second set of
instructions was handed out after everybody had correctly answered the test questions from the first set
of instructions. In the second set subjects received information about their type (H or L) and about the
first part of the experiment (i.e. the P-Experiment). At this point they only knew that there would be a
second part (i.e. the C-Experiment), but did not know what this second part would look like. After the
first part of the experiment was completed, subjects finally received the third set of instructions, which
gave them information about their treatment and the second part that followed.
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session was low and the other half was high endowed.
Subjects kept their endowment type in both parts of the experiment. The first part
of the experiment, the P-Experiment, adopts a design first proposed by Fischbacher et
al. (2001). Here, subjects stated their contributions conditional on others’ contributions
separately for all possible group structures. Since they only knew their own type but
neither the type of the other two group members nor the group structure and thus the
total group endowment, we used strategy tables where they stated their contribution
given every combination of others’ contributions and others’ endowments (LL, LH, and
HH). Table 4.1 illustrates our elicitation method for the case where one other group
member was high and the other low endowed.
Table 4.1: Strategy Table
Example for group structure LH
Contribution Contribution Own
of Type L of Type H Contribution
... ... ...
0 4 ?
1 3 ?
2 2 ?
2 3 ?
... ... ...
For a complete version of the table refer to the
instructions in Appendix 4B.
In order to make these conditional contributions incentive compatible we also asked
for their unconditional contribution in each of the three possible group structures.8 The
stated contribution preferences from the P-Experiment are used later in order to ex-
plain the treatment effects from the second part of the experiment. While the seminal
P-Experiment of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and other studies that used it elicit coop-
eration preferences conditional on the average of others’ contributions in homogeneous
8For two randomly selected subjects in each group the unconditional contribution was payoff relevant
and for one randomly selected subject the conditional contribution was payoff relevant. Payoffs were then
realized according to (4.1) but feedback about the P-Experiment was only given at the end of the session.
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groups, our P-Experiment elicits cooperation preferences conditional on every possible
combination of others’ contributions in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. This
modification allows us to investigate two open questions concerning conditional coopera-
tion preferences. First, whether subjects condition their contributions on the averages of
others’ contributions or whether inequality in contributions among others matters. And
second, whether subjects condition on relative or absolute contributions. While answer-
ing the former question shows whether the assumption of averages is justified in general,
answering the latter is especially important under heterogeneous endowments and allows
us to explain our results.
In the second part, the C-Experiment, subjects played the standard public goods
game as described above repeatedly for ten rounds. We used a partner design where
groups stayed together for all rounds.9 Subjects were randomly allocated to groups with
the structures LLL, LLH, LHH, and HHH.10 These group structures appeared equally
often in each of the following two treatments.
In the certainty treatment, subjects learned before the first period, whether the other
two group members were low or high endowed. They further received information after
each period how much each of the other group members contributed (together with the
information about their types). In each period, they first stated their belief about others’
contributions (knowing others’ type) before we asked them to state their own contribution.
In the uncertainty treatment, subjects neither received information about the types of
the other two group members nor about the total group endowment.11 They only knew
their own endowment. After each period they also received information about others’
contribution (but without type information). Within each period, we first asked each
subject to state her probabilistic belief about the group structure, then her belief about
others’ contributions, and finally asked for her own contribution.12
9Using two parts and connecting stated preferences from the P-Experiment to observed behaviour in
the C-Experiment, we adopt a design similar to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). The difference between
their and our P-Experiment is outlined above since they used the original design of Fischbacher et al.
(2001). Moreover, their C-Experiment consists of ten one-shot linear public goods games with random
matching and a group size of four. The design of our C-Experiment is further explained below.
10Although these group structures were also used to determine the payoffs from the P-Experiment,
feedback about the P-Experiment was only given at the end and after the C-Experiment.
11Note that all subjects knew that half of the them was high and the other half was low endowed
and therefore knew the endowment distribution in the experiment. They did, however, not know the
frequency of each group structure.
12In both treatments, certainty and uncertainty, beliefs about others’ contributions were incentivized
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The experiment consisted of eight sessions in total. In seven of those sessions, 24
subjects participated (12 in the certainty and 12 in the uncertainty treatment) and in
one session only 12 subjects participated (in the uncertainty treatment). So, we had
each possible group structure (LLL, LLH, LHH, and HHH) eight times in the uncertainty
treatment and seven times in the certainty treatment. Having finished both parts of
the experiment, first the P-Experiment and then the C-Experiment,13 subjects answered
a short questionnaire about socio-economic characteristics and then received feedback
about their total earnings from the experiment. Before they left, each subject was paid
in private and by a person that was not the experimenter.
4.3 Results
We organize our results in the following way. First, we report the results from the C-
Experiment where we investigate what the treatment effects (i.e. the effects of uncertain
endowments) are. Additionally, we compare heterogeneous to homogeneous endowments.
In a second step, we will then report the results from the P-Experiment and use them to
explain our observed treatment effects from the C-Experiment.
4.3.1 Treatment Effects
In the C-Experiment, subjects played the public goods game as outlined in Section
4.2 repeatedly for ten rounds. In the certainty treatment, contrary to the uncertainty
treatment, subjects knew the endowment of their group members. In this section we
compare these two treatments and investigate treatment effects on the overall, type, and
group level.
Figure 4.1 shows the average contributions in the ten periods for the uncertainty and
the certainty treatment. The mean contribution over all ten periods is 2.00 EMU in the
in the following way. If their belief was correct, subjects received 2 EMU, if their belief deviated from
the actual contribution by only 1 EMU they received 1 EMU, and if their belief deviated by 2 EMU or
more, they received nothing. Again, feedback was only given at the end of the experiment. We did not
incentivize the stated probabilistic beliefs about others’ endowment in the uncertainty treatment, since
the only existing method we are aware of (i.e. quadratic scoring rule) requires the assumption of risk
neutrality.
13We did not reverse the order of conducting the P- and C-Experiment since Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010) already showed that it has no effect on outcomes.
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uncertainty treatment and 2.21 EMU in the certainty treatment. This difference (9.5%
less contribution in the uncertainty treatment) is, however, not significant (p = 0.1891;
N = 60).14
Figure 4.1: Contributions under Certainty and Uncertainty
Figure 4.1 suggests that uncertainty about others’ endowment levels does not have
much of an effect on cooperation. In fact, this is what the sparse literature touching
endowment uncertainty concludes. However, although there is only a slight negative
effect of uncertainty on the overall level, there may well be a larger effect of uncertainty
when types (L vs. H) or groups (poor vs. rich) are considered instead.
Figure 4.2 shows type-specific absolute contributions in the ten periods for both treat-
ments. We find that L types contribute substantially less under uncertainty. The mean
absolute contribution over all ten periods is 0.99 EMU in the uncertainty treatment and
1.53 EMU in the certainty treatment. This difference (35.3% less contribution in the
uncertainty treatment) is significant at the 1%-level (p = 0.0002; N = 45). By contrast,
H types contribute slightly more under uncertainty. Here, the mean absolute contribu-
tion over all ten periods is 3.01 EMU in the uncertainty treatment and 2.89 EMU in the
certainty treatment. This difference (4.2% more contribution in uncertainty treatment),
however, is not significant (p = 0.6186; N = 45). Nevertheless, it suggests that the small
overall negative effect of uncertainty in Figure 4.1 may be due to two opposing effects
that partly offset each other. L types contribute substantially less and H types slightly
more under uncertainty.
14If not stated otherwise, all reported p-values are those of a two-sided Mann Whitney U test. The
number of observations is denoted by N .
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Figure 4.2: Type-Specific Absolute Contributions under Certainty and Uncertainty
The results under certainty replicate existing findings on the effect of heterogeneous
endowments. There are several studies (see e.g. Marwell and Ames 1979 or Wit et al.
1992) that show that high endowed individuals contribute more in absolute terms than
low endowed individuals, and many studies even indicate that subjects contribute ap-
proximately the same in relative terms (see e.g. Rapoport 1988, Rapoport and Suleiman
1993, van Dijk and Grodzka 1992, van Dijk and Wilke 1994). A notable exception is the
study by Buckley and Croson (2006), which finds that L types contribute relatively more
than H types. However, when looking at field evidence, Buckley and Croson (2006, p 937)
note the following: “Data from the Social Welfare Research Institute at Boston College
shows that in 2000, U.S. families with incomes under $125,000 (91.39% of families in the
U.S.) gave an average of 2.34% of their income to charity. There was little variation of
giving across incomes with the poorest families, those with incomes under $10,000 giving
2.25% (Giving USA 2003). Thus low-income families give the same percentage of their
income as high-income families.”
Figure 4.3 shows type-specific relative contributions in the ten periods for both treat-
ments. We find that under certainty L and H types contribute similar amounts relative to
their endowment. Over the ten periods L types contribute on average 38% and H types
36% of their endowment. Thus, there is no significant difference in relative contributions
between types under certainty (p = 0.3212; N = 28). This picture changes however
under uncertainty. Average relative contributions of L types over the ten periods drop
to 25%, whereas the average relative contributions of H types slightly increase to 38%.
When testing for differences in these relative contributions, we now find a significant
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difference in relative contributions between types under uncertainty. L types contribute
significantly less at the 5%-level relative to their endowment than H types (p = 0.0232;
N = 32). Moreover, between treatments there is no significant change in relative contri-
butions among H types (testing the difference between certainty and uncertainty yields
p = 0.6184; N = 45), but L types contribute significantly less at the 1%-level under
uncertainty (p = 0.0000; N = 45).
Figure 4.3: Type-Specific Relative Contributions under Certainty and Uncertainty
Knowing that L types contribute substantially less and H types slightly more under
uncertainty raises the question about the effect of uncertainty on different group struc-
tures. Intuitively, we should expect that the more L types a group consists of the more
this group suffers from uncertainty. Moreover, since the decrease in contributions of L
types is higher than the increase in contributions of H types, we should expect that poor
groups lose more than rich groups gain through the uncertainty. This is indeed what
we observe. Figure 4.4 shows the treatment differences (uncertainty minus certainty) of
group-specific absolute contributions over the ten periods. Groups with a majority of H
types (LHH and HHH) gain from the uncertainty, whereas groups with a majority of L
types (LLL and LLH) lose from making endowments uncertain. The average treatment
difference over the ten periods is -0.94 EMU for LLL, -0.37 EMU for LLH, 0.35 EMU
for LHH, and 0.51 EMU for HHH. These treatment differences deviate significantly from
zero only for homogeneous groups.15 We can further test whether these treatment differ-
ences differ between the various group structures. Here we find that treatment differences
are significantly different between all group structures except between LLH vs. LHH and
15p = 0.0000 for LLL, p = 0.1536 for LLH, p = 0.1204 for LHH, and p = 0.0622 for HHH; N = 15.
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Figure 4.4: Group-Specific Contribution Differences between Certainty and Uncertainty
LHH vs. HHH.16
Having shown that poor groups contribute less and rich groups more under uncertainty
we can now further analyze the efficiency of groups in the two treatments. Figure 4.5
shows group-specific mean contributions over the ten periods relative to the total group
endowment. This determines how efficient a group is in providing the public good in the
two treatments.
Under certainty, there is a U-shaped relationship between the number of H types
in a group and the efficiency of the group. LLL groups contribute on average 40% of
their endowment, LLH groups 32%, LHH groups 31%, and HHH groups contribute 43%
of their endowment. Thus, heterogeneous groups are less efficient than homogeneous
groups. When testing these differences we find that they are significant between homoge-
neous and heterogeneous groups but not within these two categories.17 This is consistent
with the existing literature. Most studies show that endowment heterogeneity decreases
cooperation (for an overview see Ledyard 1995 or Zelmer 2003). For instance, Cherry
et al. (2005) also use a linear public goods game and find that contributions are sig-
nificantly lower in heterogeneous (33.1% of endowment) than in homogeneous (42.1%
of endowment) groups (note that we find 31.4% and 41.8%, respectively). Anderson et
al. (2008) vary the distribution of a fixed payment for participating in the public goods
16p = 0.0782 for LLL vs. LLH, p = 0.0176 for LLL vs. LHH, p = 0.0000 for LLL vs. HHH, p = 0.3378
for LLH vs. LHH, p = 0.0646 for LLH vs. HHH, and p = 0.1740 for LHH vs. HHH; N = 30.
17Note that this holds with the exception of LLL vs. LLH where the difference is marginally insignif-
icant. For the comparisons of homogeneous vs. heterogeneous groups we find p = 0.1182 for LLL vs.
LLH, p = 0.0395 for LLL vs. LHH, p = 0.0822 for HHH vs. LLH, and p = 0.0379 for HHH vs. LHH;
N = 14. Within these two categories we get p = 0.9750 for LLL vs. HHH and p = 0.9483 for LLH vs.
LHH; N = 14.
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Figure 4.5: Group Efficiency under Certainty and Uncertainty
experiment and also find that inequality reduces contributions. In a field experiment,
Cardenas (2003) examines the effect of real wealth on cooperation. Villagers in rural
Columbia knew each other and others’ wealth that they brought into the public goods
experiment. Again, increased inequality decreased contributions.
Under uncertainty, the relationship between the number of H types and group effi-
ciency is not U-shaped anymore, but becomes increasing in the number of H types. The
effect of heterogeneous endowments (less efficiency than with homogeneous endowments)
breaks down under uncertainty. Instead, it becomes important how rich a group is.
LLL groups now contribute on average only 17% of their endowment, LLH groups 25%,
LHH groups 31%, and HHH groups contribute 50% of their endowment. The efficiency
differences between groups under uncertainty are all significant with two marginally in-
significant exceptions.18 Clearly, the richer a group the more efficient it is in providing the
public good. Again, Figure 4.5 further shows that under uncertainty poorer groups are
much less efficient and richer groups are slightly more efficient than under certainty. The
difference between certainty and uncertainty is however significant only for homogeneous
groups (LLL and HHH) but not for heterogeneous groups (LLH and LHH).19
Overall, we saw that uncertainty has only a small negative effect on cooperation.
However, we showed that this is due to two opposing effects that partly cancel each
other. Poor groups lose substantially and rich groups gain slightly under uncertainty,
18p = 0.1181 for LLL vs. LLH, p = 0.0001 for LLL vs. LHH, p = 0.0004 for LLL vs. HHH, p = 0.1429
for LLH vs. LHH, p = 0.0003 for LLH vs. HHH, and p = 0.0004 for LHH vs. HHH; N = 16.
19Testing the differences in efficiency between certainty and uncertainty we find p = 0.0000 for LLL,
p = 0.2406 for LLH, p = 0.3561 for LHH, and p = 0.0563 for HHH; N = 15.
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since L types contribute less and H types tend to contribute more than under certainty.
Although the overall effect is almost neutralized, uncertainty causes inequality to increase
compared to certainty. When measuring inequality in the income distribution via the Gini
coefficient20 we find that cooperation causes inequality to decrease in both treatments,
but much less so under uncertainty. Without any cooperation, the Gini coefficient is
0.167. It decreases in both treatments, to 0.154 in the certainty treatment and to 0.161
in the uncertainty treatment.
4.3.2 Explaining Treatment Effects
In this section we provide an explanation for the treatment effects that were reported
in the preceding section. In the P-experiment subjects stated their contributions condi-
tional on every combination of others’ contributions for each possible group structure.
The main purpose of the P-Experiment was to elicit individual contribution preferences
that can be used to explain cooperation behaviour in the C-Experiment. Before turning
to the explanation of our treatment effects from Section 4.2, we will first discuss the
underlying preference that can generate these findings.
Relative Conditional Cooperation
It has been argued before that a preference for conditional cooperation can explain
why people contribute in public goods games. While earlier studies used more indirect
approaches (see e.g. Sonnemans et al. 1999; Keser and van Winden 2000 or Brandts
and Schram 2001), Fischbacher et al. (2001) proposed a direct mechanism (based on the
strategy method of Selten 1967) to elicit individuals’ willingness to cooperate given that
others cooperate as well (see Ockenfels (1999) for a similar approach). This elicitation
method asks subjects to choose their own contribution for every possible average of others’
contributions. It has been used in other experimental studies in order to investigate the
robustness (see Kocher 2008) or cultural differences (see Kocher et al. 2008 or Herrmann
20The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve which plots the proportion of the total income (on
the vertical axis) that is cumulatively earned by the bottom x% of the population (where x goes from 0
to 100 on the horizontal axis). The Gini coefficient is then the ratio of the area that lies between the line
of equality (i.e. the 45 degree line) and the Lorenz curve over the total area under the line of equality.
The Gini coefficient lies always between 0 and 1 and the closer its value is to 0 the more equal is the
income distribution.
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and Thöni 2009) of conditional cooperation. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) used it in
order to explain the decline of cooperation in public goods games. The findings of these
studies support conditional cooperation with a self-serving bias (i.e. imperfect conditional
cooperation) both as the prevalent individual preference and as the average preference of
all individuals.
As mentioned above, subjects in these studies are asked to indicate their own con-
tributions for every possible average of others’ contributions. In our P-Experiment we
also used the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) but asked for own contribu-
tions given others’ individual contributions. We can therefore test whether the implied
assumption that subjects condition their own contribution on the average of others’ con-
tributions is in fact reasonable. In Appendix 4A we show that subjects indeed condition
their contributions on the average of others’ contributions. This finding supports the as-
sumption made in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and can be seen as another robustness result
on the preference for conditional cooperation.
In all previous studies on conditional cooperation individuals had the same endow-
ment. Under homogeneous endowments, there is no difference whether subjects condition
on absolute or rather on relative contribution levels. Under heterogeneous endowments it
becomes, however, important whether subjects (imperfectly) choose to match the abso-
lute amount of the average contribution of other group members or whether they choose
contributions similar to the others’ average contribution relative to their endowments. In
our experiment this conditional behaviour determines whether subjects contribute more
the poorer the group is. On a broader scale, it determines whether and how subjects
condition their own contributions on contribution levels and endowments of others.21
Figure 4.6 shows the average contribution schedule separately for each combination
of others’ endowments.22 Figure 4.6A shows own absolute contributions (on the vertical
axis) given the absolute average level of others’ contributions (on the horizontal axis)
separately for the cases where the other group members are LL, LH, and HH. Subjects
21Note that it is not our intention to test any theoretical foundations of why people may want to
condition their contributions on relative rather than on absolute contributions of others. We are rather
interested in disclosing the systematic behavioural patterns that can be empirically observed in public
goods games.
22Figure 4.6 as well as the regression analysis are based on all subjects and does not separate into
specific preference types like free-riders, conditional or triangle cooperators. We therefore investigate the
average preference of all individuals.
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Figure 4.6: Conditional Cooperation Preferences: Absolute and Relative
contribute more in poorer groups, holding the absolute level of others’ average contribu-
tion constant. The slopes of the average contribution schedules in Figure 4.6A are less
than one, and they are the higher the poorer the group members are. While positive
slopes of less than one just confirm the stylized fact of a self-serving bias in conditional
cooperation, the relation between slopes and others’ endowments, i.e. greater slopes in
poorer groups, remains to be explained.
That subjects give more in poorer groups may be due to the fact that relative rather
than absolute contributions matter. Indeed, that this is the case can be seen in Figure
4.6B. Figure 4.6B plots own relative contributions (on the vertical axis) given others’
relative average contributions (on the horizontal axis) separately for the cases when others
are LL, LH, and HH. Since subjects condition their contributions on others’ relative rather
than absolute contributions, we do not observe a difference in contribution schedules
between the combinations of others’ endowments in Figure 4.6B. The differences in the
slopes between the situations in which group members are LL, LH, or HH in Figure 4.6A
disappear almost completely when we control for their endowment level in Figure 4.6B.
We interpret this observation as subjects matching relative rather than absolute average
contributions of others. Still, the slopes are less than one, so there is a self-serving bias
in relative conditional cooperation as well.
There are two ways subjects can conditionally cooperate on relative levels. They can
condition their own contribution either on others’ relative average contributions (as in
Figure 4.6B) or on the average of others’ relative contributions. In the first specification
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they would take the average of others’ individual absolute contributions and then divide it
by the average of others’ absolute endowment. In the second specification subjects would
take others’ individual absolute contributions, divide them by others’ individual absolute
endowments, and then take the average of these relative individual contributions. Both
ways of relative conditional cooperation coincide when the endowments of other group
members are the same. But they do not when others are differently endowed. Consider
an example where one group member is low and the other is high endowed. Suppose the
L type contributes 4 EMU and the H type contributes 0 EMU. In the first case a subject
would (imperfectly) match a contribution of 33.3% (= 4+0
4+8
∗ 100) of her endowment, and
in the second case she would (imperfectly) match a contribution of 50% (= [4
4
+ 0
8
]∗100) of
her endowment. So we need to find out whether the first specification, which we used in
Figure 4.6B, can explain our data better than the second specification. In the following
quantitative analysis we will detect which of the specifications yields more reasonable
results.
To quantify conditional cooperation in absolute as well as in relative terms we estimate
OLS regressions23 of the following specification.
OwnConk = β0 + β1 OthCong + β2 OthCong ∗DLH + β3 OthCong ∗DLL + . (4.2)
The dependent variable OwnConk is an individual’s own contribution where k = {A,R}.
OwnConA stands for own absolute contribution and OwnConR for own relative con-
tribution (i.e. own absolute contribution relative to own endowment). OthCong is the
average of others’ contributions where g = {A,R1, R2}. OthConA represents others’
absolute average contribution, OthConR1 is others’ relative average contribution (first
specification from above), and OthConR2 is the average of others’ relative contributions
(second specification from above). DLL is a dummy variable that takes the value one for
being in a group where the others are LL, DLH is a dummy variable for others being LH,
and  is the individual error term. For relative conditional cooperation under the first
specification (with k = R and g = R1) we ran (4.2) with all subjects (M2; Table 4.2),
only with H types (M4; Table 4.2), and only with L types (M5; Table 4.2). For relative
23We additionally ran a Tobit regression, which disregards the clustering of the data but takes the
censoring of the dependent variable into account. Since we received similar results we only report those
of the OLS regression.
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conditional cooperation under the second specification (with k = R and g = R2) and
absolute conditional cooperation (with k = A and g = A) we ran (4.2) with all subjects
in (M3) and (M1) in Table 4.2, respectively.
Table 4.2 reports regression results for all five specifications.24 Let us first look at
(M1) in Table 4.2. The marginal effect of an additional unit of others’ absolute average
contribution is 0.4177 (= β1) when the others are HH, 0.5831 (= β1 +β2) when the others
are LH, and 0.7234 (= β1 + β3) when the others are LL. So, individuals contribute more
the more others contribute. The marginal effect is strictly lower than one, indicating a
slope of absolute conditional cooperation that is smaller than one. Moreover, holding
others’ absolute average contribution constant, individuals contribute significantly more
the poorer their group members are. The slope of the contribution schedule significantly
increases by 0.1654 when going from HH to LH and by another 0.1403 when going from
LH to LL, since the difference between β2 and β3 is also significant at the 1%-level (F-test;
p = 0.0000).
These differences (almost) disappear when we consider own relative contribution given
the relative average contribution of others in (M2) in Table 4.2. The corresponding
marginal effects are 0.5258 (= β1) when the others are HH, 0.5764 (= β1 + β2) when
the others are LH, and 0.5088 (= β1 + β3) with the others being LL. Now, individuals
increase their relative contribution by roughly half of the increase of others’ relative aver-
age contribution. Interestingly, they make almost no difference between groups anymore.
The difference in the slopes between HH and LL is not significant. However, despite
being very small there is a significant difference both between HH and LH and between
LL and LH, since the difference between β2 and β3 is significant at the 5%-level (F-test;
p = 0.0122). Before investigating the reasons for the small but significant differences in
these slopes we first consider the second specification of relative conditional cooperation
below.
24The results of Table 4.2 are qualitatively similar when we include dummy variables for the different
group structures (LL and LH) in our regression.
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Table 4.2: Absolute and Relative Conditional Cooperation
Dependent Variables
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5)
Abs.: OwnConA Rel.1: OwnConR Rel.2: OwnConR Rel.H: OwnConR Rel.L: OwnConR
and g = A and g = R1 and g = R2 and g = R1 and g = R1
OthCong 0.4177*** 0.5258*** 0.4600*** 0.6192*** 0.4324***
(0.0329) (0.0380) (0.0335) (0.0520) (0.0538)
OthCong ∗DLH 0.1654*** 0.0506** 0.1443*** -0.0227 0.1238***
(0.0197) (0.0231) (0.0225) (0.0298) (0.0338)
OthCong ∗DLL 0.3057*** -0.0170 0.0698** -0.1900*** 0.1560***
(0.0299) (0.0322) (0.0305) (0.0359) (0.0471)
Constant 0.4646*** 0.0773*** 0.0878*** 0.0778*** 0.0767***
(0.0778) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0172) (0.0175)
Observations 18900 18900 18900 9450 9450
Clusters 180 180 180 90 90
R2 0.1433 0.1650 0.1441 0.2183 0.1417
OLS Regression with data from the P-Experiment. Robust standard errors (clustered in subjects) are in parentheses.
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level.
In (M3) in Table 4.2 we consider own relative contribution given the average of oth-
ers’ relative contributions. We find that the differences in the slopes of the absolute
contribution schedules between different endowments of others (LL, LH, or HH) do not
disappear when we consider our second alternative relative specification. The marginal
effect is 0.4600 (= β1) when others are HH, 0.6043 (= β1 + β2) when others are LH, and
0.5298 (= β1 + β3) when others are LL. Therefore, all differences in the slopes between
group structures are larger and remain significant when the second specification of rela-
tive conditional cooperation is used. Note that the difference between LH (β2) and LL
(β3) is also significant at the 1%-level (F-test; p = 0.0092). In addition, the coefficient of
determination (i.e. R2) of (M2) is larger than that of both (M3) and (M1). We therefore
choose (M2), the first specification of relative conditional cooperation, as our preferred
model.
As mentioned above, the preference of absolute conditional cooperation and relative
conditional cooperation coincide with homogeneous endowments. Our results from Figure
4.6 and Table 4.2 therefore extend existing results of conditional cooperation preferences
to heterogeneous endowments. On average, individuals condition their own contribution
on others’ relative average contribution but not on the average of others’ relative con-
tribution. So far, our analysis used the data of all subjects, and we did not investigate
whether there are differences between H and L types. The last two columns (M4 and
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M5) of Table 4.2 estimate regression (4.2) separately for H and L types (using the first
specification of relative conditional cooperation).
In (M4) in Table 4.2 we see that for H types the marginal effect of others’ relative
average contribution on own relative contribution is 0.6192 (= β1) when others are HH,
0.5965 (= β1 + β2) when others are LH, and 0.4292 (= β1 + β3) when others are LL.
The difference between HH and LH is very small and not significant, but the differences
between HH and LL and also between LL and LH are significant, since the difference
between β2 and β3 is significant at the 1%-level as well (F-test; p = 0.0000). This shows
that H types contribute the same in relative terms when others are HH and LH, but they
contribute significantly less when others are LL.
In (M5) in Table 4.2 we consider own relative contribution for L types given the
relative average contribution of others. The slopes of their contribution schedule are
0.4324 (= β1) when others are HH, 0.5562 (= β1 + β2) when others are LH, and 0.5884
(= β1 + β3) when others are LL. The differences between HH and LH and between HH
and LL are significant, while the difference between LH and LL is not (F-test; p = 0.4166
for the difference between β2 and β3). L types contribute the same in relative terms
when others are LL and LH, but they contribute significantly less when others are HH.
This is the reverse pattern of H types. Both types seem to have a preference for relative
conditional cooperation, but with a negative bias if their type is the minority in the
group. Note, however, that both types still contribute more in absolute terms for a given
absolute average contribution of others the poorer their group members are.
In order to investigate whether both L and H types show the same relative conditional
cooperation behaviour in situations without negative minority bias, we ran additional
OLS regressions of the following form.
OwnConR = β0 + β1 OthConR1 + β2 OthConR1 ∗DH + . (4.3)
Our dependent variable remains OwnConR. DH is a dummy variable that is one for
being an H type (and zero for being an L type). We ran (4.3) when others are LL (M6;
Table 4.3), LH (M7; Table 4.3), and HH (M8; Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Type-Specific Relative Conditional Cooperation
Dependent Variables
(M6) (M7) (M8)
OwnConR when others LL OwnConR when others LH OwnConR when others HH
OthConR1 0.6041*** 0.5707*** 0.4085***
(0.0471) (0.0528) (0.0524)
OthConR1 ∗DH -0.1576*** 0.0419 0.1885**
(0.0551) (0.0674) (0.0738)
Constant 0.0666*** 0.0677*** 0.0914***
(0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0142)
Observations 2700 8100 8100
Clusters 180 180 180
R2 0.2414 0.1903 0.1488
OLS Regression with data from the P-Experiment. Robust standard errors (clustered in subjects) are in
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level.
First consider (M7) in Table 4.3. The slopes of the relative contribution schedule are
not statistically different between L types (β1 = 0.5707) and H types (β1 + β2 = 0.6126)
when others are LH. This picture changes, however, when we consider (M6) and (M8) in
Table 4.3. In (M6) we see that H types (β1 + β2 = 0.4465) contribute significantly less
than L types (β1 = 0.6041) when the others are LL. L types still contribute the relative
amount they contributed when others were LH (this can be seen from (M5) in Table
4.2), but H types contribute less now. When looking at (M8) in Table 4.3 we see the
reverse picture. Now, L types (β1 = 0.4085) contribute significantly less than H types
(β1 +β2 = 0.5970) when others are HH. H types still contribute at the relative level when
others were LH (again this can be seen from (M4) in Table 4.2), but L types contribute
less.
Combining the analysis of both tables yields the complete pattern of conditional
cooperation preferences. We first showed that on average subjects are imperfect relative
conditional cooperators who condition their own contribution on others’ relative average
contributions rather than on the average of others’ relative contributions (this can be
seen from (M1) to (M3) in Table 4.2). Instead of looking at the average subject we
then considered L and H types separately in a second step. Here, we showed that both
types, despite having a relative conditional cooperation preference, have a negative bias
for being the minority type. H types contribute less in relative terms when others are LL
than they do when others are LH or HH. L types contribute less in relative terms when
others are HH than what they contribute when others are LH or LL (this can be seen
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from (M4) and (M5) in Table 4.2 and (M6) to (M8) in Table 4.3).
The observed minority bias may capture the effect of group identity on social pref-
erences which has recently been analyzed by Chen and Li (2009). They show that out-
group (as opposed to in-group) identity decreases charity concerns, reciprocity, and the
likelihood of choosing the social-welfare-maximizing action. In our experiment, subjects
may identify themselves as outside the group if they are the only ones with a certain
endowment. When considering the average subject the minority bias causes relative con-
tributions to shift downward in cases where others are LL and HH, but not in cases where
others are LH. This explains why we found (in (M2) in Table 4.2) that on average sub-
jects contribute slightly (but significantly) more when others are LH than when others
are LL or HH. Nevertheless, despite having a negative minority bias in addition to the
self-serving bias in the preference of relative conditional cooperation, the clear pattern
of giving more in absolute terms the poorer the group members are, still holds. This is
because the minority bias is rather small.
However, for explaining our results on heterogeneous endowments from the C-
Experiment the minority bias may still be relevant. In contrast to heterogeneous groups,
no subject is the minority type in homogeneous groups. This suggests that homogeneous
groups are more efficient (i.e. contribute more in relative terms) than heterogeneous
groups. Having outlined how preferences for relative conditional cooperation can explain
our results from the certainty treatment in the C-Experiment, the question is now why
this preference would explain our results from the uncertainty treatment as well. This
is what we focus on in the next two sections. First, we explore the direct effect of rela-
tive conditional cooperation that is based on first-order beliefs, and second, we consider
an indirect effect of relative conditional cooperation preferences based on second-order
beliefs.
Both these effects are caused by the mere fact that subjects contribute more (for given
contributions of others) the poorer their group members are. As a robustness check for
the regression analysis of this section, we can additionally perform non-parametric tests.
For any given combination of others’ individual contributions (not averages) we can test
whether subjects’ own contributions are higher or lower for changes in the endowment
of other group members. For instance, assume that one group member contributes 2
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EMU and the other group member contributes 4 EMU. We can then compare a subject’s
own contribution for these given contributions of others in the situations where the other
group members are LL, LH, and HH.
Since we use Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we make pair-wise comparisons for
every possible combination of others’ contributions between the situations where the
other group members are LL vs. LH and LH vs. HH.25 Our results strongly support the
regression analysis. For the comparison of LL vs. LH we find that out of 15 combinations
of others’ contributions 14 are significant (0.0000 ≤ p ≤ 0.0151; N = 180). The only
one that is not significant in the comparison of LL vs. LH is when others both contribute
nothing (p = 0.3210; N = 180), where we indeed should not expect any difference.
If others contribute a given individual amount that is positive for at least one of them,
subjects contribute significantly more when others are LL than what they do when others
are LH. For the comparison of LH vs. HH we get similar results. Out of 25 combinations of
others’ contributions 23 are significant at the 1%-level (0.0000 ≤ p ≤ 0.0017; N = 180) in
the comparison of LH vs. HH. Again, when both others contribute nothing, as expected,
we do not observe a difference (p = 0.4624; N = 180). We also do not observe a significant
difference between LH vs. HH for the combination where one of the others contributes
nothing and the other contributes 1 EMU (p = 0.5146; N = 180).26 However, for all
other combinations subjects contribute significantly more when others are LH instead of
HH.
Deviation of Beliefs
A preference for relative conditional cooperation causes subjects to contribute more
in absolute terms the poorer their group members are. Therefore, under uncertainty it
is important what subjects believe about their group members’ endowments. Figure 4.7
shows how correct subjects’ beliefs are in the C-Experiment. The variable ‘deviation of
beliefs’ measures how realistic subjects’ beliefs on the endowment of their group members
are. For instance, consider a subject who has group members that are both L types. If
25We could also test LL vs. HH. However, if we can show a significant difference in a consistent
direction for the comparisons of LL vs. LH and LH vs. HH, testing LL vs. HH will be redundant.
26The non-significance of this combination disappears for the comparison of LL vs. HH. Here, subjects
contribute significantly more at the 1%-level if one of the others contributes nothing and the other
contributes 1 EMU (p = 0.0000; N = 180). Obviously, for all other combinations the comparison of LL
vs. HH also yields significant results.
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this subject believed to be in HH with probability 1, her belief would deviate by 100%
from reality. If she believed to be in LH with probability 1, her belief would deviate by
50%, and if she believed to be in LL with probability 1, her belief would not deviate (i.e.
deviate by 0%).27 Since subjects know that half of the subjects in the experiment are L
types and the other half are H types, they mostly start out with the belief to be in LH.
Hence, subjects who actually are in LH have realistic beliefs and subjects who actually
are in LL or HH start out with beliefs that deviate by about 50% from reality. Over
the ten periods, there is not much updating. Subjects in LH keep their realistic beliefs,
and subjects in LL and HH mostly keep their deviating beliefs. However, subjects in HH
update better than subjects in LL, since they get informative signals of contributions
exceeding 4 EMU. Figure 4.7 implies that subjects in LL think they are in a richer group
than they actually are.28 Because of their relative conditional cooperation preference they
therefore contribute less under uncertainty. Likewise, subjects in HH think they are in a
poorer group than they actually are, and since they prefer to give more in poorer groups,
they contribute more under uncertainty. This effect is strongest in LLL and HHH since
individual effects of all group members go in the same direction. Moreover, the fact that
subjects with other group members being HH exhibit more realistic beliefs than subjects
who have LL group members, explains why poor groups lose more than rich groups gain
through the uncertainty.
In order to quantify this explanation we have to compare the predicted contributions
that are based on actual and often deviating beliefs to predicted contributions that would
have occurred if subjects had held the correct beliefs about their group structure. We
will call the latter type of predicted contributions hypothetical contributions.
Hypothetical contributions are calculated from the individual contribution preferences
(elicited in the P-Experiment), the beliefs about others’ contributions in each period
(elicited in the C-Experiment), and under the assumption of correct beliefs about the
27We restricted beliefs to be certain in this example for illustration only. Since subjects in the
C-Experiment stated their probabilistic beliefs about their group members’ endowments, the variable
‘deviation of beliefs’ is calculated as a linear combination of the different group structures that give
100%, 50%, or 0% deviation. For instance, if this subject believed to be in LL with 33% probability, in
LH with 33% probability, and in HH with 34% probability, her belief would also deviate by 50%.
28Note that the ‘deviation of beliefs’ can be negative or positive. Under the assumption that the
deviation is positive for thinking incorrectly to be in a richer group and negative for thinking incorrectly
to be in a poorer group we would observe the HH curve in Figure 4.7 to be mirrored in the negative on
the horizontal axis. Although our analysis fully accounts for this, we chose to omit this complication in
Figure 4.7 in order to compare the LL and HH curve directly.
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Figure 4.7: Deviation of Beliefs about Group Structure from Reality
group structure. Predicted contributions are calculated from the individual contribution
preferences, the beliefs about others’ contributions, and the actual probabilistic beliefs
about the group structure. Both predicted and hypothetical contributions are the point
predictions. Although Section 4.3.2 showed that individuals have on average a preference
for relative conditional cooperation, the computations of predicted and hypothetical con-
tributions do not impose any assumptions. The calculation is based on the exact stated
preference of each individual given others’ individual contributions (and not the average
of their contributions) in each specific group structure. Nevertheless, the findings in Sec-
tion 4.3.2 are extremely useful in order to understand the mechanisms driving our results
from the C-Experiment.
The difference between predicted (Xpu) and hypothetical (Xhu ) contributions gives the
net amount that subjects contributed more or less under uncertainty because of their
deviating beliefs. We refer to this difference as DOBu = Xpu − Xhu , where u stands for
uncertainty. For L types in LL we expect DOBu < 0 since they would give more if they
knew others’ real endowments. For H types in HH it should hold that DOBu > 0, since
they would give less if they knew others’ real endowments. We expect L types and H
types in LH to have DOBu = 0 since their belief is (more or less) correct. L types in HH
will have DOBu > 0 since they would give more, and H types in LL will have DOBu < 0
since they would give less, if they knew the real endowments of others. Under certainty,
beliefs cannot be wrong, Xpc = Xhc , and therefore DOBc = 0, where c stands for certainty.
So, the difference in contributions between uncertainty and certainty, which is caused by
deviating beliefs, is captured by ∆DOB = DOBu −DOBc = DOBu.
Cooperation with Uncertain Endowments 164
We find that poor groups contribute less under uncertainty and rich groups contribute
more because of their deviating beliefs. The ∆DOB is -0.24 EMU for LLL, -0.03 EMU
for LLH, 0.11 EMU for LHH, and 0.27 EMU for HHH.29 These findings are in line with
our predictions. That this is the case can be easily seen in homogeneous groups. In
LLL, all subjects have DOBu < 0. Likewise, all subjects in HHH have DOBu > 0. So,
all individual effects go in the same direction in homogeneous groups. By contrast, in
heterogeneous groups individual effects do not go in the same direction. To see this,
consider first an LLH group. L types in this group are in LH leading to DOBu = 0, and
the H type in this group is in LL leading to DOBu < 0. So the total effect for the LLH
group should be slightly negative. Second, consider the LHH group. Here, the L type is
in HH leading to DOBu > 0, and both H types are in LH leading to DOBu = 0. Thus,
the total effect in LHH should be slightly positive.
When considering types we find that the ∆DOB for L types is -0.28 EMU and for
H types it is 0.34 EMU.30 For both types these differences are significant at the 1%-level
(p = 0.0032 for L types, and p = 0.0012 for H types; N = 16).
(Strategic) Over-Contribution
Botelho et al. (2009) show that subjects free-ride more in a perfect stranger design
where they only meet each other once. As soon as there is the possibility to meet more
than once (random stranger design), subjects contribute more. Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010) found in their random stranger design that subjects contribute more in the C-
Experiment than what is predicted from their preferences in P-Experiment. In our partner
design, such over-contribution in the C-Experiment should be even more pronounced since
subjects may strategically want to sustain high cooperation as long as possible.
(Strategic) over-contribution is calculated as the difference between predicted con-
tributions and actual contributions (Xaj ), where the latter are the observed contribu-
29While the differences for homogeneous groups are significant, they are not for heterogeneous groups
(p = 0.0240 for LLL, p = 0.6432 for LLH, p = 0.2196 for LHH, and p = 0.0176 for HHH; N = 8).
30Note that the amount that L types contribute less because of their deviating beliefs is smaller than
the amount H types contribute more despite the fact that L types’ beliefs deviate more than those of
H types. The reason is that both types are relative conditional cooperators who give more in absolute
terms the poorer their group members are. H types are more often in richer groups where the average
contribution of others is higher. The vertical distance (caused by the different slopes) between the curves
of Figure 4.6A is larger at higher average contributions of others. The impact of the deviating belief is
therefore stronger than for L types who are more often in poorer groups who contribute less on average.
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Figure 4.8: (Strategic) Over-Contribution under Certainty and Uncertainty
tions from the C-Experiment with j = {c, u}. We define (strategic) over-contribution as
SOCj = X
a
j − Xpj . Figure 4.8A shows the SOCj for homogeneous and heterogeneous
groups under certainty and uncertainty over all ten periods. In contrast to heterogeneous
groups, homogeneous groups strategically over-contribute under certainty. (Strategic)
over-contribution is significantly different from zero for both LLL and HHH, but not for
LLH and LHH. Under certainty, the SOCc is 0.42 EMU (p = 0.0788; N = 7) for LLL
and 0.51 EMU (p = 0.0424; N = 7) for HHH. For LLH and LHH the SOCc is -0.02
EMU (p = 0.9321; N = 7) and -0.14 EMU (p = 0.3720; N = 7), respectively. This
again indicates why homogeneous groups are more efficient than heterogeneous groups
under certainty. Regarding the quantitative effects of our two identified explanations for
the efficiency loss of heterogeneous endowments under certainty, the minority bias and
(strategic) over-contribution, we find that the latter almost completely drives the result.
Recall that the difference in group efficiency between homogeneous and heterogeneous
groups is 10.4 percentage points (homogeneous groups contribute 41.8% of their endow-
ment, whereas heterogeneous groups contribute only 31.4% of their endowment). The
difference in relative (strategic) over-contribution between the two groups is 9.5 percent-
age points. Thus, 93% of the efficiency loss caused by heterogeneous endowments can be
explained by the absence of (strategic) over-contribution in heterogeneous groups. The
minority bias is therefore only marginally relevant.
Under uncertainty, heterogeneous groups still show no (strategic) over-contribution.
The SOCu is -0.13 EMU (p = 0.1610; N = 8) for LLH and -0.10 (p = 0.6688; N =
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8) for LHH. These differences still do not deviate significantly from zero. However,
rich homogeneous groups still over-contribute under uncertainty, but poor homogeneous
groups do not. The SOCu drops to -0.14 EMU (p = 0.5584; N = 8) for LLL but
stays at 0.77 EMU (p = 0.0200; N = 8) for HHH. (Strategic) over-contribution under
uncertainty is not significantly different from zero for LLL, but for HHH it is significant
at the 5%-level. We denote the difference in (strategic) over-contribution between the
uncertainty and certainty treatment as ∆SOC = SOCu − SOCc. The ∆SOC is -0.56
EMU (p = 0.0178; N = 15) for LLL, -0.11 EMU (p = 0.0526; N = 15) for LLH, 0.04
EMU (p = 0.2640; N = 15) for LHH, and 0.26 EMU (p = 0.0874; N = 15) for HHH.
Note that all differences are significant except for LHH.
(Strategic) over-contribution captures the amount subjects contribute more in a re-
peated set-up given their preferences and actual beliefs. We showed in the previous
section that poor groups would contribute more under uncertainty if they had correct
beliefs. Thus, the SOCu of poor groups would be higher and therefore ∆SOC would
be less negative if subjects had correct beliefs. So, ∆SOC includes the effect caused by
deviating beliefs, which is ∆DOB. For rich groups we showed that they would contribute
less if they had correct beliefs. Hence, the SOCu of rich groups would be lower and the
∆SOC therefore less positive. Again, ∆SOC includes the effect caused by deviating
beliefs.
The net (strategic) over-contribution (NSOCj) is the amount subjects would over-
contribute even if they had correct beliefs, namely NSOCj = Xa
′
j − Xpj , where Xa′j =
Xaj + (X
h
j − Xpj ). The term in brackets is the amount subjects would contribute more
(poor groups) or less (rich groups) if they had correct beliefs.31 Figure 4.8B shows the
NSOCj for homogeneous and heterogeneous groups under certainty and uncertainty over
all ten periods. Under certainty, NSOCc = SOCc since DOBc = 0. Under uncertainty,
heterogeneous groups still show no net (strategic) over-contribution. The NSOCu is -
0.09 EMU (p = 0.4234; N = 8) for LLH and -0.22 (p = 0.2104; N = 8) for LHH.
These differences still do not significantly deviate from zero. However, rich homogeneous
groups still over-contribute under uncertainty, but poor homogeneous groups do not. The
NSOCu drops to 0.11 EMU (p = 0.3188; N = 8) for LLL but stays at 0.50 EMU (p =
31Note that SOCj = NSOCj + DOBj ⇔ DOBj = SOCj − NSOCj = [Xaj − Xpj ] − [Xaj + (Xhj −
Xpj )−Xpj ] = Xpj −Xhj . Under certainty, Xpc −Xhc ⇔ Xac = Xa
′
c and hence SOCc = NSOCc.
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0.0002; N = 8) for HHH. Net (Strategic) over-contribution for LLL is not significantly
different from zero, but for HHH it is significant at the 1%-level. We denote the difference
in net (strategic) over-contribution between the uncertainty and certainty treatment as
∆NSOC = NSOCu − NSOCc. The ∆NSOC is -0.31 EMU (p = 0.0732; N = 15) for
LLL, -0.07 EMU (p = 0.3092; N = 15) for LLH, -0.08 EMU (p = 0.4514; N = 15) for
LHH, and -0.01 EMU (p = 0.7894; N = 15) for HHH. Note that the difference is only
significant for LLL.
A possible explanation for the results of ∆NSOC is that under uncertainty L types
may fear to send H type signals when they strategically over-contribute. If they anticipate
that others give less in richer groups, i.e. if they know about the relative conditional coop-
eration preference of others, it may strategically make sense not to over-contribute under
uncertainty even though they want to sustain cooperation. That such an explanation
may be plausible can be seen from type-specific net (strategic) over-contributions. Under
certainty, L types’ NSOCc is 0.38 EMU (p = 0.0228; N = 21) and under uncertainty
their NSOCu is 0.18 EMU (p = 0.2108; N = 24). The NSOCc of H types is 0.30 EMU
(p = 0.0362; N = 21) and their NSOCu is 0.26 EMU (p = 0.0429; N = 24). While under
certainty both L and H types show significant net (strategic) over-contribution, under
uncertainty only H types still over-contribute significantly. In other words, uncertainty
causes only L types to reduce their net (strategic) over-contribution. The ∆NSOC for
L types is -0.20 EMU (p = 0.0936; N = 45), but for H types it is only -0.04 EMU
(p = 0.8666; N = 45). The difference of net (strategic) over-contribution between un-
certainty and certainty is therefore only significant for L types but not for H types. It is
interesting that H types do not try to mimic L types in order to increase their payoff. This
suggests that subjects follow their elicited preference of relative conditional cooperation.
Figure 4.8A showed SOCc and SOCu for homogeneous and heterogeneous groups
over the ten periods. We further outlined that ∆SOC captures two effects (i.e. ∆SOC =
∆NSOC+ ∆DOB), the effect of deviating beliefs (as discussed in Section 4.3.2) and the
effect of net (strategic) over-contribution (as shown in Figure 4.8B). Both these effects
are ultimately due to relative conditional cooperation preferences based on first- and
second-order beliefs, respectively. Since our objective is to explain the results from the
C-Experiment, we now have to compare ∆SOC to the treatment effects.
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Figure 4.9: Figure 9: Explaining Treatment Effects
The gray bars in Figure 4.9A illustrate ∆SOC graphically for all group structures.
The black bars in Figure 4.9A and 4.9B depict our treatment differences from the C-
Experiment, namely Xau−Xac . Roughly speaking, they show that poor groups contribute
less under uncertainty and rich groups contribute more than under certainty. Figure 4.9A
shows that the ∆SOC captures the observed treatment effects reasonably well. In Figure
4.9B ∆SOC is split graphically into its components, ∆NSOC and ∆DOB. The shaded
bars capture the amount explained by net (strategic) over-contribution and the white
bars capture the effect of deviating beliefs.32
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the effect of uncertain endowments on cooperation be-
haviour in a linear public goods game. Making endowments uncertain necessarily in-
volves the possibility of heterogeneous in addition to homogeneous endowments. In our
C-Experiment we found that results for heterogeneous endowments are in line with the
existing literature. Homogeneous groups are more efficient in providing the public good
than heterogeneous groups. We further showed that this is almost entirely due to the
absence of (strategic) over-contribution in heterogeneous groups. Concerning uncertain
endowments, our C-Experiment showed that uncertainty has only a slight negative ef-
fect (9.5% less) on cooperation. However, we found that this is caused by two effects
32Results are similar when separating into types. We observe a ∆SOC of -0.48 EMU (p = 0.0134;
N = 45) for L types and 0.30 EMU (p = 0.1924; N = 45) for H types. ∆SOC is significantly different
from zero only for L types.
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that partly cancel each other. L types contribute substantially less and H types slightly
more under uncertainty. Poor groups (with a majority of L types) therefore suffer more
than rich groups (with a majority of H types) benefit from uncertainty. As a result, the
pattern that prevailed under certainty, i.e. that homogeneous groups are more efficient
than heterogeneous groups, breaks down under uncertainty. Here we find that the poorer
a group the less efficient it is under uncertainty. Thus, despite the small overall effect,
uncertainty causes the inequality of the income distribution to increase.
There are only a few other studies that investigate the effect of uncertain endowments.
Isaac and Walker (1988) use a linear public goods game and find that mean contributions
under certainty are 8.2% higher (though not significantly) than under uncertainty. Their
interest in the effects of communication, however, may have confounded these results.33
Chan et al. (1999) are also interested in the effects of communication. They use a non-
linear public goods setting and find that uncertainty has a small but significant negative
effect (7.4% less) on mean contributions.34 Levati et al. (2007) use a linear public goods
game to study the effects of leadership. They do not find any effect of uncertainty on
contributions without a leader. However, in their uncertainty setting subjects knew the
total group endowment and, since we find that subjects condition their own contribution
on others’ relative average contribution, we should not see any difference in contributions
between certainty and uncertainty based on our results. Van Dijk and Grodzka (1992) use
a one-shot step-level public goods setting where they are interested in contribution rules.
All groups in their experiment consisted of two H and two L types. They find no effect
of uncertainty on actual contributions. However, in their uncertainty treatment subjects
were not informed about any endowment asymmetry. So, subjects probably believed that
endowments were symmetrically distributed. This suggests that their uncertainty treat-
ment rather reflects a certainty treatment with homogeneous endowments. We showed
that the efficiency difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous endowments un-
der certainty is only due to the absence of (strategic) over-contribution in heterogeneous
groups. Since there is no (strategic) over-contribution in a one-shot public goods game,
it is not surprising that van Dijk and Grodzka (1992) do not find an effect.
33Isaac and Walker (1988) find 18% higher levels of contributions with homogeneous than with het-
erogeneous endowments. These findings are also similar to our results under certainty.
34In their setup without communication and without preference heterogeneity, they also find 16%
higher mean contributions with homogeneous than with heterogeneous endowments.
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None of these studies has attempted to examine the opposing effects of uncertainty
on groups and types. Moreover, we are not aware of any studies explaining the ef-
fects of uncertain and heterogeneous endowments in a way similar to our approach. We
explain behaviour observed in the C-Experiment with relative conditional cooperation
preferences elicited in the P-Experiment. A preference for relative conditional cooper-
ation causes subjects in poor groups to contribute less and subjects in rich groups to
contribute more under uncertainty than under certainty, since subjects in poor groups
believe to be in a richer group and subjects in rich groups believe to be in a poorer
group than they actually are. Moreover, L types may fear sending ‘H-type signals’ when
they anticipate that others are relative conditional cooperators as well. As a result, they
do not strategically over-contribute under uncertainty which causes poor groups to lose.
In contrast to homogeneous groups, heterogeneous groups do not over-contribute under
certainty which further explains their relative inefficiency.
Besides explaining behaviour that is observed in the C-Experiment, our results from
the P-Experiment extend the growing literature on conditional cooperation. We found
that subjects are on average relative conditional cooperators, and ascertained that the
implicitly made assumption in the literature on conditional cooperation, i.e. that subjects
condition their own contribution on the averages of others’ contributions, is indeed reason-
able. As noted for instance by Kocher (2008), the theoretical foundation for conditional
cooperation is, however, still unclear. Future research should therefore try to incorporate
existing findings on conditional cooperation and develop a theoretical foundation for a
preference that seems to be empirically highly relevant in public goods games.
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4.5 Appendix 4
Appendix 4A: Do Subjects Condition on Averages?
The seminal work by Fischbacher et al. (2001) that proposed the method we used in
our P-Experiment in order to elicit conditional cooperation preferences, as well as other
papers that used it (e.g. Kocher et al. 2008, Herrmann and Thöni 2009 or Fischbacher and
Gächter 2010), ask subjects to state their own contributions conditional on the averages
of others’ contributions. However, it may well be possible that inequality in the individual
contributions of others matters for own contribution levels.
For instance, suppose imperfect conditional cooperation behaviour was based on the
model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). This would imply that own
contributions are sensitive to the inequality of others’ contributions. That this is the case,
can already be seen in the linear specification of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). For simplicity,
suppose groups have homogeneous endowments. Then, one’s own predicted contribution
is either zero or equal to the lowest of the others’ individual contributions. This could
reason imperfect conditional cooperation behaviour in cases where others contributed
unequal amounts, since then one’s own contribution would match the lowest of the other
contributions, which is lower than the average of others’ contributions by definition.
In these cases the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) would predict a change in own
contributions for increases in the inequality of others’ contributions (holding their average
contribution constant) since increases in inequality imply that the lowest of the other
contributions changes.35 A similar prediction could be made in the model of Charness
and Rabin (2002) for situations where their model can generate (perfect or imperfect)
conditional cooperation. The reason is that increasing inequality of others’ contributions
always decreases the income of another worst off person. The ERC model of Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) can also generate conditional cooperation. However, in their model
inequality of others’ contributions has no effect on own contributions, since it is only
important how one’s own payoff compares to the average payoff. Note that it is not our
intention to test models of social preferences in the context of conditional cooperation.
35Note that own contributions would also change for increases in the inequality of others’ contributions
in cases where their model would predict perfect conditional cooperation, i.e. when others give the same
amounts.
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We only use these models as inspiration for the tests we perform in this appendix.
Instead of asking for subjects’ own contributions conditional on the averages of others’
contributions, in our P-Experiment we asked for own contributions conditional on every
combination of others’ individual contributions. This allows us to test whether the implied
assumption of previous studies, namely that subjects condition their own contributions
on the averages of others’ contributions, can indeed be justified. For empirical research
on conditional cooperation it is important to know whether the elicitation method of
Fischbacher et al. (2001) is robust toward our design variation. Moreover, for future
research on the theoretical foundations of conditional cooperation it seems important to
know not only whether conditional cooperation is relative or absolute (which we showed
in Section 4.3.2), but also, whether inequality increases in others’ contributions matter
for own contributions. Since all previous studies on conditional cooperation endowed all
subjects with the same income, we focus in this appendix on homogeneous groups but
additionally report the results for heterogeneous groups.36
From the data of our P-Experiment we know how much every subject contributes for
any given combination of others’ individual contributions for all combinations of others’
endowments. We can therefore make multiple pairwise comparisons (i.e. matched pairs)
of own contributions where we increase the inequality of others’ individual contributions
and, at the same time, hold their average contribution constant. As an example, consider
a subject that contributes a certain amount given the other group members contribute
2 and 3 units. We then compare this amount to her contribution when the other group
members contribute 1 and 4 units. We can make 7 such pairwise comparisons when the
other group members are LL and 50 comparisons when they are HH.
In homogeneous poor groups (LLL) we find that none of the pairwise comparisons
is significant.37 Likewise, in homogeneous rich groups (HHH) none of the pairwise com-
parisons is significant.38 Moreover, there is no tendency of subjects contributing more or
less for increases in inequality since the z-values of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests
36Note that our explanation for the effects of heterogeneous and/or uncertain endowments in Section
4.3.2 is not based on the averages but on individual contributions of others.
37Using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we find p = 0.182 for c(1, 1) vs. c(0, 2), p = 0.738
for c(1, 2) vs. c(0, 3), p = 0.658 for c(1, 3) vs. c(0, 4), p = 0.248 for c(2, 2) vs. c(0, 4), p = 0.680 for c(2, 2)
vs. c(1, 3), p = 0.808 for c(2, 3) vs. c(1, 4), and p = 0.860 for c(3, 3) vs. c(2, 4) with N = 90 and c(x, y)
being own contribution given the other group members contribute x and y.
38Using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we find 0.111 ≤ p ≤ 0.988 with N = 90 for the 50
comparisons.
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are negative and positive.39 This suggests that the implicitly made assumption in the
elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) can be justified. Making these multiple
pairwise comparisons, we do not find any evidence that subjects change their contribu-
tions for increases in the inequality of others’ contributions when holding the average
contribution of others constant. As stated above, a model of inequity aversion with a
linear specification would rather predict changes in own contributions. One can, however,
construct a model of inequity aversion with a non-linear specification that would predict
imperfect conditional cooperation where certain inequality increases would not have an
effect. In such a model, there would be no effect of inequality increases as long as they
do not lead to rank changes in the income distribution. For inequality increases leading
to a rank change, the model would still predict changes in own contributions.
We therefore separate the pairwise comparisons into three classes. The first class
consists of those comparisons that do not lead to a rank change. For instance, suppose
a subject contributes 3 units, when others contribute 2 and 6 units. Then, this subject’s
rank does not change in the comparison of others contributing 1 and 7 units.40 The
second class consists of comparisons leading to negative rank changes. As an example,
consider a subject contributing 1 unit given others contribute both 2 units. Then, there
is a negative rank change for the comparison where others contribute 0 and 4 units. If
this subject had contributed 3 instead of 1 units, there would have been a positive rank
change. This is the third class of pairwise comparisons that we consider.
In homogeneous poor groups (LLL) there is only one potential situation (out of 7)
which can generate a rank change. This is the comparison of c(2, 2) vs. c(0, 4). This
comparison generates a negative rank change if c(2, 2) = 1 and a positive rank change if
c(2, 2) = 3. Out of 90 subjects, 67 subjects contributed amounts that did not generate a
rank change in this comparison, 9 subjects had a positive rank change, and 14 subjects
had a negative rank change. Those with a positive rank change contribute significantly
more and those with a negative rank change contribute significantly less (as predicted
by the above mentioned model of inequity aversion).41 However, since there is only one
39In LLL 2 are positive and 5 are negative. In HHH 12 are positive and 38 are negative.
40Note that we defined rank changes to be strict. For instance, there is no rank change in the
comparison of c(2, 2) = 2 vs. c(1, 3), but there is a rank change when comparing c(2, 2) = 1 vs. c(0, 4).
41Using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we find for the comparison of c(2, 2) vs. c(0, 4)
p = 0.467 with N = 67 if there is no rank change, p = 0.083 with N = 9 if there is a positive rank
change, and p = 0.046 with N = 14 if there is a negative rank change.
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potential situation generating a rank change in homogeneous poor groups and only few
observations that in fact experience rank changes in this situation, we should not derive
any conclusions from this result before having analyzed homogeneous rich groups.
In homogeneous rich groups (HHH) there are 22 pairwise comparisons (out of 50)
that can possibly generate rank changes. Of those 22 situations that induce positive rank
changes only one is significant.42 Of the 22 situations inducing negative rank changes only
two are significant.43 Although the direction of change in the three significant situations
is consistent with the predictions of the model, in the remaining 39 comparisons rank
changes do not have a significant effect.44 Again, even the z-values of the Wilcoxon
signed rank sum tests are both negative and positive suggesting that there is not even a
tendency that can be observed in these 39 non-significant cases.45
Moreover, in none of the 57 comparisons inducing no rank change, neither in poor (7
comparisons) nor in rich groups (50 comparisons), do we observe any significant effect of
inequality increases. Overall, distinguishing between rank changes and no rank changes
does not lead to any results different from those for the pooled data. Rank changes do
not have an effect in virtually all cases. In those few cases where they have an effect, the
direction of change is such that own contributions increase for higher ranks and decrease
for lower ranks in the income distribution.
So far, our analysis used data which was aggregated over subjects and tested whether
there is a prevalent pattern that can be observed. From this analysis we obtain the fol-
lowing picture. Holding the average contribution constant, increases in the inequality
of others’ contributions has on average no effect on own contributions, not even if these
inequality increases lead to rank changes in the income distribution. However, since each
subject makes multiple decisions where the average but not the inequality of others’ con-
42Using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we find for the comparison of c(2, 2) vs. c(0, 4)
p = 0.189 with N = 68 if there is no rank change, p = 0.083 with N = 7 if there is a positive rank
change, and p = 0.317 with N = 15 if there is a negative rank change.
43Using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we find for the comparison of c(3, 4) vs. c(0, 7)
p = 0.240 with N = 60 if there is no rank change, p = 0.934 with N = 9 if there is a positive rank
change, and p = 0.046 with N = 21 if there is a negative rank change. For the comparison of c(4, 4) vs.
c(1, 7) we find p = 0.290 with N = 67 if there is no rank change, p = 1.000 with N = 4 if there is a
positive rank change, and p = 0.080 with N = 19 if there is a negative rank change
44Using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests we find 0.317 ≤ p ≤ 1.000 with 0 ≤ N ≤ 13 in
21 situations inducing positive rank changes and 0.159 ≤ p ≤ 0.934 with 6 ≤ N ≤ 27 in 20 situation
inducing negative rank changes.
45In situations inducing positive rank changes 5 are negative, 9 are positive, and 7 have p = 1.000.
Concerning negative rank changes 15 are negative and 5 are positive.
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tributions remains the same, we can further use Binomial tests to classify subjects on
the individual level. Subjects are classified if their behaviour can be significantly distin-
guished from random behaviour based on the 5%- (1%-) significance level. Otherwise,
they remain unclassified.
Our within-subject analysis yields a result similar to our across-subject analysis. In
homogeneous poor groups (LLL), 77 (62) out of 90 subjects can be classified as contribut-
ing the same for inequality increases in others’ contributions. No subject can be classified
as contributing differently and 13 (28) subjects remain unclassified. In homogeneous rich
groups (HHH), 79 (78) out of 90 subjects are classified as contributing the same, none
are classified as changing their contribution, and 11 (12) remain unclassified.
Our results do not change when we consider heterogeneous instead of homogeneous
groups. Out of 90 H types 69 (56) can be classified as contributing the same when
the other group members are LL, none can be classified as contributing differently, and
21 (34) remain unclassified. With the other group members being LH 65 (53) H types
contribute the same, none contributes differently, and 25 (37) remain unclassified. Out
of 90 L types 87 (87) can be classified as contributing the same when the other group
members are HH, none can be classified as contributing differently, and only 3 (3) remain
unclassified. If the other group members are LH instead, 73 (68) L types contribute the
same, none differently, and 17 (22) remain unclassified.
Neither in homogeneous nor in heterogeneous groups can we classify a single subject
as changing her contribution for increases in the inequality of others’ contributions. Our
within subject analysis therefore supports the results from our across subject analysis. To
conclude, this appendix showed that subjects condition their contribution on the average
of others’ contribution. Inequality in others’ individual contributions has no effect on
own contributions.
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Appendix 4B: Instructions (translated from German)
General Instructions46
Thank you very much for your appearance. In the next 90 minutes you are going to take part in an
experiment at the laboratory of MELESSA.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can earn money depending on your decisions. The
money earned during the experiment will be added to the show-up fee and paid out in cash at the end
of the experiment.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. If you have any
questions, please raise your arm. One of the experimenters will then come to your seat to answer your
questions. You are not allowed to use your mobile phones or to open any programs on the computer. In
the case of violation of these rules we have to exclude you from the experiment including all payments.
During the experiment we will refer to Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) and not to Euros. Your
income will be calculated in EMU. At the end of the experiment, the total sum of earnings in EMU will
be exchanged into Euros.
The exchange rate is: 1EMU = 10 Eurocents.
In this experiment there are two different types: L and H. Type L and type H differ in their initial
endowment. The total number of both types in the experiment is equal, hence there are as many L as
there are H types.
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned a type. All participants have an equal
chance to be of either type (L or H).
Then all participants are, again randomly, distributed into groups of three. None of the participants
knows the identity of his or her group partners. Thus, all your decisions remain completely anonymous.
The Decision Situation:
We will explain the details of the experiment later. First, we want you to get familiar with the decision
problem.
You are in a group together with two other participants (hence there are three group members in total).
Every group member receives an initial endowment which depends on the type (L or H). Remember: the
type is assigned randomly. Type L and type H have the following initial endowments.
Type L has an initial endowment of 4 EMU.
46All participants; both types; both treatments.
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Type H has an initial endowment of 8 EMU.
All group members have to decide how many EMU of their initial endowment they want to transfer
to a project. All EMU that are not transferred to the project are kept in private (by the respective
participant). In the following we will describe how your total income is calculated.
Income from Private Property:
Every unit (EMU) of the initial endowment that has not been transferred to the project is kept in private
property. For instance, if you are an L type (you have an initial endowment of 4 EMU) and decide to
transfer 3 EMU to the project, 1 EMU will be kept as your private property. If you decide, for example,
to transfer nothing (0 EMU) to the project, your private property will contain 4 EMU.
Income from the Project:
All group members benefit equally from the contributions made toward the project. This means that your
income from the project is equal to that of the two other group members. Only the sum of contributions
determines this income. Your income (and that of the two other group members) is calculated as follows.
Income from the project = Sum of all 3 contributions ∗ 0.6.
Example:
If you contribute 3 EMU to the project and the other group members contribute 1 EMU and 6 EMU,
the sum of contributions is 10 EMU (3 + 1 + 6 = 10). Then, all group members receive 6 EMU (10 ∗ 0.6)
as their income from the project.
Total income:
Your total income is calculated as the sum of the income from private property and the income from the
project:
Your private income (= Your endowment - Your contribution to the project)
+ Your income from the project (= 0.6 ∗ Sum of all contributions)
= Your total income.
The following control questions will help you to better understand the calculation of your total income.
Control Questions:
Please answer the following questions. They will help you to better understand the calculation of your
income. Please fill in the solutions of all questions and raise your arm as soon as you have finished this
task. Then, one of the experimenters will come to your seat in order to check your answers.
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1. Assume that all three group members have an initial endowment of 4 EMU. Assume further that
neither you nor any of the other group members has contributed anything to the project.
a) What will your total income be?____________
b) What will the total income of each of the other two group members be? ____________
2. Assume that all three group members have an initial endowment of 8 EMU. Assume further that you
have contributed 8 EMU and the two other group members have also contributed 8 EMU.
a) What will your total income be? ____________
b) What will the total income of each of the other two group members be? ____________
3. Assume that you have an initial endowment of 4 EMU. The two other group members have an initial
endowment of 8 EMU. The two other group members contribute 5 EMU each.
a) What will your total income be if you contribute nothing (0 EMU)? ____________
b) What will your total income be if you contribute 2 EMU?____________
c) What will your total income be if you contribute 4 EMU?____________
4. Assume that all group members have an initial endowment of 4 EMU. Assume further that you
contribute 2 EMU.
a) What will your total income be if the two other group members contribute the sum of 6
EMU?____________
b) What will your total income be if the two other group members contribute the sum of 8
EMU?____________
c) What will your total income be if the two other group members contribute the sum of 2
EMU?____________
After you have answered all four control questions or in case you have any other questions, please raise
your arm. Then, one of the experimenters will check your answers of the control questions and will
answer further questions.
Instructions Part 147
The Experiment
The experiment includes the decision situations that you have just become acquainted with. At the end
of the experiment you will receive a payment according to your decisions.
The experiment consists of two parts. These two parts are completely independent from each other.
Your decisions in the first part of the experiment have no influence on the process or the income of the
second part of the experiment, and vice versa. During the experiment you have to confirm your decisions
47P-Experiment; H type; both treatments.
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by pressing the “OK" button. Please note that decisions that have been confirmed are final and cannot
be reversed.
You have been randomly assigned the type H. This means you are type H for the entire duration
of the experiment and you can decide over the initial endowment of 8 EMU.
The procedure of the experiment is the following:
1. Please read the instructions for the first part of the experiment carefully and put them on your desk
in front of you (up-side down) when you have finished reading.
2. Next, you will exercise Part 1 of the experiment on the computer.
3. As soon as all participants have completed Part 1, you will receive the instructions for Part 2 of the
experiment. Again, you should read them carefully and put them up-side down on your desk when you
have understood the set-up and in case you have no further questions.
4. Then, you will complete Part 2 of the experiment on the computer.
5. As soon as all participants have finished Part 2, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire on the
computer. Your answers to this questionnaire have no influence on your income.
6. At the end of the experiment you will get information about your income of both parts of the
experiment.
In the following we describe the first part of the experiment in detail.
Instructions for Part 1
Since you do not know the types (L or H) of the other two members of your group, you may find yourself
in one of three possible situations. The two other group members may be both of type L, they may both
be of type H or one group member may be a L type and the other may be an H type.
The first part of the experiment consists of two stages:
Stage 1: unconditional decisions
Stage 2: conditional decisions
1. Unconditional Decisions:
Here you decide about your contribution to the project independently from the decisions of the other
group members. In this table you have to state your contribution to the project for all three possible group
structures in which you may find yourself (see above). Since all participants of the experiment decide
simultaneously, neither you nor the two other participants in your group know the level of contributions
of the other group members.
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2. Conditional Decisions:
Here you decide about your contribution, conditional on the decisions of your group members. To do
this you have to fill in the following three tables. For each of the three possible group structures you get
one table. The rows in the tables tell you what the contributions of your group members are. You have
to state in each row and column how much you want to contribute given the contributions of the other
group members. This means you know how much the other group members have contributed before you
decide about your own contributions in the different situations.
In the following example you see the table for the case where both other group members are of type L:
Two Examples:
1. In the first situation (upper left side of the screenshot) the two other group members (in this table
both are of type L) have decided to contribute 0 EMU. Hence you have to decide how many EMU you
want to contribute to the project (between 0 and 8, since you are of type H) and enter the amount into
the respective cell.
2. In the second situation (lower right side) one of the group members has contributed 3 EMU, and the
other has contributed 4 EMU. Again, you have to decide about your own contribution and enter the
number into the respective cell.
These decisions have to be made for all presented situations.
Note that every single situation may be relevant for your income.
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After all the participants have made all the decisions, conditional and unconditional, they will be allo-
cated randomly into groups of three. As mentioned above, you may be matched with two group members
of type L, both group members of type H, or one group member of type L and the other one of type H.
Then, one member of the group is chosen randomly. For this participant, the three tables of the con-
ditional contribution decisions are relevant (which of these three tables is relevant, depends on the
randomly determined group structure). Which particular situation (entry) of the respective table is in
fact relevant, depends now on the unconditional contributions of the other two group members for the
randomly determined group structure.
So, the income of all three group members depends on the conditional contribution of the randomly
chosen participant and on the unconditional contributions of the other two group members.
At the time when you make your decisions, you will not know, whether you will be one of the participants
for whom the unconditional contribution is relevant or one for whom the conditional contributions are
relevant. Therefore you should think carefully about every single decision (in both stages), since every
one of them may determine your income (of this part of the experiment).
For an illustration consider the following example:
Assume you are randomly allocated to a group in which the other group members are of type L. Assume
further that you are randomly chosen to be the participant for whom the conditional contribution is
relevant. Consequently, the unconditional contribution is relevant for the other two group members.
Assume that the unconditional contributions of the other two group members (both type L) are 2 EMU
and 3 EMU for the relevant situation (for both, the situation is relevant in which one group member is
of type L and the other is of type H). For yourself, the table for the group structure with two type L
participants is relevant. Your income is now determined by the decision on your contribution in case one
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group member has contributed 2 EMU and the other has contributed 3 EMU. Assume you have chosen
to contribute 5 EMU in this situation.
In this case, the sum of contributions is 2+3+5 = 10 EMU. Hence, all group members receive 0.6∗10 = 6
EMU from the project. In total you receive 3 EMU from your private property (8− 5 = 3 EMU) and 6
EMU from the project leading to the sum of 9 EMU.
The group member (type L) who has contributed 2 EMU receives 2 EMU from his/her private property
(4− 2 = 2 EMU) and 6 EMU from the project and hence has a total income of 8 EMU.
The other group member (type L), who has contributed 3 EMU, receives 1 EMU from his/her private
property (4− 3 = 1 EMU) and 6 EMU from the project, making it a total income of 7 EMU.
If you have any further questions, please raise your arm. An experimenter will then come to your seat
in order to answer the questions. If you have no further questions, please put the instructions up-side
down on your desk.
Instructions for Part 248
In the second part of the experiment, the now familiar decision situation is repeated 10 times (structured
in 10 periods).
You are still type H and have an initial endowment of 8 EMU (you will receive these 8 EMU in each
period).
You are still together with the two other group members from the first part of the experiment. You still
do not know the types of the other group members. You will stay together with these two participants
over all 10 periods.
The decision situation remains unchanged. You decide in each period about the allocation of your initial
endowment of 8 EMU. The calculation of your income remains also unchanged and is repeated in the
following:
Private income (= 8 - contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (= 0.6 ∗ Sum of all contributions)
= Total income.
At the beginning of each period, we will ask you to indicate your expectations about the initial endow-
ments of the other two group members. So, you are required to make a guess about the type of the other
participants in your group. There are three possible compositions of your group: you are together with
two participants of type L, with two participants of type H, or with one participant of type H and one
of type L. Please allocate probabilities (in percentage points) to each of these group structures.
For example, if you are 100% sure that you are in a group in which both other group members are of
type L, you will fill in 100 in the first row and 0 in each of the other two rows.
48C-Experiment; H type; uncertainty treatment
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If you think the chances are 50% to be in a group in which both other group members are of type L,
25% to be in a group in which one group member is of type L and the other is of type H, and 25% to be
in a group with two participants of type H, you will fill in 50 in the first, 25 in the second and 25 in the
third row.
Note that the probabilities of your expectations (the numbers you fill in) have to add up to 100.
If you believe that the probability to be in each of the three group structures is equal, please fill in 34,
33, and 33 in the three rows.
Moreover, you are asked how many EMU you think the other two group members will contribute in the
respective period. So, you have to guess how many EMU each of your group members will contribute.
You will be paid for the accuracy of this guess in the following way:
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• If your expectation is completely correct, you will receive 2 EMU (for each group member).
• If your expectation deviates by not more than 1 EMU from the real value, you will receive 1 EMU
(for each group member).
• If your expectation deviates by 2 EMU or more, you will receive nothing.
In a last step you have to decide how many EMU of your initial endowment of 8 EMU (which you
receive at the beginning of each of the 10 periods) you actually want to contribute to the project in the
respective period.
As soon as all group members have stated their decisions, you will be shown a table that states how many
EMU all other group members have contributed and how many EMU you have earned in the respective
period (excluding the income from correct expectations about the group structure). Then, a new period
starts.
All group members get the same information about the contributions of the other group members.
None of the group members receives information about the type (L or H) of any of the other group
members.
The income of all periods is summed up. After the 10th period you receive the payment in private and
separately from other participants.
The final income then consists of the following:
1. Show-up fee of 4 Euros.
2. The income from the first part of the experiment.
3. The sum of incomes from the 10 periods of the second part of the experiment, including the payments
for correct expectations.
If you have any questions, please raise your arm. An experimenter will come to your seat in order to
answer your questions. If you do not have any further questions, please put the instructions up-side
down on your desk, so that we can start with the second part of the experiment on the computer.
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